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The aim of the dissertation is to show that, with few exceptions, citizens have a 
defeasible moral obligation to participate in politics. Moreover, the arguments presented 
in support of the thesis have an implication on how exactly one should participate: 
participation can take many different forms, but they all need to constitute democratic 
deliberation of one’s polity—the policy-making process guided by the exchange of reasons 
among citizens. In Chapter One, I clarify the thesis and frame the issue in terms of a 
challenge raised by a classical liberal consideration against the obligation to participate in 
politics. In Chapter Two, I argue that one should not defend the obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation by thinking of democracy as a sort of shared value in democratic 
society. In Chapters Three and Four, I present two independent arguments for the thesis 
that citizens have a defeasible moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In February 2015, Mother Jones released an investigative report by Brian Joseph about 
the widespread abuse and neglect of children in the privatized foster care system in the 
United States. The report documents the circumstances around the tragic death of 
Alexandria Hill, a toddler from Rockdale, Texas, as well as other children who died from 
the abuse or neglect of their foster parents. According to the report, many private foster 
care agencies routinely place children into unsafe foster homes to maximize profit. Private 
foster care agencies are compensated by the amount of placement they make and there is 
a shortage in foster parents. Therefore, these agencies have a great incentive to recruit 
foster parents from low-income households and ignore warning signs of an unsafe home. 
In the case of Alexandria Hill, her foster parent, Sherrill Small, is herself a victim of child 
abuse and has a history of abusing her own biological children. Small’s agency could have 
easily found out she did not raise one of her children and why that was the case. 
Foster care reform is a complicated issue and one can expect radically different and 
opposing opinions on how it should proceed. For example, one may follow Dr. Roland 
Zullo, a social scientist at the University of Michigan, to blame the aggressive 
privatization of social welfare programs;1 whereas a libertarian may believe that the 
culprit is cronyism and government bureaucracy, and that privatization is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) remedy to the situation.2  
However, what interests me the most is the only reactions I solicited after I posted the 
Mother Jones article on Facebook. One friend commented, “Very sad... can’t even finish 
reading it...” (presumably she did not get to the part that discusses the socio-political 
problems of privatized foster care) while another friend only left a sad emoticon. This sort 
                                                
1 Excerpt from Joseph’s report: “Roland Zullo, a researcher at the University of Michigan who has studied 
foster care privatization, believes tragedies like these may be linked to the financial incentives of the 
industry, which he says are not aligned with child welfare. ‘This is just the kind of service where the market 
approach doesn’t work,’ he says.” According to a report in 2013 by Garrett Therolf of the Los Angeles Times, 
“children in private homes [in Los Angeles County] were about a third more likely to be victims of abuse.” 
2 For example, Andrea Ball and Eric Dexheimer of Austin Statesman discover that Texas’s child protection 
system fails to disclose hundreds of abuse-related child deaths. One may argue that it is the failure of 
government bureaucracy, not privatization, that leads to systematic abuse. 
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of reaction to socio-political problems raises the following question: do citizens have any 
moral obligation to educate themselves on the socio-political problems in their society, 
reflect on them and contribute to the solutions of the problems if there is indeed 
something that they can do? On the one hand, it seems that the lack of moral outrage 
towards these socio-political problems or the subsequent willful ignorance signifies a sense 
of moral failure.3 On the other hand, a liberal society embraces value pluralism; in such a 
society, it is up to the individual citizen to decide what problems are worthy of her time, 
attention, emotional energy and other resources that are at her disposal. It is not 
immediately clear as to what grounds a liberal has to claim that citizens ought to give 
these socio-political problems any priority in their thoughts or actions.4 
The questions I wish to address in this dissertation project are the following: are 
citizens living in a liberal democracy morally obligated to participate in politics and, if 
they are, what exactly are they obligated to do? My aim is to show that, with few 
exceptions, citizens are morally obligated to participate in politics. Moreover, the 
arguments I provide to support the obligation to participate have an implication for how 
exactly one should participate: participation can take many different forms, but they all 
need to constitute democratic deliberation of one’s polity. 
1.1 DEFINING THE THESIS 
Politics is the process through which a polity determines its laws and policies. A 
citizen can participate in this process formally (e.g., voting, running for public offices) or 
informally (e.g., lobbying, public debate). Roughly speaking, the process is democratic if 
every citizen can formally participate to a more or less equal extent.5 
                                                
3 Whether this is a moral failure on the individual level or societal level is an issue to be addressed in this 
dissertation (e.g., if the individual refuses to engage because she is overwhelmed by helplessness in the face of 
these socio-political problems, one may argue that this is a problem of society as a whole). 
4 A similar question can arise in a different scenario. Imagine that instead of indifference, my friend reacts 
to the Mother Jones story with anger and jumps to the conclusion that “This is what happen when you let the 
Democrats run the country! They let criminals run free!” without engaging in any serious deliberation on 
the issue. One may ask whether this reaction signifies a similar sense of moral failure. 
5 Robert Dahl’s necessary conditions for polyarchy can be used as a more sophisticated definition of 
democracy: 
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Democratic deliberation consists of a host of activities through which members of a 
polity collectively deliberate on political issues. The outcomes of the deliberation determine 
the laws and policies of the polity. When multiple individuals collectively deliberate, each 
of them should be deliberative—each should, for example, weigh and consider certain 
courses of action by herself or others that would have some bearing on what the collective 
constituted by them would end up doing. However, it is possible to have a division of 
labor in collective deliberation. For example, suppose three individuals collectively 
deliberate on how to create a mobile app. One of them is an artist and she is particularly 
good at visual design. So after some thoughtful consideration, the other two delegate all 
the design-related tasks to her. In this case, the artist deliberates on the design-related 
problems and the other two deliberate on whether to defer to the artist on design-related 
problems. This is collective deliberation with a division of labor.6 Democratic deliberation 
can have a division of labor as well. While democratic deliberation can happen in the 
form of direct participation of all, it can also happen in the form of representative politics, 
as long as the delegation of power to the policymakers is deliberative in nature. 
Furthermore, in either case, everyone would need to defer some factual judgments to 
experts in the relevant domains of knowledge, because no one can gather the expert 
knowledge required to make political decisions all by herself. 
                                                                                                                                            
1. Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials. 
2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections in 
which coercion is quite limited. 
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections. 
4. Most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which candidates run in these 
elections. 
5. Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political 
expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing 
political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology. 
6. They also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the 
government or any other single group. 
7. Finally, they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, 
including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to 
influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means. (Dahl 233) 
6 Here is an example that is not collective deliberation. If Amy just buys Billy coffee to help him stay awake, 
so that he can plan their next trip to Paris entirely by himself, Amy and Billy are not deliberating 
collectively, even though there would be some deliberation going on in both Amy and Billy. 
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Democratic deliberation as a method of generating political outcomes is different 
from other methods in the following ways: 
1. It is the reasoning among people, not the bargaining between competing 
interests or the aggregation of private preference, that guides political 
procedure. 
2. The giving, weighing, acceptance, or rejection of reason is a public act, 
as opposed to the purely private act of voting.7 
Roughly speaking, an act of political engagement is public instead of private if the acting 
agent can, in principle, justify the act to someone else. Voting, conceived as a right (as 
opposed to a duty) and a means to express a voter’s preferences on political matter, is 
often a private act because the voter need not justify her vote to others.8 Her vote can be 
informed by her considerations on the public goods, but it can also be informed by 
anything else (e.g., she wants a good-looking governor) or nothing at all (e.g., she just votes 
for the sake of going through the motion, which gives her a sense of identity as an 
American). The distinction between a public act and a private act is not a matter of 
whether the act is visible to others or whether the actor actually articulates the 
justification of the act. That means considering a political issue silently can be a public 
act. 
                                                
7 Adopted from John Parkinson (3), with some modification. The term “democratic deliberation” means 
many different things to different deliberative democrats (and their opponents). For example, while Robert 
Goodin (“Democractic Deliberation Within”) thinks that democratic deliberation can also happen in the 
form of imagined exchange of reasons in one person’s head, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
(Debating Deliberative Democracy), as well as Ian Shapiro insist that only actual exchange of reasons between 
different individuals can be genuine democratic deliberation. I will discuss the different implementations of 
democratic deliberation in Appendix A. 
8 This is a point of contention in the debate about secret ballot in the 19th Century England. John Stuart 
Mill famously argues against secret ballot on the following ground: 
In any political election… the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest 
of the public, not his private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his judgment, exactly as 
he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended upon him alone. 
This being admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence that the duty of voting, like any 
other public duty, should be performed under the eye and criticism of the public… 
However, some have rejected Mill’s assumption that voting, or weighing in on the interest of the public, is a 
duty rather than a right. Joseph Park describes the debate in detail. 
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The difference between the bargaining of private interests and collective deliberation 
is that, when one bargains with someone else, one only needs to provide enough incentive 
to entice the other party to strike a deal. The incentive can be moral or non-moral in 
nature. One need not justify one’s preference to the other party, where justification is 
necessarily moral in nature. For example, suppose Amy and Billy are traveling together; 
Amy wants to visit the zoo and Billy wants to visit the museum. They decide to spend half 
of their time in the zoo and half of their time in the museum. If Amy and Billy reach this 
decision by collective deliberation, Amy would need to show Billy why going to the zoo is 
a good idea for Billy as well, why Billy ought to go to the zoo, or anything that can be 
regarded as considerations that favor going to the zoo together from Billy’s standpoint. If 
Amy and Billy reach this decision by bargaining, then Amy would only need to provide 
Billy enough incentive to agree to visiting the zoo (e.g., “if you spend half a day in the zoo 
with me, I will spend half a day in the museum with you; if not, let’s just don’t go 
anywhere!”). 
To participate in democratic deliberation is to participate in activities that amount to 
giving, weighing, accepting or rejecting reasons for or against a certain law or policy. For 
example, explaining to other people the criteria one should appeal to in evaluating the 
arguments for and against gay marriage would amount to participating in the weighing of 
reasons for and against the legal ban on gay marriage. 
This definition of participation has three important implications. First, voting, the 
hallmark of political participation, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the participation 
in democratic deliberation. It is not sufficient because a vote that is not backed up by 
deliberation does not count as participating in democratic deliberation. It is not necessary 
because a citizen could participate in democratic deliberation in other ways. In particular, 
one should not regard voting as a minimum requirement of participation for every 
citizen. If a citizen has to choose between waiting at the voting booth for two hours and 
using the same amount of time to convince a hundred people to vote for the candidate 
she supports, why must she choose the former? The institution of voting may still be 
indispensible in a democracy (e.g., as a way to end deliberation on a particular issue and 
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generate an actionable decision), but a citizen need not participate in democratic 
deliberation through voting. 
Second, it is not necessary for a participant to take a stance at any point during the 
deliberation because she need not give, accept or reject any reason for or against a 
particular stance; she can participate by weighing the pros and cons. For example, one 
may withhold judgment on whether gay marriage should be banned and still be 
considered as participating in democratic deliberation, as long as one does something that 
amounts to weighing reasons publicly (and perhaps silently). 
Third, the reasons given, weighed, accepted or rejected have to be reasons for or 
against some political outcome. For example, giving an argument against eating junk food 
constitutes the participation of democratic deliberation only if the argument has some 
potential legal or political ramification. 
“Democratic deliberation” is closely related to “deliberative democracy” and some 
clarification about the terminology is needed. Deliberative democracy is a form of 
government that uses democratic deliberation, a method or a kind of activity in which 
people can participate, to determine laws and policies.9 The focus of this project is on 
democratic deliberation because my aim is to investigate the ethics of political 
participation, although the topic of this dissertation clearly has important implication on 
deliberative democracy as well. My arguments for the obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation do not appeal to the merits of deliberative democracy or 
particular versions of it, but they show why individual citizens have reason to support at 
                                                
9 Deliberative democrats regard democratic deliberation and deliberative democracy to be conceptually 
distinct. For example, Gutmann and Thompson say, 
The theory of deliberative democracy does not always in all circumstances demand the practice 
of deliberation. The best means of promoting deliberative democracy in the future may 
sometimes require refraining from deliberation in the present, for example, to ensure a timely 
and necessary life-saving response to a crisis. (Why Deliberative Democracy? 43) 
It is also conceptually possible that democratic deliberation can happen in a relatively undemocratic 
regime. Imagine an undemocratic regime that has freedom of speech and assembly (e.g., British Hong Kong 
in the 90’s). Public debate on a certain issue may lead to protests and lobbying that can successfully pressure 
the government to change its law or policy. 
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least some form of deliberative democracy. Which form they should support depends on 
empirical facts about social and individual psychology, technological advancement, etc.10 
Citizens may participate in democratic deliberation in many different ways, and how 
exactly a citizen should participate depends on individual circumstances. My arguments 
for the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation will elucidate how one may 
decide what a particular citizen needs to do in order to fulfill the obligation to participate 
democratic deliberation. 
The moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation is a defeasible one, 
meaning it can be defeated or outweighed by other moral obligations. For example, a 
single parent that needs to work two full-time jobs to feed her child may end up not 
having any time or mental resources to educate herself on current political matter. In that 
case, her obligation to feed her child may outweigh her obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation.11 It is also possible that one can be excused for not fulfilling an 
undefeated obligation to participate in democratic deliberation (by which I mean one is 
not blameworthy for not fulfilling the undefeated obligation). For example, someone who 
has fallen into deep coma or someone who cannot think clearly after suffering a massive 
brain injury can be excused. In fact, in the latter case, it can be argued that an obligation 
not to participate arises because one cannot participate in democratic deliberation 
properly.12 
The moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation or politic in general is 
to be distinguished from political obligation, the obligation to obey the law in general. 
There is no political obligation to participate in democratic deliberation unless there is a 
law that requires one to do so (and as a matter of fact there is no such law in the world). 
Moreover, the moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation does not depend 
on the legitimacy of the democratic government. It follows from my arguments that a 
                                                
10 An overview of the debate concerning the merits of deliberative democracy is provided in Appendix A. 
11 But in Chapter 4, I will also argue that one’s obligation to care for one’s child can give rise to an 
obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. 
12 Jason Brennan has a similar argument (68–92), in which he focuses on (wrongful) voting instead of 
democratic deliberation. 
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citizen is morally obligated to participate in democratic deliberation regardless of whether 
the government is legitimate or not. That is, even a philosophical anarchist can accept my 
arguments.13 
1.2 DEFINING THE CHALLENGE 
From the liberal perspective, those who believe in the obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation have the burden of proof to show that there is such an obligation. 
All liberals would agree that participation in democratic deliberation, as defined above, is 
a political right. However, many of them think that a citizen has no obligation of any sort 
to participate in politics.14 
Consider voting as an example. Voting, the simplest form of political participation, is 
often included in the list of civic duties along with items such as obeying the laws, serving 
on a jury, paying taxes, providing public services (e.g., military, rescue…) in times of need, 
etc. The idea that a citizen is obligated to participate in the civic life in some way seems 
intuitive to many people, and voting is often the easiest way to participate. However, the 
claim that a citizen is obligated to devote her time and resources to do certain things 
                                                
13 A philosophical anarchist is a person who believes that political power is never morally justified, although 
one may have other (moral or non-moral) reason not to overturn the government. An example of such a 
person is Robert Paul Wolff. 
14 I use both “duty” and “obligation” to describe my view. While “duty” and “obligation” are almost 
synonymous in their ordinary and legal usage (look up “duty,” “obligation” and “bond” in Oxford Dictionary 
of Law), some philosophers draw a distinction between them. For example, H.L.A. Hart thinks that 
obligations “may be voluntarily incurred or created” and “they are owed to special persons (who have 
rights)” (179 n. 7); by contrast, duties arise from roles or positions. John Rawls, partly following Hart, thinks 
that obligations are moral requirements that “arise as a result of our voluntary acts” and their content “is 
always defined by an institution or practice the rules of which specify what it is that one is required to do” 
(A Theory of Justice 113); whereas duties are “tasks and responsibilities assigned to certain institutional 
positions” (ibid.). Thomas Pogge uses the pair of terms to mark another distinction: “Duties are general; 
obligations are specific. For example, someone may have a general duty to keep her promise and a 
derivative obligation to return a book to her colleague” (5). Philosophers in the special obligation debate 
would draw another distinction, namely, the distinction between “special obligations” and “natural duties,” 
where the latter means “moral requirements which apply to all men irrespective of status or acts 
performed… owed by all persons to all others” (Simmons 13). 
I will use “obligation” and “duty” interchangeably because for the purpose of my project, it is unclear what 
the payoff of marking a sharp distinction between these terms would be. Instead, I will introduce new 
terminology when I need to mark a distinction about obligation or duty (e.g., the distinction between 
“obligation” and “quasi-obligation” in Chapter 2). 
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regardless of her own life goal seems to be in tension with the ideal of liberalism. The 
appearance of tension calls for further justification. 
There are two popular candidates of such justification. First, one may say that good 
governance is a public good that every citizen can enjoy and so every citizen should help 
bringing about good governance through political participation. Second, one may also 
appeal to the idea of civic virtue: a good citizen should participate in politics at least in 
some way. Failing to do so makes one a bad citizen, and presumably it is bad or even 
immoral to be a bad citizen—it sounds like, say, being a bad parent or a bad worker in a 
company. Of course, one can combine the first and second candidates: failing to 
contribute to the public good makes one a bad citizen. 
However, Jason Brennan, who attacks the issue from a classical liberal perspective, 
finds neither of these candidates successful. He argues that there is no reason to think 
engaging in politics (or more specifically, voting) is an obligation in a peaceful, decently 
functioning democracy.15 His overall argument has two main components: a conception 
of civic virtue and an account about what constitutes (or, to be precise, what does not 
constitute) free-riding on a public good. 
Different theorists may have different conceptions of civic virtue.16 According to one 
conception a good citizen should put the interests of the public before one’s private 
interests; according to another conception a good citizen should participate in public 
services (e.g., serving in the military or holding public offices); so on and so forth. 
However, Brennan thinks that what is central to the concept of civic virtue is that “civic 
virtue makes one a good member of a community” (45), and he rejects any particular 
conception of civic virtue that requires one to engage in politics. According to Brennan, 
one can be a good member of a community by contributing to the common goods of that 
                                                
15  For example, any western developed democratic states would be such a democracy. Brennan 
acknowledges that citizens may be required to get involved in politics under some extreme circumstances 
(say, a referendum about whether to reinstate slavery and the pro-slavery side has a decent chance to win), 
but those occasions are rare. 
16 Brennan is appealing to the Rawlsian distinction between concept and conception here. While people 
may share the same concept of justice (e.g., justice entails fairness), they may have different conception of 
justice (i.e. different normative theories disagree on what constitutes fairness). 
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community,17 and one can do so without doing anything political in nature. He calls this 
“the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue” (49). 
Brennan’s argument for the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue goes as follows. 
Suppose civic virtue requires one to contribute to the common goods of society. A society 
has many different common goods; just to name a few: clean water, the welfare of the 
future generation, the health of the general public, good governance, the advancement in 
science, the creation of fine arts, etc. There are a variety of common goods and the pursuit 
of each of these common goods requires a sophisticated division of labor. No one can 
contribute to all of them. In order to be a good member of society, one only need to do 
something that would contribute to some common goods—they do not even need to 
contribute to the common goods intentionally. A physician can contribute to the common 
goods by curing her patients. A parent can contribute to the common goods by raising 
her children well. Richard Feynman contributed to the common goods through his works 
in quantum mechanics. Michelangelo contributed (perhaps unwittingly) to the common 
goods by painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. One should not think that a lawyer 
is not a good member of society simply because she does not contribute to, say, the health 
of the general public. She can contribute to other common goods. Good governance is 
only one of the many common goods in society. One need not contribute to this 
particular common good in order to be a good member of society. Moreover, one need 
not contribute to good governance by engaging in politics. For example, “Martin Luther 
King Jr. … could not have rallied for political reform if others had not provided food, 
clothing, shelter, transportation, and even much of the basic philosophy underlying his 
movement” (Brennan 55). People who provided King these needs have contributed to 
good governance indirectly. Therefore, civic virtue does not require one to engage in 
politics. 
Now suppose instead that civic virtue requires significant political engagement, in 
ways described by the civic humanists or civic republicans. Brennan thinks there is no 
                                                
17 In Brennan’s terminology, “common goods” refer to both rivalrous and non-rivalrous (i.e. public goods) 
non-excludable goods. 
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ground to insist that it is the right conception of civic virtue. He stipulates “schlivic virtue” 
to be “the disposition and ability to promote the common good by nonpolitical means” 
(48). Then he says, “[i]f one insists that it is not an open question whether civic virtue 
involves political engagement, this just implies that it is an open question whether good 
citizens should have civic virtue, schlivic virtue, or some combination of both” (49). 
I would like to add that there is a potential argument that Brennan has not 
considered, although at the end of the day I believe it is incorrect. One might think that 
civic virtue requires one to be a good member of the political community, which would 
require one to do something political in nature. In order to be a good member of, say, the 
medical community, one is required to contribute to some medicine-related good (and 
avoid some medicine-related bad). For example, a nurse is required to take good care of 
her patients. One cannot be a good member of the medical community by doing 
something unrelated to medicine, e.g., feeding homeless people on the street. Similarly, in 
order to be a good member of a political community, one needs to vote, participate in 
public debate, hold public offices, or engage in politics in some way. One cannot be a 
good member of a political community simply by, say, raising one’s child well, even 
though this is a common good of the population that constitute the political community. 
I think this objection to Brennan is incorrect for the following reason. On the one 
hand, if political community is identical to polity, then one is not always obligated to be a 
good member of the political community one is a member of. For example, one is not 
obligated to be a good member of Nazi Germany (in the sense of being a good Nazi). If 
civic virtue always requires one to be a good member of a polity, then whether one should 
have civic virtue becomes an open question. On the other hand, if a political community 
is constituted by members of a polity but not identical to the polity,18 then it is unclear 
how one may distinguish political community from what Brennan calls “community.” 
                                                
18 In this case, political community and polity are not identical in the sense that a lump of clay is not 
identical to the statue being made out of that lump of clay. The lump of clay is not identical to the statue 
because one can destroy the statue without destroying the lump of clay. 
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Then, what Brennan says about civic virtue and its relation to the variety of common 
goods would still stand. 
Now, we can move on to the account of what constitute free-riding on a public good. 
In a productive society there is a sophisticated division of labor. Farmers specialize in 
producing food, doctors specialize in treating patients, teachers specialize in education, 
etc. Although a doctor never produces any food herself, she is not free-riding on the food 
produced by the farmer. Rather, the doctor exchanges her labor for food (indirectly 
through money). Similarly, even if a citizen enjoys good governance without making any 
contribution to it, it does not immediately follow that the citizen is free-riding on the work 
of those who engage in politics and contribute to good governance. As long as the citizen 
contributes to some common goods to some reasonable extent,19 which can be done in 
many different ways, she is not free-riding. 
With the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue in mind, Brennan sets out to debunk 
three common arguments for the duty to vote. The first one is the Agency Argument 
(Brennan 36): 
1. (Given that you’re a citizen,) you should be a good citizen. 
2. In order for you to be a good citizen, it is not enough that other citizens 
obtain adequate levels of welfare and live under a reasonably just social 
order. (Rather, in addition, you need to be an agent who helps to cause 
other citizens to have these adequate levels of welfare, etc.) 
3. In order to do this, you must vote. 
4. Therefore, you must vote. 
Brennan rejects 3. He thinks that one can be “an agent who helps to cause other citizens 
to have these adequate levels of welfare, etc.” without going to the voting booth. One can 
contribute to the common goods of the community though other non-political means. 
                                                
19 I say a citizen should contribute “to some reasonable extent” because one may think that a citizen is still 
free-riding if her contribution is not proportional to the benefit she receives. However, it seems impossible 
to have any theory about what the reasonable extent would be. 
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This line of reasoning can be generalized from voting to other kinds of political activity, 
including participation in democratic deliberation. 
The second argument is the Public Good Argument (Brennan 38): 
1. Good governance is a public good. 
2. No one should free-ride on the provision of such goods. Those who 
benefit from such goods should reciprocate. 
3. Citizens who abstain from voting free-ride on the provision of good 
governance. 
4. Therefore, each citizen should vote. 
Brennan rejects 3. There is a variety of common goods and good governance is just one 
of them. In a sophisticated society, there is a division of labor in the pursuit of common 
goods. Those who abstain from voting do not free-ride on the provision of good 
governance as long as they (i) contribute to other common goods or (ii) contribute to good 
governance indirectly. Again, this objection can be generalized from voting to other kinds 
of political activity. 
The third argument is the Civic Virtue Argument (Brennan 40): 
1. Civic virtue is a moral virtue. 
2. Civic virtue requires voting. 
3. Therefore, citizens who do not vote thereby exhibit a lack of civic virtue 
and are, to that extent, morally vicious. 
Brennan rejects 2, which presupposes something like a civic humanist or republican 
conception of civic virtue. Given the plausibility of the extrapolitical conception of civic 
virtue, one has the burden of proof to show that civic virtue requires voting or any other 
kind of political engagement. 
At this point, we are left with no good argument, from the liberal perspective, for the 
claim that citizens are obligated to engage in politics, especially democratic deliberation. 
Even if democratic deliberation is necessary for safeguarding certain liberal ideals (e.g., 
laws and policies that respect individual liberty), it does not immediately follow that 
everyone in society ought to participate in democratic deliberation. Society only needs 
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enough people to engage in politics, just like society only needs enough people to produce 
food. The amount can be pretty small in both cases. 
1.3 THE RESPONSE 
In response to the challenge presented above, I develop two arguments for the claim 
that citizens in a democratic society have an obligation to participate in politics, or more 
specifically, democratic deliberation. According to the first argument, a citizen is 
obligated to participate in democratic deliberation in order to avoid participating in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity. According to the second argument, a 
citizen is obligated to participate in democratic deliberation in order to fulfill the moral 
obligations associated with her station in life. In addition to the arguments, I will also 
present an account about social group as an acting agent to dispel the thought that a 
theory that appeals to group identity or political culture can do a better job in grounding 
democracy. 
The Harm Avoidance Argument: an Outline 
The first argument rests on two moral claims: that it is morally wrong for anyone to 
unjustifiably harm someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-determination, and 
that everyone has an obligation to avoid participating in collective wrongdoing. To avoid 
participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by one’s polity, one needs to 
determine whether the law or policy one complies with is unjustifiably detrimental to 
someone’s well-being or self-determination, and try to change it if it is. In order to 
determine whether the law or policy is unjustifiably detrimental to someone’s well-being 
or self-determination, one needs to determine whether the law or policy is (borrowed 
from T.M. Scanlon) disallowed by a set of action-guiding principles that no one can 
reasonably reject. That requires one to engage in some form of political discourse and 
take political actions when such actions are called for. 
A polity is a collective agent. It acts when the government enacts and enforces laws 
and when the citizens (including both government officials and private citizens) comply 
with the law. The polity cannot act if, for whatever reason, its citizens do not comply with 
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the laws enacted by the government. When a polity does something wrong, it perpetrates 
a collective wrongdoing. 
A polity can harm someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-determination if 
the government enacts and enforces laws, with the compliance of the citizens, that are 
detrimental to her well-being or self-determination. Sometimes a polity is justified in 
doing so. Harming someone’s well-being or impeding someone’s self-determination is 
wronging someone only if it is unjustifiable to that person, and unjustifiability is a sufficient 
condition of moral wrongness. There is no predetermined list of theories, principles or 
reasons of justification.20 Reasonable rejection may come in many different forms, and it 
involves taking into consideration the points of view of those who would be burdened or 
benefitted by the principles. 
When a polity unjustifiably harms someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-
determination, what does that say about its members? A citizen participates in the 
collective wrongdoing of her polity when she complies with its laws and policies, or 
exercises her legal rights, in ways that help realizing the collective wrongdoing.21 To avoid 
participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by a polity, one needs to determine 
how laws and policies are affecting people’s lives (or how the proposed laws and policies 
may affect their lives). If a law or policy harms some people’s well-being or impede their 
self-determination, one needs to determine whether they can reasonably reject the 
considerations that favor or justify the law or policy. If it turns out that a (proposed) law 
or policy unjustifiably harms them, one should try to change it (or prevent it from coming 
into existence). What means one should take depends on one’s personal circumstances. 
Whatever means one may take, one would be engaging in politics (at least by paying 
attention to current political issues and being aware of how one should act when an 
opportunity comes). 
                                                
20 By contrast, according to, say, utilitarianism, one is justified in performing an action if, and only if, the 
action satisfies the principle of utility. 
21 When a citizen exercises her legal rights, it affects what others need to do in order to fulfill their legal 
obligations, which in turn affects how the polity acts. 
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The Sufficient Freedom Argument: an Outline 
The obligation to participate in democratic deliberation can be derived from the 
other obligations an individual already has. The argument begins with three premises. 
First, one has many obligations in virtue of being a person and standing in various special 
relations with other people. Second, one cannot live without being hindered by 
government policies in some way.22 Third, one’s obligation to do or to refrain from doing 
something requires one to create or sustain the conditions that would enable one to fulfill 
this obligation, to the extent that it is possible to create or sustain the conditions, or that 
doing so does not conflict with other weightier obligations (or reasons in general). If it is 
impossible to create or sustain the conditions, or if doing so would conflict with other 
weightier obligations, then the original obligation is defeated. From these premises it 
follows that one needs to participate in democratic deliberation to make sure that political 
interference does not prevent one from fulfilling one’s undefeated obligations. 
In addition to thinking of freedom as the prerequisite of moral obligation, one should 
also think that one’s moral obligation requires one to maintain one’s capacity and means 
to act as a free moral agent. What does that mean? Consider the following example: if I 
have an obligation to deliver something from point A to point B tomorrow with my car, I 
have the obligation to top up the gas tank if there is not enough gas to travel from A to B 
(assuming this is within my capacity to top up the gas tank). I cannot say, “since ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ and my car cannot travel from A to B in its current state, I do not have the 
obligation to deliver anymore.” 
Everyone is morally obligated to do (or refrain from doing) many things. Some moral 
obligations are universal (e.g., thou shalt not kill). Some moral obligations are particular to 
certain individuals depending on their stations in life. For example, a parent has an 
obligation to care for her child, an obligation her childless peers do not have. These 
obligations can be defeated or outweighed. A parent is obligated to feed her child. But 
                                                
22 The second premise does not assume that government is justified by such necessity. A philosophical 
anarchist may think that a government is never justified, but it is practically impossible to prevent any 
government from existing and it would be unwise to destroy a decently functioning government. 
 17 
when the only way to feed her child is by killing someone else’s child, this obligation is 
outweighed by her obligation not to kill a child. 
As long as one lives in a lawful society, one cannot avoid having limits imposed on 
one by the government. Interference from the government itself may not be morally 
wrong, but it can prevent the interfered individual from fulfilling her moral obligations. 
To make sure the polity does not prevent one from fulfilling one’s obligation, one needs to 
participate in politics. However, one also needs to avoid over-doing it—one need not 
fulfill one’s defeated obligations. In particular, one should not support policies that are in 
conflict with the “winning” obligations. Therefore, one needs to determine whether one’s 
obligation to support or oppose a policy is defeated or not by engaging in democratic 
deliberation. 
This argument, if successful, shows that democratic deliberation is a practical 
necessity of political freedom (understood as a kind of negative freedom). This contradicts 
Isaiah Berlin’s view that there is no relation between political freedom and democracy. I 
also believe that, contrary to Philip Pettit, there is no need to conceive of freedom as non-
domination in order to establish any relation between freedom and democracy. Finally, 
contrary to Rawls, I think the obligation to support a democratic political institution 
should be derived from the other obligations an individual already has, which fall under 
Rawls would call “existing comprehensive doctrines.” I will discuss these issues in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
Group Identity or Political Culture as a Source of Obligation? 
This section could be titled “how not to defend democracy.” One may be tempted to 
defend the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation by thinking of democracy 
as a sort of shared value in democratic society. According to this thought, the political 
culture historically developed in a political community would ground various obligations 
its members have regarding how they should engage with politics, including the 
obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. There are two ways to understand 
this claim. According to the Aristotelian way, the obligation to participate in democratic 
 18 
deliberation constitutes one’s conception of what constitutes a good life.23 According to 
the Rawlsian way, the shared political value (from which one may derive an obligation to 
participate in politics) is not itself a conception of a good life.24 Either way, the shared 
value marks the boundary of the political community and constitutes some sort of cultural 
or ideological identity of its members, and it is in virtue of being a member of the 
community that one has an obligation to participate in democratic deliberation, whatever 
“in virtue of” means. Democracy is understood as the self-determination of the political 
community as a whole.25 
I believe that if this sort of account has any intuitive appeal, the appeal stems from 
certain confusion about the nature of a polity as an acting agent. To resolve this 
confusion, I develop an account of a composite agent in order to characterize the relation 
between a polity and its citizens (and between actions of a polity and actions of its citizens) 
in Chapter 2. A composite agent is an acting subject constituted by multiple acting 
subjects. Paradigmatic examples include corporations, nonprofits, academic departments 
in universities, youth soccer teams, two people going for a walk together, three people 
moving a stone together… and of course, polities. However, there are two kinds of 
composite agent; each has a different criterion of individuation. Polities are of the same 
kind as corporations, nonprofits, academic departments, soccer teams, etc. while two 
people going for a walk together, three people moving a stone together, etc. are of the 
other kind. Being a member of the latter kind of composite agent may have an 
implication on individual moral obligations, but being a member of the former kind does 
                                                
23 As Aristotle famously states in Politics I.2, “man is by nature a political animal… he who by nature… is 
without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity…” (1253a) 
24 Rawls thinks that at first, some people in the community would engage in social cooperation in fair terms 
out of self-interest. But over time the social cooperation in fair terms would develop into a freestanding 
shared value that every member of the community would identify with. It is not a conception of the good 
because its application is limited in the political sphere (Political Liberalism 158–168). 
25 For example, Sungmoon Kim seems to be providing the Rawlsian version of such an account. Kim 
argues that in a Confucian democracy (e.g., Korea), “public reason is largely grounded in Confucian social 
habits and moral sensibility” (120), and citizens are “obligated to maintain and reproduce the constitutional 
integrity, which is at once cultural and political, of their political regime… This obligation is… a moral 
obligation in nature because it is deeply concerned with the democratic ideal of collective self-
determination” (121). 
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not. However, because different kinds of composite agent are often instantiated by the 
same set of individuals, people misattribute the implication to the wrong kind of 
composite agent.  
 20 
CHAPTER 2: POLITY OR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AS AN AGENT 
In this chapter, I will explore the plausibility of the idea that a citizen has a defeasible 
moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation in virtue of being a member of 
a democratic society. According to this idea, the political culture (democratic or not) that 
historically developed in a political community grounds various obligations regarding 
how its members should engage with politics. By being a member of a democratic society, 
one acquires the obligation to participate in the society’s deliberation and to act on the 
decisions collectively made, that is, the obligation to participate in politics and the 
obligation to obey the law in general.26 One can acquire such obligations even if one’s 
membership is not (entirely) voluntary. My aim is to undermine an intuition that favors 
this idea. 
There are two ways to understand the claim that the political culture historically 
developed in a political community grounds various obligations regarding how its 
members should engage with politics (and my objection against the claim applies to both). 
According to the Aristotelian way, the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation 
constitutes one’s conception of what constitutes a good life.27 According to the Rawlsian 
way, the shared political value (from which one may derive an obligation to participate in 
politics) is not itself a conception of a good life.28 Either way, the shared values and norms 
mark the boundary of the political community and constitute some sort of cultural or 
ideological identity of its members, and it is in virtue of being a member of the 
community that one has an obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. 
Democracy is understood as the self-determination of the political community as a whole. 
According to some (e.g., Isaiah Berlin), this understanding of democracy is anti-liberal.29 
There are at least two ways to understand what the “in virtue of” relation amounts 
to. One way is that the communal obligation is partially constitutive of one’s identity that 
                                                
26 For example, Sungmoon Kim seems to be providing such an account. See footnote 25. 
27 See footnote 23. 
28 See footnote 24. 
29 Cf. Chapter 4, Section 2. 
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it is impossible for one not to regard oneself as not so obligated.30 The other way to 
understand “in virtue of” is that the obligation somehow arises from the demand of the 
composite agent (in our case the political community), of which one is a member. The 
discussion below is concerned with the latter. 
A composite agent is an acting subject constituted by multiple acting subjects. When 
we think of a polity or a political community as something that can act, we are regarding 
it as an agent of this sort. Several philosophers have appealed to metaphysical accounts of 
a composite agent to explain the individual obligations one owes to the social groups one 
belongs to, including political obligation.31 Conceivably, this approach can be applied to 
explain the (non-political) obligation to participate in politics. However, I think the appeal 
of this approach stems from certain confusion about the concept of a composite agent: 
There are two kinds of composite agent and people conflate the two. 
2.1 TWO KINDS OF COMPOSITE AGENT 
The concept of a composite agent is disjunctive. There are two kinds of composite 
agent, and each has a different criterion of individuation. The criteria that I am 
proposing are non-reductive, but I will argue that a set of individual agents can satisfy one 
of them without satisfying the other at the same time. Moreover, being a member of one 
kind of composite agent may have some normative implication on individual obligation 
while being a member of the other kind does not. Conflating different kinds of composite 
agent can lead one to misattribute the implication to the wrong kind. 
The term “composite agent” is adopted from Peter French.32 What distinguishes a 
composite agent from an individual agent is that more than one of its proper parts, or 
members, are themselves agents. Paradigmatic examples include corporations, nonprofits, 
                                                
30 Michael Sandel is a representative of such a view. Daniel Bell has an overview of this view and its rebuttal 
(sec. 2). 
31 E.g., Margaret Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation and John Searle, Making the Social World. Searle’s view 
on the matter is complicated; see Appendix B. 
32 Other philosophers have used “collectives” (Tracy Isaacs), “group agents” (Christian List and Philip 
Pettit), “collective intentionality” (John Searle), “group persons” (Carol Rovane), “social groups” (Margaret 
Gilbert), etc. to refer to similar entities. For the sake of uniformity, I will use “composite agent” when I 
discuss different authors’ views. 
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academic departments in universities, youth soccer teams, two people going for a walk 
together, three people moving a stone together, etc. Some cases are disputed. While 
Christian List and Philip Pettit include the medical profession, generation X and the 
financial market in their list of composite agents, neither Tracy Isaacs nor Margaret 
Gilbert would consider these entities as composite agents.33 I will stay with cases that are 
less controversial. 
Philosophers who believe that there are composite agents typically think that there 
can be one account for all of them.34 They seem to assume that there is a common feature 
shared by all composite agents that explains what makes them composite agents. List and 
Pettit believe that their theory of group agency accounts for (alleged) composite agents 
that are as different as Greenpeace and generation X. Gilbert believes that her theory 
about two people going for a walk together can be generalized to account for actions of a 
state (A Theory of Political Obligation 97). Searle believes that his theory of collective 
intentionality can account for institutional facts of any sort of social institution. 
Christopher Kutz thinks that his theory of participatory intentions can account for the 
common core shared by all composite agents. Sometimes a philosopher may acknowledge 
that her theory does not cover group entities that sound like an agent in our ordinary 
conversations, but then she would claim that these entities are not really agents after all. 
For example, Gilbert thinks that an economic class is not a composite agent (even though 
people often say things like “the middle class does this and that”) because it does not fit 
well with the cases that motivate her theory of shared intention (On Social Facts 225–232). 
However, why should philosophers assume that there is a common feature shared by 
all composite agents that explains what makes them composite agents in the first place? 
Even the paradigmatic examples listed above do not naturally fit into one mold. 
                                                
33 These entities do not satisfy Isaacs’s criteria of being an organization or a goal-oriented collective (Isaacs 
23–51), and most members of gen X or the financial market do not consider themselves as constituting a 
“plural subject” with their fellow members in Gilbert’s sense (cf. On Social Group). 
34 One exception is Michael Bratman, who says on multiple occasions that his account of shared intention is 
just one approach to explain shared agency. Bratman makes it clear that his target is “small scale shared 
intentionality” and he “do[es] not mean to claim that the exercise of planning capacities is the only possible 
form of temporally extended or shared intentional activity” (“Agency, Time, and Sociality” 9). 
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Corporations, nonprofits, academic departments and youth soccer teams plausibly to fall 
under one category while two people going for a walk and three people moving a stone 
plausibly to fall under another one. One might think that it is because those in the former 
category have more formal institution while those in the latter category do not. Or one 
might think that it is a difference in size or stability. However, I think there is a deeper 
distinction: they are entirely different kinds of agent, with different criteria of 
individuation. 
I should make three preliminary remarks. First, an agent is the kind of being that has 
intentions at least at some point of its existence, but it need not be the case that an agent 
intends all the intentional actions it performs. Moreover, one can identify an agent prior 
to identifying any of its intention. Therefore, the criteria of individuation of a composite 
agent need not specify how the intention of a composite agent is determined (e.g., how 
members make decisions together as a whole). 
Second, there is a disagreement between Gilbert and Bratman about whether being a 
member of a composite agent is constitutively normative. Gilbert thinks that an adequate 
account of shared intention must satisfy the “obligation criterion,” namely, members of a 
composite agent have an obligation to act in ways that would achieve what they jointly 
intend to achieve (Sociality and Responsibility 25–26). This is an obligation with a 
corresponding claim right; members are entitled to the obligatory actions from each 
other. By contrast, Bratman thinks that shared intention is not constitutively normative in 
this sense and gives two counterexamples to Gilbert’s account (Intention, Plans, and Practical 
Reason 132–134). Instead of being bound by obligation, an individual is bound by the 
requirement of rationality to act in ways that is consistent with the shared intention. Some 
have proposed some compromised position between the two (e.g., Abraham Roth, 
Facundo Alonso). But I think the disagreement and the efforts to come up with a 
compromised position are misguided if there is no common core in the concept of a 
composite agent in terms of how a shared intention comes to be or that the concept is 
“disjunctive,” so to speak. 
Third, composite agents are social kinds. Roughly speaking, the existence of social 
kinds is mind-dependent, and there would not be any composite agent if no one has any 
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propositional attitudes about some specific sort of quasi-obligations, reasons for actions, 
or the mental states of other people. However, the modes of dependence can be different 
for different social kinds. Muhammad Ali Khalidi organizes social kinds into three 
categories by considering (i) whether the existence of the kind depends on people having 
propositional attitudes about it and (ii) whether the existence of instances of the kind 
depend on people having propositional attitudes about them. The existence of the first 
kind does not depend on people having propositional attitudes about it or instances of it, 
e.g., racism and recession. The existence of the second kind depends on people having 
propositional attitudes about it, but not people having propositional attitudes about 
instances of it, e.g., war and money. The existence of the third kind depends on people 
having propositional attitudes about it and instances of it, e.g., permanent residents and a 
prime minister. Khalidi argues that nothing prevents the first and second kinds from 
being natural kinds, or in Searle’s term, being “ontologically objective,” because, like 
natural kinds, they are also associated with a cluster of causal properties (9–10). For 
example, war is just as devastating as volcanic eruption (perhaps even more so), and 
neither of them can be “thought” out of existence. 
I take it that composite agents belong to the first kind of social kind. Their existence 
depends on their members having propositional attitudes of some sort (e.g., propositional 
attitudes about their obligations, or their reasons for actions, or other people’s 
propositional attitudes, etc.), but not people having propositional attitudes about 
composite agent as a kind or about instances of the kind. I have no argument for this 
claim, or the claim that composite agents are real, but conceiving of composite agents this 
way gives us some reason for thinking that they are real, or at least “more real” than 
fictional kinds (e.g., Sherlock Holmes).35 
The criteria of individuation are intended to provide a partial explication of the 
concept of a composite agent. It is a partial explication because the criteria presuppose 
                                                
35 If one insists that composite agents are not real, I can concede that talks of composite agents are fictional 
in the way that a mathematical fictionalist thinks that mathematical discourse is fictional and then set the 
issue aside. 
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that people talk as if composite agents are real and they already have some grasp of what 
composite agents are (except for controversial cases). Nonetheless, non-reductive criteria 
can be illuminating because they can show that a certain important distinction can be 
drawn among different composite agents.36 To illustrate how the partial explication might 
work, consider the following toy/fake example: 
(A) Several agents constitute a composite agent CA and CA is a composite 
agent(Animal) if, and only if, 
1. all these individual agents are animals, and 
2. their actions realize various functions of CA when they carry out a 
certain set of tasks assigned to them; 
(R) Several agents constitute a composite agent CA and CA is a composite 
agent(Robot) if, and only if, 
1. all these individual agents are robots (including simple robots), and 
2. their actions realize various functions of CA when they execute the 
procedures preprogramed in them. 
If (A) and (R) were nontrivially true (i.e. there existed a CA such that both sides of the 
biconditional are true), they would have revealed something significant about the concept 
of a composite agent (e.g. an important feature of being a composite agent is the 
coordination of its parts and that the coordination can be realized in either an intentional 
system or non-intentional system). However, one must already have some grasp of the 
concept of a composite agent in order to understand clause 2 in (A) and (R). 
With the criteria of individuation that I am actually proposing, I hope to show that 
members of a composite agent can relate to each other in two different ways, and only 
one of these ways is normatively significant (it will become clear what “normatively 
significant” means later in the chapter). That means, as I also hope to show, actions of 
                                                
36 P.F. Strawson also argues that one should not dismiss non-reductive analysis because it can elucidate the 
interconnections between some complex and irreducible notions, despite the fact that the analysis is circular 
(17–28). 
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individual members can relate to actions of the composite agent in two fundamentally 
different ways. 
In the next few sections, I will explain the two criteria in my proposal, and I will 
show that they are distinct by given examples that satisfy only one criterion but not the 
other. Then, I will discuss apparently difficult cases and explain why they pose no 
problem to the proposed criteria. Finally, I will discuss some anticipated objections and 
my responses to them. 
2.2 THE METAPHYSICAL (MET) AND NORMATIVE (NORM) CRITERIA 
There are two kinds of composite agent and each has its own criterion of 
individuation. Any set of individual agents that satisfies one of these criteria would 
constitute a composite agent of a particular kind. Each criterion specifies the relation 
between individual agents in the set. One of these criteria is what I call the Metaphysical 
Criterion (Met): 
(Met) Several individual agents constitute an entity 37  CA and CA is a 
composite agent(Met) if, and only if, 
1. each individual agent is directly related to at least one other agent in CA 
and indirectly related all other agents in CA,38 and the direct relation or 
relations define the practical role(s) of each individual agent, 
2. (a) actions of an individual agent realize the information states (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, etc.) of CA when she acts on the special quasi-
obligations associated with the practical roles mentioned in 1, and 
(b) these information states can be invoked to explain or predict actions 
of CA, and 
3. each individual agent is aware that other individual agent(s) in CA may 
act on the special quasi-obligations associated with their practical roles. 
                                                
37 The entity can be a group constituted by an arbitrary set of individuals or a composite agent of a 
particular kind. 
38 A is indirectly related to C if, and only if, A is directly related to B and B is directly related to C, given 
that A, B and C are distinct individual agents in the composite agent. “Is related” is bidirectional: A is 
related to B if, and only if, B is related to A.  
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A practical role is a relational property possessed by an individual agent.39 For example, 
to say that someone is a stepparent is to say that this person stands in a certain relation 
with another person, whom we may refer to as her stepchild. Some relations are defined 
in part by special quasi-obligations. Special obligation is the obligation one owes to a 
person in virtue of standing in a special relation with that person, and special quasi-
obligation is special obligation minus the reason-giving part (i.e. one may or may not have 
any reason to fulfill a special quasi-obligation).40 For example, the hiring relation between 
an employer and an employee is defined by the employer’s special obligation to pay the 
employee and the employee’s special obligation to work for the employer. They act on 
their practical roles by fulfilling their special obligations. Since special obligation entails 
special quasi-obligation, it is also true that the employer and employee act on their 
practical roles by fulfilling their special quasi-obligations. 
The relation between individual agents in a composite agent(Met) can be an 
obligation-owing-relation or a beneficiary-relation. In the case of a hiring relation, the 
employer owes the employee the obligation to pay the latter. What about a relation 
between employees? Suppose part of the employee’s obligation to work for the employer 
is to assist other employees. Then, the obligation to assist other employees is not owed to 
the assisted employees but to the employer. The relation between the employees is still 
defined in part by some special obligation, but it is a beneficiary-relation instead of an 
obligation-owing-relation. 
Now, consider a case from Diane Jenke, in which one only has a special quasi-
obligation but not special obligation: 
Suppose that all of my neighbors organize the “West Side Reading Group,” 
which will meet once a month at the local coffee house to discuss edifying 
books, articles, etc. Members of the group are obligated to attend a certain 
number of meetings a year, participate in discussions, and recommend books 
                                                
39 Not all roles are relational. 
40 The relation between obligation and quasi-obligation is analogous to the relation between memory and 
Sydney Shoemaker’s “quasi-memory.” “A remembers that p” entails that “A quasi-remembers that p.” 
Similarly, “A owes some special obligation to B” entails “A owes some special quasi-obligation to B.” 
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or articles to other members of the group. Everyone who lives in a certain 
sector of the west side of town is a member of the group. Given that I live in 
that part of the west side of town, I am thereby a member of the group. Do I 
have obligations to attend meetings, etc.? The group appears to be just and to 
have good ends. Given that I am well-read, it would be good if I were to 
contribute to the group, and my participating would certainly not be unjust 
or immoral. But why suppose that I have special obligations to other 
members of the reading group simply because those others have decided to 
describe me in a certain way, even if their group is a good group with just and 
worthy goals in which I could participate without violating any requirements 
of justice or morality? (“Special Obligations” sec. 4) 
I take it that Jenke’s point is obvious. By my definition, the protagonist of the story has 
special quasi-obligations, but not genuine special obligations, to attend meetings, etc. 
The idea of an obligation can be contrasted with what I will call “supererogation.” 
For example, it would be nice for me to volunteer in my neighborhood (or I would 
appear as a selfish and obnoxious neighbor if I do not volunteer), but I would not be 
failing to fulfill my special obligation as a member of the neighborhood if I do not 
volunteer. By contrast, if I promised (explicitly or implicitly) to follow the rule or 
convention that requires me to provide unpaid service to the neighborhood when I 
moved in, I would be failing to fulfill my special obligation as a member if I do not 
provide such service (regardless of whether I have any good reason to not do so). 
Similarly, it would be a friendly gesture if the protagonist in Jenke’s case shows up in 
the meetings of the West Side Reading Group. But she would not be fulfilling any special 
obligation in doing so because there is none. 
Finally, each individual agent needs to be aware of the fact that there are other 
individual agents who may act on the special quasi-obligations associated with their 
practical roles. The agent need not know who exactly these other agents are or whether 
they would definitely act on their special quasi-obligations, but she must believe that, 
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most likely, at least some of them would. In other words, she should have some expectation 
about what other people may do.41 
Now, consider a simple example that illustrates how (Met) works: imagine a small 
corner store with an owner and two employees. One of the employees is the manager, 
who supervises the work of the other employee. Some of their special obligations are 
listed here: 
Owner: pays the manager and the assistant; entertains the needs of the 
manager and the assistant within the limits of legal and 
contractual obligations (e.g. approve sick leaves); etc. 
Manager: keeps the owner informed about the operational status of the 
store (e.g., check the stock level); the supervision of the assistant; 
everyday operation of the store (e.g., operating the cashier); etc. 
Assistant: executes instructions from the manager and the owner 
regarding the operation of the store; etc. 
Suppose the manager discovers that Heineken is low in stock. He asks the owner whether 
to restock this particular brand, and the owner says “yes.” The manager submits an order 
to the supplier. When cases of beer arrive, the manager tells the assistant to move them 
into storage. Given what is said here, we may also say that the store comes to believe that 
Heineken is low in stock and it decides to restock; it follows through its decision. If we opt 
for a simple Humean account,42 we can say the following: the store’s belief about stock 
level is realized by the manager checking the stock level and reporting it to the owner; the 
                                                
41 Notice that this is different from Michael Bratman’s requirement of shared intentional activity, namely, 
agents with shared intention need to intend to coordinate what they intend to do individually—they need to 
“mash their subplans.” My account is different because individual agents can fulfill their special quasi-
obligations without mashing subplans (e.g., imagine a workplace with vicious office politics and everyone is 
stepping on each other’s toes when they do their jobs). 
42 What I mean by a “Humean” is someone who believes that representational states (e.g. belief) and 
motivational states (e.g. desire) are distinct. The content of a belief is determined by the world, but it does 
not have any downstream causal effect of changing the world unless it is coupled with a certain desire. For 
example, List and Pettit believe that a corporation is a Humean agent because it has “representational 
states that depict how things are in the environment” (something analogous to beliefs), “motivational states 
that specify how it demands things to be in the environment” (something analogous to desires), and “the 
capacity to process its representational and motivational states, leading it to intervene in the environment 
whenever that environment fails to match a motivating specification” (List and Pettit 12). 
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store’s desire or intention to restock is realized by the owner deciding what to do and the 
employees executing the decision. Moreover, the owner knows that the manager is doing 
his job, the manager knows that the owner and the assistant are doing their jobs, and the 
assistant knows that the manager is doing his job. Hence, the owner, the manager and the 
assistant constitute a set that satisfies (Met). 
The other criterion is what I call the Normative Criterion (Norm): 
(Norm) Several individual agents constitute an entity CA and CA is a 
composite agent(Norm) if, and only if, there exists some consideration R and 
action φ such that 
1. each individual agent m has or believes that she has R as her reason for 
ψm-ing, where ψm-ing is an action that may vary with m, 
2. (a) CA φ-s if and only if some individual agent(s) ψm-s, where φ-ing is an 
action distinct from any ψm-ing, and 
(b) CA φ-s, and 
3. each individual agent is aware that other agent(s) in CA may act on R. 
The universal quantifier in clause 1 is outside of the scope of the disjunction, i.e., 
∀m(m has R ∨ m believes that m has R) 
The relation between individual agents is characterized by the sharing of a reason. A 
reason for action is a consideration that favors the performance of an action (type). It 
need not be something that actually causes or motivates someone to act (although one 
would think that it has to be something for which someone may act). One may have a 
reason that favors the performance of an action regardless of whether one actually 
performs that action. “Sharing of a reason” is a shorthand of the following: when two 
agents share a reason, each of them has, or believes that she has, the same consideration 
for some action, where the action may not be the same for both of them. In other words, 
although the reason is said to be the same, there may be different favoring relations 
between considerations and actions. 
The two-criterion account proposed above superficially resembles Tracy Isaacs’s 
account. Isaacs argues that “organizations” and “goal-oriented collectives” are two kinds 
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of composite agent that need to be accounted for separately. Examples of organizations 
include “[c]orporations, nonprofit groups, nations, universities, departments of 
philosophy, and professional sports teams” (Isaacs 24–25). They can act intentionally 
because they have institutional structures resembling that of a Humean agent. Examples 
of goal-oriented collectives include “[t]wo people going for a walk, three people painting 
a house together, a thousand people doing the wave at a sports events, or tens of 
thousands of people ‘Running for the Cure’,” as well as the perpetrators of Rwanda 
genocide (Isaacs 25). They can act intentionally because for each of them, the collective 
aims at a certain end (whether it is “Running for the Cure” or the extermination of an 
ethnic group) and all of its members intend to bring about that end. The end is aimed at 
(or intended) by the collective instead of each of its members because the end may not be 
something that can be achieved by any member individually. Finally, things like the 
perpetrators of global warming do not constitute a composite agent because they “lack a 
joint goal around the achievement of which a group comes together in solidarity” (ibid.). 
However, contrary to Isaacs, I think individual agents can constitute a composite 
agent without constituting an organization or having a joint goal; they can constitute a 
composite agent(Norm) by having or believing to have the same reason R, while the action 
favored by R and the strength of R can be different for each individual. The so-called 
“joint goal” can be something indeterminate and the composite agent(Norm) can end up 
doing something that cannot be regarded as the goal common to all members. I shall 
come back to this point when I discuss examples of composite agents(Norm) in the next 
section. 
The reason shared by members of the composite agent(Norm) may not be given by the 
special relation between any of them. It might be said that these members must stand in 
some special relation with each other, namely, the relation of sharing a reason. However, 
it is not because they stand in this special relation with each other that they share the 
same reason; rather, it is because they share the same reason that they stand in this 
special relation with each other. Of course, it is possible that they all stand in some other 
special relation that gives each of them genuine special obligation to each other, but this is 
not necessary. 
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Similar to individual agents in a composite agent(Met), each of the individual agents in 
a composite agent(Norm) must not believe that she is on her own. She should be aware of 
the fact that there are other agents who may act on the same reason, even though she 
may not know who they are or what exactly they would do. 
To see how (Norm) works, imagine that Joseph of Arimathea and Nicodemus are 
about to roll a stone to close the entrance of a tomb after they laid the body of Jesus 
inside. The reason R for each of them to push the stone in a certain way, so that the stone 
would roll to the right place, is that Jesus was a respected rabbi who deserves to be buried 
properly. If Joseph pushes the stone at a certain angle with a certain force (i.e. ψJoseph-s) and 
Nicodemus pushes the stone at a different angle with a different force (i.e. ψNicodemus-s), the 
composite agent(Norm) constituted by them, CAN, would cause the stone to roll (i.e. φ-ing). 
Here, ψJoseph-ing, ψNicodemus-ing and φ-ing are different actions (consider the direction of 
force applied through each of them). Moreover, CAN φ-s if, and only if, Joseph ψJoseph-s or 
Nicodemus ψNicodemus-s. 
Now, imagine a deviant case. Suppose Joseph only pretends to ψJoseph, and the stone 
rolls somewhere else (let’s call this “φalt-ing”). Two things may be said about this. First, if 
φalt-ing is not distinct from ψNicodemus-ing, i.e. Nicodemus does everything, then clause 2 is 
not satisfied and there is no composite agent(Norm). Second, if φalt-ing is distinct from 
ψNicodemus-ing (and ψJoseph-ing), then clause 2 is satisfied and CAN does something different 
from what it would have done if Joseph actually ψJoseph-ed. One may think of the second 
interpretation as analogous to someone throwing a ball intending to hit a target: because 
of a sudden pain in her wrist the moment before the ball leaves her hand, the ball misses 
the target entirely. If there were no sudden pain, she would have thrown the ball 
differently and the ball would have hit the target. Whether φalt-ing is distinct from 
ψNicodemus-ing depends on how one fills in the detail of the story and it is not to be decided 
by my theory. 
(Norm) also applies when individual agents are mistaken about what reasons they 
have or do not have. Imagine that several women are about to visit Jesus’s tomb with 
spices, planning to anoint Jesus’s body. Unbeknown to them, the body has disappeared. 
Therefore, these women have no reason to visit Jesus’s tomb. There is no body to be 
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anointed, so what they believe to be a reason is untrue. Also, at this point, they have no 
reason to suspect that Jesus’s body has disappeared; so they have no reason to check the 
tomb either. However, it seems that these women constitute a composite agent(Norm) as 
much as Joseph and Nicodemus do. (Norm) captures this intuition by the disjunction in 
clause 1. 
Notice that it is not necessary for each member of a composite agent(Norm) to think 
that she is ψm-ing for the purpose of collective φ-ing. They do not even need to share a 
common purpose. However, in order for them to constitute an entity that φ-s (instead of 
an entity that happens to be coextensive with an entity that φ-s at a particular time),43 
each of them needs to have the same reason R or believe that she has that reason. 
The idea that there is a metaphysical criterion and a normative criterion of being a 
composite agent is inspired by Carol Rovane’s discussion of personal identity. John Locke 
famously argues that there is a distinction between the criteria of animal identity and 
personal identity. Unlike “animal,” Locke thinks that “person” is a “forensic term” and 
we “appropriat[e] actions and their merit” only to entities that satisfy the criterion of 
personal identity (bk. 2, ch. 27, sec. 26). The identity of an animal over time is established 
by spatiotemporal continuity; whereas the identity of a person over time is established by 
the continuity of consciousness (the memory criterion). Historically, the memory criterion 
has been understood as a metaphysical criterion that purports to explain the moral 
significance of personhood in non-moral terms; on this interpretation, Locke is wrong 
because, as Bishop Joseph Butler rightly points out, memory presupposes personal 
identity. However, Rovane proposes what she calls a “revisionary” interpretation of 
Locke: instead of thinking that the continuity of a person explains the appropriation of 
                                                
43 Here is an example of individual agents constituting an entity that happens to be coextensive with an 
entity that φ-s at a particular time. Suppose business startup C is a two-person company; Amy and Bill are 
both its owners and employees. C negotiates a contract with another company, but in the middle of the 
negotiation (time t), Bill quits and Amy becomes the sole owner and employee. C eventually closes the deal 
with the other company. Now, the entity that negotiates the contract is identical to the entity that signs the 
contract. Then, it must be C, not the composite agent constituted by Amy and Bill, which negotiates the 
contract, even though C and the composite agent constituted by Amy and Bill are coextensive prior to time 
t. 
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actions and their merit to that person, we should think that the appropriation of actions 
and their merit establishes the continuity of a person. The contrast between animal and 
personal criteria is not the contrast between two metaphysical criteria (spatiotemporal 
extension and memory), but the contrast between the metaphysical and the ethical 
criteria. Rovane thinks that the criterion of personal identity is that of rational unity. A 
person is an agent unified by its committed pursuit of projects, i.e. it takes rational steps to 
achieve its goals; whereas an animal agent may continue to exist without such a rational 
unity (imagine something like Dory the blue tang in Finding Nemo). From this she argues 
that composite agents are possible, because a person need not be embodied in one 
animal. 
In order to show that composite agents(Met) and composite agents(Norm) belong to two 
distinct kinds, I will give examples that satisfy (Met) but not (Norm) and examples that 
satisfy (Norm) but not (Met). 
2.3 EXAMPLES SHOWING THAT COMPOSITE AGENTS(MET) AND AGENTS(NORM) ARE 
DISTINCT 
I will start with an example that satisfies (Met) but not (Norm). The Abwehr was a 
German military intelligence agency from 1921 to 1944. William Sebold was an 
American immigrant from Germany who worked as a double agent for the FBI. At first, 
he was blackmailed into becoming an agent of the Abwehr when he visited his mother in 
Germany, and he was eventually assigned to a spy ring in New York. He revealed the 
matter to the United States Consulate before he returned to the United States, telling 
consulate officials that he wished to cooperate with the FBI. So he became an agent for 
the FBI as well. His activities led to the dissolution of the spy ring (Kahn 331–333). 
It seems obvious that the Abwehr was a composite agent. It collected intelligence in 
New York, among other things. It also had rules and regulations that defined the special 
quasi-obligations of various roles played by its members (different ranks of intelligence 
officers, radio engineers, division heads, etc.). When they acted on their roles, the Abwehr 
functioned as an agent with beliefs about the world and intentions (or desires) to change 
the world. Since the Abwebr is more complicated than the corner store example that I 
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discussed earlier, let me make up an oversimplified scenario to illustrate the point. 
Suppose some intelligence officers found out about Sebold’s personal history and reported 
it to those who analyzed information and made plans based on the intelligence collected. 
Further suppose that the relevant decision-makers decided that they should blackmail 
Sebold after they reviewed his case. They ordered a team of officers to blackmail Sebold; 
the team made follow-up plans and executed them. Here, actions of the officers who 
found out about Sebold’s personal history and reported it realized a belief the Abwehr 
had, namely, its belief about Sebold’s personal history; actions of those who made the 
decision about what to do with Sebold and issued the order to blackmail him realized an 
intention or desire the Abwehr had; and actions of the blackmailing officers added more 
fine-grained content to the intention to blackmail Sebold; so on and so forth. Moreover, 
Sebold was aware that there were other people doing their jobs at the Abwehr, even 
though Sebold only knew some of them personally. This shows that all clauses of (Met) 
are satisfied and so the Abwehr was a composite agent(Met). 
However, the Abwehr was not a composite agent(Norm). Sebold was a spy of the 
Abwehr; he gathered information for the Abwehr and executed its decisions. His 
membership could be sufficiently established by certain written or oral agreement 
between him and the Abwehr agents who contacted him, his spy school training, the 
internal communication and documents of the Abwehr, etc. However, either he had no 
reason to ψSebold, where ψSebold-ing was part of what it took for the Abwehr to φ (to collect 
intelligence in New York, serve Nazi Germany, etc.), or his reason to ψSebold would not be 
the same as the reason his colleagues at the Abwehr had or believed that they had for ψm-
ing. If he had any reason to ψSebold, it would be that of self-preservation, or that the FBI 
told him to do so. Once he was free from the threat of the Abwehr, or the FBI told him to 
stop, he would have no reason to ψSebold. 
So now we have an example that satisfied (Met) but not (Norm). Examples like this 
are easy to find. Senior executives of AT&T have a reason for brokering a deal to buy T-
Mobile, namely, to eliminate a competitor and maximize the profit of AT&T (which 
would in turn profit the senior executives). However, this need not be the reason its in-
house lawyers (especially those who do not have any AT&T stock) have for drafting the 
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contract of this deal. Its lawyers may hate AT&T’s monopoly on the GSM service in the 
United States (and rightfully so), and yet they still work for AT&T because it pays a good 
salary. Or the directors of the International Mission Board (IMB) of the Southern Baptist 
Convention have a reason to steer IMB to provide humanitarian aids in some of the most 
impoverished regions in India (rather than other underdeveloped regions with a 
prominent Christian presence), namely, to evangelize residents in those regions. Its 
volunteers need not share this reason. Their reason for volunteering in India could simply 
be to serve the poor; they would do so even if they believe that none of the people they 
serve would be converted (and let’s say they join IMB instead of other non-religious 
NGOs because working with IMB is the only opportunity they have). 
Next, I will turn to examples that satisfy (Norm) but not (Met). A ready example 
would be the stone-rolling case that I discussed earlier. To recall, Joseph and Nicodemus 
are about to roll a stone to close the entrance of a tomb after they laid the body of Jesus 
inside, and they constitute a set that satisfies (Norm). However, (Met) is not satisfied 
because Joseph and Nicodemus are not trying to fulfill the special obligations associated 
with the practical roles they play. For example, perhaps they are friends with one 
another, but they are not acting on the special obligation of being a friend when they 
bury Jesus. Now, one might object by claiming that each of them has the obligation to 
push the stone because the participation of one party has raised the expectation of 
continued participation in the other party. For example, because Joseph has done all the 
burial preparation with Nicodemus prior to moving the stone, Nicodemus expects Joseph 
to move the stone together. There are two responses to this objection. First, there is no 
role from which the obligation arises. The mere fact that one has raised some expectation 
in someone else does not indicate that the two are in any special relationship (e.g., in order 
for the two to be in, say, a contractual relation, something more is needed). Second, even 
if there is an expectation of continued participation, I do not see why the expected action 
has to be regarded as obligatory rather than supererogatory. It would be rude for Joseph 
to stop working with Nicodemus after they put Jesus’s body into the tomb, leaving 
Nicodemus to roll the stone by himself, but this is not a failure in fulfilling an obligation. 
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If the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory is not obvious enough in the 
stone-rolling case, consider the following case instead. Typhoon Vicente blew six 
containers carrying tons of plastic nurdles into the sea off the coast of Hong Kong. A 
week later, some local residents saw layers of plastic nurdles piled up on many beaches. 
They reported it to the authorities, only to realize that the officials already knew about 
the incident and were doing little to clean up the mess. Out of desperation, the local 
residents called for the public to clean up the beaches themselves and publicized relevant 
information on the Internet. Hundreds of people responded. Some went to the beaches to 
remove plastic nurdles; some went to check on remote beaches and spread the word on 
the Internet when they discovered new polluted spots, resulting in more cleanup efforts; 
some shared information about how to separate the nurdles from the sand efficiently, and 
many people followed suit. 
In this case, the volunteers who attempted to alert the authorities, removed plastic 
nurdles in beaches, surveyed the shoreline for unknown polluted spots, publicized useful 
information, etc. shared a reason for doing so, namely, to protect the ocean. In doing what 
they did with the common reason they shared, they constituted a composite agent(Norm) 
that cleaned up plastic nurdles on the shoreline. However, (Met) is not satisfied because 
they were not fulfilling their special quasi-obligations associated with the practical roles 
they occupied in what they did. Perhaps most of them were citizens of Hong Kong, and 
Hong Kong qua political community could be regarded as a composite agent that acts. 
However, they were not acting on their special obligations as Hong Kong citizens when 
they did what I described above. The special obligation of a citizen does not obligate one 
to, say, go out to the beaches to remove plastic nurdles. Moreover, arguably, the 
composite agent that cleaned up the beaches was not Hong Kong; the authority did not 
orchestrate the clean up. 
Now, imagine two complications. First, suppose there was a volunteer who shared 
useful information online and encouraged people to go down to the beach. However, she 
did not do so to help clean up the plastic nurdles. She believed that most plastic nurdles 
were in the water and they would be consumed by marine life or broken down into plastic 
molecules before they were washed up to the shore. That is, she did not think that 
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cleaning up the beaches was very important per se. However, she believed that mobilizing 
people to remove plastic nurdles on beaches was still a good thing to do because it would 
raise the public awareness of marine conservation and plastic pollution. On my view, she 
was also a member of the composite agent that cleaned up the beaches. Although she did 
not ψm (i.e. share useful information online) for the purpose of collective φ-ing (i.e. to clean 
up the plastic nurdles), her reason for ψm-ing (i.e. to protect the ocean) is the same as other 
members’ reason for ψm-ing, and her ψm-ing played a part in causing the event that could 
be identified with the collective φ-ing. 
Second, suppose there was another volunteer who went down to the beach to clean 
up so that she could brag about it on Facebook later. She did not care about plastic 
pollution or ocean conservation. She only believed that posting pictures of her working 
along side with other volunteers would make her look cool. Now, was she a member of 
the composite agent that cleaned up the beaches? It depends on whether she had the 
same reason that other volunteers had for ψm-ing. There are two points to bear in mind 
when one evaluates the case. First, sometimes a person can have a reason for action that 
she does not know she has, and she performs the action for a different reason (e.g., Amy 
does not believe that she has a Good Samarian reason for saving a pedestrian who passes 
out on the street, but she saves the pedestrian out of her desire for praise). Second, 
sometimes personal circumstances can prevent a person from have a reason for action 
that she would have otherwise (e.g., Amy does not know there is a pedestrian that passes 
out in her proximity, or she does not know what she can do in order to help, assuming 
that the ignorance is inculpable). The volunteer who tried to look cool did not share the 
reason for action other volunteers had (i.e. to protect the ocean) if she had no belief about 
the relation between cleaning up the beach and ocean protection. Otherwise, she had the 
reason that other volunteers had even if she did not recognize it as her reason for action 
or acted from this reason. 
The explication of the second complication may give rise to an apparent 
counterexample. The White Rose was a non-violent resistance group in Nazi Germany 
that consisted of a professor and some students at the University of Munich. They created 
and distributed anti-Nazi leaflets, until Gestapo arrested the most recognized members of 
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the group. The White Rose was a composite agent(Norm) with its members sharing the 
following reason for action: to overthrow the repressive Nazi regime that was causing 
disaster both at home and oversea. Now, imagine (fictionally) the Gestapo sent an 
undercover operative to infiltrate the White Rose. She participated in the creation and 
distribution of the anti-Nazi leaflets, so that other members of the White Rose would 
believe that she wanted to overthrow the Nazi regime with them. According to (Norm), 
this undercover operative would be a member of the White Rose as long as she had the 
same reason for creating and distributing leaflets that other members did, despite the fact 
that she did not believe that was the case. Let’s further suppose that she did have the 
reason other members of the White Rose had, namely, the Nazi ought to be overthrown 
(as a matter of moral fact). This seems to yield a counterintuitive result: the Nazi 
undercover operative was a member of the White Rose. 
But I think the result is not counterintuitive. A composite agent(Norm) can consist of 
members who do not believe that they share a reason for action. In this case the 
composite agent(Norm) is defective because it cannot act effectively through its members’ 
acting on the reason they share—because of the action of the Nazi undercover operative, 
the White Rose failed in its mission. 
For the sake of completeness, I will discuss a case in which all member agents are 
mistaken about the reasons they actually had. According to a CNN report by Katie Hunt 
and Habib Nasir in 2012, an eleven-year-old Pakistani Christian girl was accused of 
burning pages from the Qu’ran, which was in violation of the blasphemy law in Pakistan. 
A hundred and fifty angry Muslims gathered at where the girl lived, a poor Christian 
neighborhood, and threatened to burn everything down. The reason for which these 
Muslims turned up and threatened to attack the Christians was that the Christian girl 
blasphemed, but that was no reason for them to do what they did—as Hasan Mehdi 
points out, it was not even mandated by their own religion. However, it seems that the 
mob was a composite agent(Norm) as much as the beach-cleanup volunteers were a 
composite agent(Norm). These confused Muslims constituted a set that satisfied (Norm) by 
believing that they had a particular reason for persecuting the Christians. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that a set of individual agents may satisfy both (Met) and 
(Norm) at a particular time, but the composite agent(Met) and composite agent(Norm) 
constituted by them are still distinct entities. Suppose several Muay Thai enthusiasts 
decide to practice together regularly and promote Muay Thai to their college peers (by, 
for instance, inviting friends to watch their practice), for their love of Muay Thai. In 
doing do they constitute a composite agent(Norm) at time t1. After a while, these enthusiasts 
form a Muay Thai club and they register the club with the university at time t2. At this 
point, the Muay Thai club is a composite agent(Met) constituted by all the members of the 
composite agent(Norm), the Muay Thai enthusiasts. As a university sports club, it has the 
institutional structure mandated by the university (e.g., it must have a constitution, certain 
executive positions, etc.). It also welcomes any student who can afford to pay a small due 
to join. It recruits some new members at time t3. Many of the new recruits know nothing 
about Muay Thai; they join the club solely out of curiosity or to meet new friends. These 
new recruits are members of the composite agent(Met) as long as they pay their due and 
fulfill any other special obligations as members of the club, but they are not members of 
the composite agent(Norm) constituted by the enthusiasts. In this case, (Met) and (Norm) are 
satisfied by the same set of individuals at t2, but not so at t1 or t3. At t1 (Met) is not satisfied 
(no club) and at t3 (Met) is satisfied by a different set of individuals (newbies have different 
reasons for participating in club activities). Therefore, the composite agent(Met) and 
composite agent(Norm) constituted by the Muay Thai enthusiasts at t2 are not identical. 
2.4 COMPLICATIONS 
Now, I will consider some complications to the simple account I have been giving so 
far. 
Can Several Agents Constitute a Composite Agent Merely For The Sake Of It? 
Before answering this question, let’s us remind ourselves of the distinction between 
the reason for doing something and the reason for which one does something: the latter is 
the consideration one takes to be the reason for her action, which may or may not be a 
reason (i.e. the consideration that favors an action) one actually has. Therefore, while one 
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may do something for the sake of it, one may not have any reason for doing it, unless it is 
something with intrinsic value.44 
Individual agents constitute a composite agent(Met) as long as they act in ways that 
fulfill their special quasi-obligations associated with their practical roles and believe that 
some other people may do the same. They can do so for any reason or even no reason, 
and certainly they can do so for the sake of constituting the composite agent(Met). For 
example, some members of a traditional Kendo dojo (a Japanese fencing school as an 
organization, not the building in which people practice) may try to keep the dojo alive just 
for the sake of it. The dojo is a composite agent(Met) because of the way its members 
related to each other: there are formal and informal institutions that govern the actions 
the sensei (the head teacher), the students, a senpai (senior), a kohai (junior), etc., as well as 
the interactions between them. However, whether the members have any reason for 
keeping the dojo alive (or believe that they do) is a separate issue. One could argue that 
keeping the dojo alive itself can be a reason for keeping it alive because the tradition itself 
has intrinsic value: the tradition that consists in the relations between dojo members and 
the martial art they practice has aesthetic value. But obviously, not all composite 
agent(Met) have intrinsic value. 
Individual agents constitute a composite agent(Norm) as long as they share a reason 
and believe that some other people are in situations relevantly similar to theirs. This 
reason can possibly be anything, including the existence of a composite agent(Norm). For 
example, imagine three college friends looking for things to do together when they hang 
out. They hang out because, well, they want to, i.e. for the sake of it. But hanging out is 
not just a matter of physical proximity (and thanks to technology, people now can hang 
out through the Internet). It is constituted by doing something together. Now, suppose 
these college friends decide to go fishing in Galveston together. None of them are 
particularly interested in fishing, but this is something they can do together, and that they 
                                                
44 This is incompatible with an extreme form of Humean view, namely, that one has a reason for doing 
something as long as one wants to do it, and one wants to do it as long as one is motivated to do it. I think it 
this is a highly implausible view. 
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can do it together is a reason for choosing fishing over other activities (e.g., a trip to 
London). So one of them drives, one catches a huge drum fish (while the driver catches 
none), one just takes picture, so on and so forth. In this case, the composite agent(Norm) 
constituted by them go fishing (φ-ing), despite the fact that one member does not fish at 
all. And each of them does the driving, fishing or photographing (ψm-ing) for the sake of 
hanging out. To put it differently, when they hang out, they constitute a composite 
agent(Norm) that φ-s and the reason they believe they have for ψm-ing is to bring this 
composite agent(Norm) into existence. 
Even strangers can constitute a composite agent(Norm) just for the sake of it. There was 
a Youtube video of two strangers having a spontaneous jam session in a New York 
subway train that had gone viral. A narrator explained in front of the camera that the 
lady with a ukulele and the man with a set of bongos had never met one another before. 
The duo played a song together. Like the stone-rolling case, the song was performed by 
the duo, not solely by either one of the musicians. It also appears that there was no 
particular reason for the musicians to do so (one may say that the reason for doing so was 
to have fun or to make oneself famous, but it need not be the case). The musicians did not 
seem to do it for any particular reason—except for the sake of doing it. We may conclude 
that the musicians constitute a music-playing duo and each of them played music with the 
following reason: bringing this music-playing duo into existence. 
Transient Composite Agents 
On my account, there can be lots of composite agents in the world at any given time 
and many of them overlap with each other. However, many of these composite agents are 
very short-lived. 
It is easy to see why there can be many short-lived composite agents(Norm). Someone 
drops a pile of documents and sheets of paper are flying around on the street. Several 
pedestrians stop to help her to collect the documents, and leave quickly after it is done. 
These pedestrians share the same reason (kindness) for helping and they constitute a 
composite agent(Norm) that exists for a very brief period of time. This kind of case is 
probably more common than things like the beach-cleanup case. 
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There are also many short-lived composite agents(Met). When one hires a taxi, a sales 
contract is formed between the passenger and the driver (for simplicity, let’s just suppose 
that the passenger pays the taxi fare by herself and the driver is self-employed). According 
to the contract, the passenger has (among other special obligations) the special obligation 
to tell the driver the destination and pay the driver for her service, and the driver has 
(among other special obligations) the special obligation to drive the passenger to the 
destination named.45 They constitute a composite agent(Met) with the intention to deliver 
the passenger to the destination. This composite agent(Met) disappears once the contract is 
discharged. This may happen in various ways. It could be that the taxi arrives at the 
destination and the passenger pays in full (i.e. discharge by performance). It could be that 
the taxi was heavily hit by another car before it arrives at the destination (i.e. discharge by 
frustration). In any case, the composite agent(Met) does not last. 
Borderline Cases 
There are borderline cases of composite agents and vagueness can manifest itself on 
multiple levels. First, the exact time at which the clauses in (Met) or (Norm) are satisfied 
can be vague. This makes the temporal boundaries of the composite agent (the time it 
comes into existence and the time it ceases to exist) fuzzy, although we would know that 
the composite agent in question exists at some point. I will call this “boundary vagueness.” 
Second, the scope of the quantifier in “several individual agents…” in (Met) and (Norm) 
can also be vague. In this kind of case, it would be unclear as to whether a particular 
individual agent should be included in the “several agents” that constitute the composite 
agent in question. I will call this “scope vagueness.” Third, in some circumstances, the 
conditions that make the boundaries or scope of a composite agent vague can make an 
alleged composite agent itself a borderline case. I will illustrate each kind of vagueness by 
examples. 
                                                
45 Special obligations here can be any kind of contractual terms—conditions, warranties or innominate 
terms. Because we are not interested in legal responsibilities here, we do not need to complicate things by 
concerning ourselves with these distinctions. 
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Let’s start with a case of boundary vagueness. Consider the composite agent(Norm) 
constituted by the Muay Thai enthusiasts again. Each of its members may come to have 
or believe that she has a reason for promoting Muay Thai at different time. They may 
become aware of the existence of other Muay Thai enthusiasts on campus at different 
times. Some of them may be in certain personal circumstances that make it difficult to 
determine whether they have the reason (e.g., having injuries that would prevent one from 
practicing Muay Thai). These complications make it difficult to pinpoint the exact time at 
which the composite agent(Norm) comes into existence. 
Boundary vagueness can also manifest in a composite agent(Met). Imagine a person 
distributes free food items to homeless people at a park regularly. After a while, several 
other people see what she does and decide to join her effort. The number of volunteers 
grows over time, and they serve more and more people. They begin to have some division 
of labor—some are responsible for gathering food items from donators, some operates a 
catering truck, some distribute food, etc. The structure of the division of labor becomes 
clearer and more sophisticated. At some point, they decide (i.e. all of them agree) to 
become a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. Now, we know that there certainly is a composite agent(Met) 
when there is a nonprofit, because in order to be a nonprofit there must be some special 
obligations imposed on different members of the organization. But it seems that the 
composite agent(Met) comes into existence before that—it comes into existence when an 
organizational structure that can be characterized in terms of special quasi-obligations 
emerges. We do not know the exact time (When they start to assign special obligations to 
each other orally? Or when they write down some rules on a piece of paper? Or would it 
all be implicit in the interaction between the volunteers?), but we know it happens some 
time between several people join the person who starts it all and the nonprofit registration. 
Next, we will consider a case of scope vagueness. Watsons Water is a producer and 
distributor of distilled water in Hong Kong. Its products include bottled water for distilled 
water dispensers and it delivers water bottles to its customers by trucks. It used to employ 
all of its delivery workers directly. However, starting in 2012, the company encourages its 
delivery workers to form their own delivery teams and become self-employed. The self-
employed workers would do the same thing as before, except that the company would 
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pay them slightly more and stop providing benefits. Watsons Water is a composite 
agent(Met). Are these self-employed workers members of this composite agent(Met), despite 
the fact that they are now contractors of the company instead of its employee? We would 
normally regard the employees of a company as its members, and those who make other 
kinds of contract with the company (e.g., its suppliers and customers) as someone who is 
not part of the company. Legally speaking, the self-employed workers are like suppliers of 
the company—they supply delivery services using the equipment provided by the 
company. However, it seems strange to regard them as suppliers like the suppliers of 
plastic nurdles or bottling machines—it seems that workers are more like employees. This 
is vagueness in demarcating composite agents(Met) in the web of practical roles. Is the 
practical role of a self-employed delivery worker a practical role in the composite 
agent(Met) constituted by other employees and shareholders of Watsons Water, or is it 
merely a practical role in the transient composite agent(Met) that is coextensive with the 
contract between Watsons Water and the worker? I do not know.46 
Another case of scope vagueness is the status of shareholders of a company. Including 
some IBM stock in one’s investment portfolio does not make one a member of IBM. But 
some types of share give the shareholders the rights to vote on directors nominated by the 
board of directors or other important decisions of the company. Are these shareholders 
members of the company? And what if one is a shareholder of a company that owns 
shares of another company—is one a member of the latter? I take it that at least one of 
these cases is a borderline case. 
Now, imagine a company that has no employee and is fully owned by a single 
person.47 The labor it needs in order to operate is entirely provided by the self-employed 
                                                
46 If you think that the self-employed workers are obviously members of the composite agent(Met) constituted 
by Watsons Water’s employees and shareholders, consider a case in which the contractors are companies 
instead of individual self-employed workers. For example, a feeder airline is a regional airline contracting 
with a major airline that operates under the latter’s brand name. It transports passengers between hubs of 
the major airlines and the surrounding regions. Are pilots and fight attendants of the feeder airline 
members of the composite agent(Met) constituted partly by the employees and shareholders of the major 
airline? (I am inclined to say no in this case, but intuition may vary with different people.) 
47 This is an unusual case, because an owner of a solo business would usually employ herself for the purpose 
of tax benefits. 
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workers the company hires. Do we have a composite agent(Met) here at all? If the practical 
role of a self-employed worker is a practical role in the composite agent(Met) constituted 
also by the owner of the company, then we have a composite agent(Met). Otherwise we do 
not have any composite agent(Met) because the company is constituted by one individual 
agent. But the case of self-employed workers is a borderline case. Therefore, this is a 
borderline case of composite agent rather than a borderline case of the boundaries or 
scope of a composite agent. 
The purpose of discussing these borderline cases is to acknowledge their existence 
and not worry about them. The fact that there are borderline cases should not be seen as 
a threat to the idea that there are composite agents, just as sorites should not be seen as a 
threat to the idea that there are heaps (of sand, dust, beans, rice, etc.). Moreover, the 
existence of borderline cases should not be seen as a threat to (Met) or (Norm). In the 
cases discussed above I showed that they can be explained along the distinction I intend 
to draw.48 
2.5 OBJECTIONS 
I will now consider some objections to my proposal that there are two kinds of 
composite agent, if which instances of one kind satisfy (Met) while instances of the other 
kind satisfy (Norm). My opponents may (a) deny that (Met) or (Norm) is a criterion of 
being a composite agent (objections 1–3) or (b) argue that they can be replaced by 
another criterion (objections 4–5). 
Objection 1. Some might think that some cases of bystander effect are counterexamples 
against (Norm). In a case of bystander effect, all the bystanders have a reason for 
intervention (e.g. saving a person who got stabbed by calling 911, trying to stop the 
bleeding…) and yet they all fail to act on such a reason one way or another, resulting in 
collective inaction. According to my view, a set of bystanders satisfy (Norm) if the 
                                                
48 Isaacs also thinks that collectivity comes in degree (45–48), but she conceives of the degree of collectivity 
in terms of the degree of coordination between members of the composite agent in question. This is 
different from my view, in which the degree of coordination is not the only factor in play. 
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resulting event can be identified as the action or inaction (e.g. letting die) of the would-be 
composite agent(Norm) constituted by them. 
Isaacs does not think that bystanders can constitute a composite agent (141–144). She 
agrees that there are times when we appear to attribute obligations or responsibilities for 
inaction to a random collection of persons. For Issacs, bystanders would constitute such a 
“random” collection; it is random in the sense that they happen to be around the scene 
and get involved by accident. But she denies that such a collection is an agent. In 
response to Virginia Held and Larry May, who maintain that a putative group can be 
held morally responsible for actions and inactions, Isaacs argues that a putative group can 
have putative obligations at best, and it certainly cannot act. She worries that regarding 
random collections of individuals as agents trivializes the concept of a composite agent. A 
putative group would need to be transformed into a composite agent by its members 
when they choose a decision-making procedure or form a collective goal around which 
their individual actions would revolve. If Isaacs is correct, one might think that some cases 
of bystander effect are counterexamples of (Norm) because there is no composite agent in 
those cases and yet (Norm) is satisfied. 
I do not have any strong intuition as to whether bystanders can constitute a 
composite agent. Either way, these bystander cases are not counterexamples of (Norm). If 
the inaction of the bystanders (e.g., letting die) is not regarded as an action (because the 
bystanders do not do anything that causes the event in question to happen), then the set 
of bystanders does not satisfies clause 2 of (Norm) and there is no composite agent(Norm). If 
the inaction of the bystanders is regarded as an action (because there is no significant 
difference between killing and letting die), then I would simply reject Isaacs’s worry. My 
account does not trivialize the concept of a composite agent because “random” does not 
mean arbitrary here. On my account, although a random group of persons can satisfy 
(Norm), not just any arbitrary set of persons can satisfy (Norm). 
Objection 2. One may argue that (Met) is satisfied in all cases and (Norm) is irrelevant. 
Once one judges that several agents constitute a composite agent, one can simply 
construct the role-defining social relations between them. All one needs to do is to 
stipulate a method that can determine the information states of the composite agent based 
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on the mental states, preferences or actions of its members. It is in virtue of satisfying 
(Met) that something qualifies as a composite agent. 
However, this objection presupposes a problematic view about composite agent. If 
the method can always fix the information states of a composite agent by taking any set of 
mental states, preferences or actions of individuals as input, then it cannot distinguish 
composite agents from mere aggregates of agents. Some people are not bothered by this. 
List and Pettit think that we can assume anything to be an agent when we try to ascribe 
representational and motivational states to it under what Daniel Dennett calls the 
“intentional stance” (List and Pettit 23). Their sole concern is to develop a method (i.e. an 
algorithm) that can accurately predict the representational and motivational states 
ascribed to the composite agent under the intentional stance. This explains why they 
think that generation X and the financial market are agents. However, this approach is 
unsatisfying. It seems that for List and Pettit, we always get a description of an action 
when an action-verb is predicated of a physical subject. Commonsense suggests that there 
is some deep difference between Hurricane Katrina devastating New Orleans and the 
Syrian Army devastating Homs; but for List and Pettit it would only be a difference in the 
physical nature of the intentional states involved in each case. Since part of the purpose of 
the present discussion is to explicate the concept of a composite agent given how we 
ordinarily think of actions and agents, their view is not acceptable. 
Objection 3. One may argue that (Norm) is satisfied in all cases and (Met) is irrelevant. 
One may think that the composite agent itself has a reason for φ-ing and it automatically 
becomes a reason all its members have. The idea is a Davidsonian one: the primary 
reason for action is the cause of action that would rationalize the action; what rationalizes 
an action is something that “leads us to see something the agent saw” (Davidson 1963: 
685), namely, its pro-attitude towards the action and what it believes about the action. 
Now, the Abwehr, AT&T and IMB are composite agents with various information states. 
A reason for φ-ing is a set of relevant representational and motivational states of the 
composite agent (i.e. a version of internalism of reason); it causes and rationalizes the 
event of φ-ing. If there is a reason that causes and rationalizes actions of the composite 
agent, the same reason also causes and rationalizes actions of its members. It is a mistake 
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to think that members do not have this reason simply because they do not think that it is a 
reason; one can be mistaken about what reason one has. Therefore, one reason both 
Sebold and his colleagues at the Abwehr had for spying in New York was the same as the 
Abwehr’s reason for collecting military intelligence for Nazi Germany (e.g., the collective 
desire to advance the interest of Nazi Germany). 
But the objection is misguided. One might think that an agent’s reason for action has 
to be a reason for which she can act, and so her reason for action has to be related her 
own desires or “motivational set” one way or another (Williams 1981). However, in the 
present case, the beliefs and desires that supposedly constitute the Abwehr’s reason for 
collect military intelligence were not Sebold’s beliefs and desires. Although they play some 
role in explaining some of Sebold’s actions (e.g., they explain why Sebold was coerced), 
they do not rationalize Sebold’s actions in the way that my desire to stay dry can 
rationalize my action of carrying an umbrella.49 In other words, the motivation behind 
the Davidsonian view is the internalism of reason, but a reason that is internal to the 
composite agent is not internal to its members. Therefore, internalism does not motivate 
this objection. 
Objection 4. Instead of trying to fit all my examples under either (Met) or (Norm), one 
may try to come up with an alternative criterion that can be satisfied by all of them. Let’s 
call it “the criterion of shared intention.” One way of specifying the alternative criterion 
would be to adopt Bratman’s account of “shared intentional agency.” According to 
Bratman, several agents constitute a composite agent that intends to φ if, and only if, each 
of them intends that the group φ “by way of the other’s corresponding intention,” “of 
meshing sub-plans,” “of interdependence in persistence,” and “of relevant mutual 
responsiveness” (“Agency, Time, and Sociality” 15). Suppose Amy and Bill intend to go 
to San Francisco together; Amy will drive and Bill will ride with her. On Bratman’s view, 
                                                
49 There are additional considerations for rejecting the idea that a reason for action is simply what is 
motivating. Michael Smith has argued that we should reject the Humean theory of normative reasons even 
if we accept the Humean theory of motivating reason, while Jonathan Dancy has argued in Moral Reasons 
that the distinction between normative and motivating reasons is a bad one, and beliefs and desires are not 
the sort of things that can be reasons at all. 
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that means Amy intends that both of them go to San Francisco by way of Amy’s 
intending to drive there and Bill’s intending to ride with Amy, and Bill intends the exact 
same thing. The contents of their intentions (i.e. motivational states with action plans as 
their contents) reference one another. They need to cooperate with each other over an 
extended period of time (e.g., Bill needs to get ready on time so that Amy can leave town 
at the agreed time; Amy needs to pick up Bill at the agreed spot so that Bill can get onto 
the car). Notice that Amy and Bill do not need to have all the detail of their subplans 
worked out right away; as soon as each of them intend that they act together (i.e. “I intend 
that we…”) they have a shared intention. 
However, Bratman’s criterion of shared intentional agency does not apply in all cases 
of (Met) and (Norm). First, members of a composite agent(Met) need not intend that they 
act together by way of meshing subplans, etc. Imagine the operation of a “zombie” 
company: a zombie company is a failing business propped up by government financial 
support for various political reasons. Members of the zombie company, regardless of their 
positions, do not care about the profitability or any stated goal of the company, or the 
harm it does to society. They only fulfill the special quasi-obligations prescribed by their 
job titles and pay no attention to any bureaucratic or mismanagement issues. In other 
words, they do not care if the fulfillment of one member’s special quasi-obligation may 
undermine the fulfillment of another member’s special quasi-obligation—they have no 
intention to mesh subplans or act with mutual responsiveness. But a zombie company is a 
composite agent(Met) as much as Google is a composite agent(Met). Or imagine an 
organization in which members have different visions about the future of the 
organization. There may be internal strife and members with disagreement may try to 
undermine each other’s work—not only do they have no intention to mesh subplans, they 
intend to undermine each other’s subplans. And they can do so while they fulfill their own 
special quasi-obligations. 
Second, members of a composite agent(Norm) also need not to intend that they act 
together by way of meshing subplans, etc. Like their counterparts in a composite agent(Met), 
they may act on their shared reason without any intention to mesh subplans. For 
example, consider a case in which several disorganized individuals constitute a composite 
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agent(Norm) that saves children from a burning house. Image that a house is on fire and 
several children are trapped inside. Several nearby individuals share a reason to do 
something for the children, namely, to alleviate the suffering of the children, but they 
disagree on what exactly they should do. Some believe that they should put out the fire by 
water first; some believe that they should cover themselves in wet blankets and break into 
the house to search and save the children first and all of them should do this in order to 
find the children quickly. They eventually decide to act separately and proceed to do 
what they believe to be right. Let’s stipulate that it would be too late to save the children if 
they all have to wait until the fire is extinguished, and parts of the house is too hot for 
anyone to reach the children. However, those who try to put out the fire cool down the 
house significantly by water, which makes the search and save mission possible for those 
who want to save the children first. At the end, the children are saved. 
Now, one may think that there is no composite agent in this case because there is no 
cooperation. John Searle has a case to highlight the distinction between having 
cooperation and not having cooperation: 
Business School Case 1 
Imagine a group of Harvard Business School graduates who were taught and 
come to believe Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand. After graduation 
day, each goes out in the world to try to benefit humanity by being as selfish 
as each of them possibly can and by trying to become as individually rich as 
they can.  Each does this in the mutual knowledge that the others are doing it. 
Thus, there is a goal that each has, and each knows that all the others know 
that each has it and that they know that each knows that each has it. All the 
same, there is no cooperation. There is even an ideology that there should be 
no cooperation. This is a case where the people have an end, and people have 
common knowledge that other people have that end, but there is no collective 
intentionality in my sense. 
Business School Case 2 
There is a second possible case where we imagine they all get together on 
graduation day and make a solemn pact that they will each go out and try to 
 52 
help humanity by becoming as rich as they can and by acting as selfishly as 
they can. All this will be done in order to help humanity. In this case there is 
a genuine cooperation and genuine collective intentionality even though it is 
a higher level of cooperation to the effect that there should be no lower level 
cooperation. I want to say that the first case is not a case of collective 
intentionality and the second case is a case of collective intentionality. (Making 
the Social World 48) 
On Searle’s account, there is a collective intentionality in Case 2 because “mak[ing] a 
solemn pact,” a speech act of declaration, creates what he calls “we-intentionality.” Searle 
use Cases 1 and 2 as a case against reducing “we-intentionality” to individual 
intentionality (i.e. “I intend that…”). On Bratman’s account, neither Case 1 nor Case 2 is 
a case of shared intentional agency because in both cases, the business school graduates 
have no intention to mesh subplans, etc.; whereas if the business school graduates in Case 
1 change their mind and decide to mesh their selfish subplans, etc., they have shared 
intentional agency without making a solemn pact. Therefore, rejecting my fire-fighting 
case by saying there is no cooperation in Searle’s sense would not be a good Bratmanian 
response, because a Bratmanian case of shared intentional agency need not have 
cooperation in Searle’s sense. (But Searle’s consideration may constitute its own objection 
to my account, which I will discuss shortly.) 
Therefore, I conclude that (Met) and (Norm) cannot be replaced by the criterion of 
shared intentional agency. However, we need to consider the following question: should 
we think that a given set of individual agents do not constitute a composite agent unless 
each of them possess some sui generis collective or joint intention? 
Objection 5. On Bratman’s view, the meshed sub-plans are not a special kind of 
intention, but, rather, intentions with a special kind of content. Now, instead of adopting 
Bratman’s account, one might instead appeal to a special kind of intention, that is, a sort 
of group-oriented intention, when one tries to establish an alternative criterion of being a 
composite agent. For example, Searle thinks that each member of a composite agent has 
a “we intention” of the same content, where a “we intention” is “biologically primitive” 
and distinct from an individual intention (The Construction of Social Reality 24). Raimo 
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Toumela has a similar idea. He tries to distinguish what he calls the “we-mode reasoning” 
from the “I-mode we-reasoning.” The former requires everyone in the alleged composite 
agent to have a certain “we-attitude”—if other people do not have the we-attitude that 
one has, one is not we-mode reasoning (whereas one can I-mode we-reason solely by 
oneself). It is in virtue of everyone’s we-mode reasoning that there is a composite agent 
that reasons and acts.50 Toumela seems to believe that the condition of having a certain 
we-attitude can eventually be specified in neuropsychological terms (68–69). 
The problem with this sort of account is that, instead of explaining what the criterion 
of being a composite agent is, it only labels what needs to be explained. Searle claims that 
such a biologically primitive type of brain state can be identified in all members of a 
composite agent. But natural science suggests the opposite.51 Toumela’s view has the 
same problem. It is highly unlikely that science will identify the physical property  
(neurological or not) possessed by all of those who we-reason that they will do a particular 
thing together, i.e. have a we-attitude of the same content, that is not possessed by those 
who do not have the we-attitude. 
One may try a line of argument that does not regard a shared “intention” as a 
mental state or something reducible to individual mental states. On Gilbert’s view, several 
individual agents constitute a composite agent if and only if they are “jointly committed 
to espousing as a body” a certain goal (A Theory of Political Obligation 146) or to having a 
certain attitude. According to Gilbert, “[a] joint commitment is a kind of commitment of 
the will” created by “the wills of two or more people” (A Theory of Political Obligation 134). 
A “commitment of the will” is “a commitment resulting solely from an act or state of a 
                                                
50 According to Toumela, the “Collectivity Condition” has to be satisfied in order for someone to we-mode 
reason rather than I-mode we-reason: 
(GCC) It is necessarily true … that the participants’ shared we-attitude toward p (here assumed 
equivalent to the group’s attitude toward p, that is, ATT(g,p)) is satisfied for a member A1 of g 
(qua a member of g) if and only if it is satisfied for every other member of g (qua a member of g). 
(49) 
51  This is what neuroscientists actually do, according to John Cacioppo and Jean Decety: “Social 
neuroscience seeks to specify the neural, hormonal, cellular, and genetic mechanisms underlying social 
behavior, and in so doing to understand the associations and influences between social and biological levels 
of organization” (163). Social properties possessed by a group of individuals need not be reducible to 
biological properties possessed by each individual in the group. 
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will or wills” (A Theory of Political Obligation 128). That is, the joint commitment itself is not 
a psychological state or mental act but rather a “result” of it. So instead of appealing to a 
special kind of mental state, Gilbert’s account appeals to a special kind of state resulting 
from ordinary individual mental states or activities. 
The creation of a joint commitment is constituted by the expression of “readiness for 
joint commitment” by every agent and the common knowledge of such expression of 
readiness. Once there is a joint commitment, it is supposed to guarantee that members of 
the composite agent have reasons for performing actions that “conform to the 
commitment” (Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation 147)—each member owes such 
actions to members in the group. 
However, it is unclear what such owing-relation would amount to, and so it is 
unclear what exactly a joint commitment is. Or to put it differently, “members in the 
group” is ambiguous. Is the owing-relation a one-to-one relation, or is it a one-to-many 
relation? At first, Gilbert claims that each member owes conforming actions to the 
composite agent espoused by them (i.e. the entity constituted by members in the group), 
and whoever commands the members to act must do so “in the name of” the composite 
agent (A Theory of Political Obligation 154). However, a few paragraphs down, Gilbert makes 
an unwarranted shift and claims that “[g]iven the above considerations, one can see that 
(and how) those who are jointly committed with one another owe each other conforming 
actions” (A Theory of Political Obligation 155, my emphasis). If a member owes her 
conforming actions to the composite agent, the owing-relation is a one-to-one relation; 
whereas if a member owes her conforming actions to other members, then the owing-
relation is a one-to-many relation. If it is not clear what the owing-relation is, the account 
does not tell us much about what a joint commitment is or how a joint commitment can 
be a reason for performing conforming actions. In particular, the paradigmatic case of 
individual commitment, promising, would not help us understand joint commitment 
because we do not know what the analogue of the promisor-promisee relation is in the 
latter case. 
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Then, the proposal of joint commitment does not say much about the content of the 
alternative criterion but only give us a label. There is no improvement when we move 
from Searle’s account to Gilbert’s account. 
2.6 CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION 
I argued that there two distinct kinds of composite agent. Instances of one kind satisfy 
(Met), 
(Met) Several individual agents constitute an entity CA and CA is a composite 
agent(Met) if, and only if, 
1. each individual agent is directly related to at least one other agent in CA 
and indirectly related all other agents in CA, and the direct relation(s) 
define the practical role(s) of each individual agent, 
2. (a) actions of an individual agent realizes the information states (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, etc.) of CA when she acts on the special quasi-
obligations associated with the practical roles mentioned in 1, and 
(b) these information states can be invoked to explain or predict actions 
of CA, and 
3. each individual agent is aware that other individual agent(s) in CA may 
act on the special quasi-obligations associated with their practical roles. 
while instances of the other kind satisfy (Norm). 
(Norm) Several individual agents constitute an entity CA and CA is a 
composite agent(Norm) if, and only if, there exists some consideration R and 
action φ such that 
1. each individual agent m has or believes that she has R as her reason for 
ψm-ing, where ψm-ing is an action that may vary with m, 
2. (a) CA φ-s if and only if some individual agent(s) ψm-s, where φ-ing is an 
action distinct from any ψm-ing, and 
(b) CA φ-s, and 
3. each individual agent is aware that other agent(s) in CA may act on R. 
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This is an important distinction for those who believe that facts about being a member of 
a composite agent have some normative significance. There is some sort of practical 
failure on one’s part if one is a member of a composite agent(Norm) and yet the shared 
reason plays no role in her practical deliberation. For example, if I (like five other people 
around me) believe that I have a reason for helping a seemingly wounded victim nearby, 
and yet I neglect that belief and leave the scene quickly, there is some practical failure on 
my part even if I do not actually have that reason (e.g., because the wound is fake). By 
contrast, there may not be any practical failure on one’s part when one is a member of a 
composite agent(Met) and yet the quasi-obligation plays no role in her practical 
deliberation—it is perfectly fine to neglect the demands from the West Side Reading 
Group. If one conflates different kinds of composite agent, one would misattribute the 
normative significance to the wrong composite agent. 
Moreover, in neither case does reference to the composite agent itself play a role in 
grounding the obligation its members have. On the one hand, one may conceive of a 
democratic society as a polity with formal and informal political institutions, including 
(informal) norms that require its members to participate in politics. In this case, a polity is 
a composite agent that satisfies (Met), and the political institutions specify the special 
quasi-obligations associated with being a citizen. The polity plays a role in explaining why 
certain quasi-obligations exist and membership explains why these quasi-obligations 
apply to of certain individuals. But more needs to be said about whether these quasi-
obligations are genuine obligations, and neither the polity nor membership plays any role 
in that explanation. On the other hand, one may conceive of a democratic society as a 
political community with shared democratic values and norms. In this case, a political 
community is a composite agent that satisfies (Norm), and the shared democratic values 
and norms give its members a reason for participating in politics (namely, an obligation to 
do so). But what gives each individual member the reason is the values and norms 
themselves, not the fact that they are shared or communal. The community constituted 
by value-sharing individuals does not play any role in explaining why the member has the 
reason for participating in politics. 
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Therefore, the claim that a citizen has the moral obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation in virtue of being a member of a democratic society does not 
seem promising. Regardless of whether political culture is understood as the formal or 
informal institutions of a polity, or as shared values and norms of society, it is idle in 
explaining or grounding the obligation to participate in politics. It is possible that certain 
values shared by members of society give rise to an obligation to participate in politics, 
but whether the values are shared is irrelevant and so there is no need to make reference 
to the culture that embeds these values.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE HARM AVOIDANCE ARGUMENT 
In a democratic society with decent social order, actions of the polity are supposed to 
be determined by its constituents’ decisions concerning the law and their compliance with 
the law. This raises a question about the moral obligation a citizen may have with respect 
to the actions of the polity. It seems plausible to think that a citizen should behave in a 
way that would minimize the chance of the polity unjustifiably harming the well-being or 
impeding the self-determination of someone, especially when she does not need to 
sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance. 
In this chapter, I will develop an argument for the obligation52 to participate in 
democratic deliberation.53 The argument depends on two moral claims: that it is morally 
wrong for anyone to unjustifiably harm someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-
determination, and that everyone has an obligation to avoid participating in collective 
wrongdoing. The argument roughly goes as follows: To avoid participating in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by one’s polity, one needs to determine whether the 
laws (or potential laws) one complies (or would comply) with constitute government 
policies that are unjustifiably detrimental to anyone’s well-being or self-determination, 
and try to change them if they are.54 In order to determine whether government policies 
are unjustifiably detrimental to anyone’s well-being or self-determination, one needs to 
determine whether any of the policies in question is disallowed by a set of action-guiding 
principles that no one can reasonably reject.55 This would require one to participate in 
democratic deliberation. Therefore, one has an obligation to participate in the 
                                                
52 Unless otherwise noted, “obligation” means defeasible moral obligation. 
53 To recall from Chapter 1, to participate in democratic deliberation is to engage in some public act that 
involves the giving, weighing, accepting or rejecting reasons that guide political procedures. The act is 
public in the sense that the acting agent can justify the act to someone else. 
54 Government policies can be defined as action plans of the government determined by the enactment 
(including repealing an existing law) or enforcement of the law. The executive and judiciary branches 
enforce the law enacted by the legislative branch. The existing law also defines the power each branch of 
the government has in terms of enactment and enforcement of the law. Government policies can be 
changed by enacting new law or by changing how a law is to be enforced. 
55 This is an extension of T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
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democratic deliberation of one’s polity. In the next three sections, I will explain and 
justify the premises of this argument one by one. In the last section, I will discuss issues 
surrounding the culpability of failing to fulfill this obligation when it is not defeated. 
The concepts of “wrong,” “defeasible obligation,” “responsible,” “excuse” and 
“culpable” are related to one another in the following way. “It is wrong to φ” entails that 
there is an obligation to avoid φ-ing. The obligation is defeasible because particular 
circumstances may render it impossible to avoid φ-ing, or the obligation may be 
outweighed by other obligations when it conflicts with them. If an agent is responsible for 
φ-ing and φ-ing is wrong, she is culpable for φ-ing unless she is excused. “Culpability” 
means blameworthy. When an agent is excused for doing something wrong, she is not 
blameworthy for doing so (although what she does is still wrong).56 
Before I lay out the justification and explanation of the premises of my argument in 
detail, I want to motivate my argument by an analogy. Under normal circumstances, it is 
morally wrong to hit someone with a car. It can be wrong in two different ways. It is 
morally wrong to hit someone willingly, e.g., attempting to badly injure someone out of 
revenge. It is also morally wrong to hit someone out of negligence, e.g., texting while 
driving. Under some extraordinary circumstances, it is morally permissible or excusable 
to hit someone with a car, e.g., when a pedestrian suddenly jumps in front of the car out of 
nowhere and it is impossible to avoid hitting her. What follows from these moral 
intuitions is that one has an obligation to avoid hitting someone with a car to the extent 
that one can. 
There are multiple ways to fulfill this moral obligation. Perhaps the simplest way 
would be to avoid driving altogether. But this may not be an option. For whatever reason, 
one may already be driving (e.g., after moving to a small town with no public 
transportation) and it would be too late to fulfill the obligation by not driving. Even if one 
is kidnapped and forced at gunpoint to drive, our moral intuition suggests that one still 
                                                
56 Wrongfulness, obligation, responsibility, excusibility, culpability and blameworthiness come in degree. 
But for the sake of convenience, I will talk as if they are all-or-nothing notions. 
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ought to avoid hitting someone with the car.57 Or one may be morally obligated to drive 
because driving is necessary for fulfilling one’s obligation to care for oneself or others. If 
one is already driving or is morally obligated to drive, then one would need to fulfill one’s 
obligation to avoid hitting someone by driving safely. Driving safely requires one to do 
something actively. One needs to learn how to drive properly and actively watch out for 
other cars and pedestrians when one is behind the wheel. One also needs to make sure 
that the car is safe to drive, which requires one to maintain the car and pay attention to 
any mechanical abnormality while one is driving. 
The obligation to participate in democratic deliberation is similar to the obligation to 
drive safely in some important respects. Members of a democratic society collectively 
determine the laws of their political institution, and they give these laws causal efficacy by 
complying with them. On the national level, most members are born into the polity and 
the rest choose to enter by choice (immigration); both of them are like drivers who are 
already driving. A political institution can “run people over” with its bad laws in a 
metaphorical sense. So members who neglect to participate in democratic deliberation or 
fail to participate in a proper way are like a driver who fails to drive safely. 
But driving is not a perfect analogy. For one thing, in the case of political institution, 
the political institution, not any of its individual members, perpetrates the wrongful act of 
“running people over.” It takes further argumentation to show that (some) individual 
members have done something wrong when the composite agent constituted by them acts 
wrongfully (Section 2). Moreover, there needs to be an account of what constitutes 
institutionally “running people over” to make precise what exactly the metaphor means 
(Section 1). 
3.1 UNJUSTIFIABLY HARMING THE WELL-BEING OR IMPEDING THE SELF-
DETERMINATION OF SOMEONE 
A polity “runs someone over” when it unjustifiably harms someone’s well-being or 
impedes someone’s self-determination. In this section, I will extend T.M. Scanlon’s 
                                                
57 Of course, if one were being forced to hit someone with a car, the considerations in play would be different. 
 61 
contractualism to characterize the wrongfulness of wrongdoing perpetrated by a polity 
and flesh out the concept of unjustifiability. I shall note upfront that this is not an account 
of public reason or public justification and I will explain this towards the end of this 
section. After that, I will explain what it is for someone to participate in the collective 
wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity. 
Harm to Well-Being and Impediment to Self-Determination 
In order to see what the metaphor of “running people over” amounts to, we may 
take a step back to reflect on why hitting someone with a car is morally wrong under 
normal circumstances. Here is a suggestion: it is morally wrong because it is unjustifiably 
detrimental to the victim’s well-being and self-determination.58 It is detrimental to the 
victim’s well-being because it would severely harm her health or even cause her death. It 
is detrimental to the victim’s self-determination because it would incapacitate the victim 
or even end her existence as a free acting agent. It is unjustifiable because it is 
unreasonable for the driver to do this to the victim under normal circumstances and the 
victim has very good reasons to refuse this treatment. 
It is uncontroversial to say that harming someone’s well-being or impeding self-
determination is at least prima facie wrong.59 This claim does not presuppose a particular 
normative theory in ethics, as one can reach this conclusion using any common 
normative theories.60 Nor does it presuppose that the wrongfulness of harming someone’s 
well-being is distinct from the wrongfulness of harming someone’s self-determination. It 
could be that impeding someone’s self-determination is prima facie wrong because self-
                                                
58 Presumably it can be wrong for other reasons too (e.g., it is illegal and one has a moral obligation to obey 
the law in general regardless of what the ground of the law is), but I believe the explanation I just give is a 
major and obvious one. 
59 That means harming someone’s well-being or impeding self-determination is an action that calls for 
moral justification—it is morally wrong if none can be provided (by contrast, saving a drowning child is not 
an action that calls for moral justification). Unjustifiable harming or impeding is wrong, which implies a 
defeasible moral obligation to avoid doing so. 
60 For example, it follows from the utilitarian theory that not harming someone’s well-being or impeding 
someone’s self-determination is a utility-maximizing rule and so a good action-guiding rule of thumb. It is 
obviously that the Kantian theory disallows harming someone’s self-determination because it violates 
someone’s autonomy. It can also be argued that the Kantian theory disallows impeding someone’s well-
being without justification because that would fail to respect that person’s humanity. 
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determination constitutes well-being, or vice versa, depending on one’s favorite value 
theory. 
The complete list of things that constitute well-being and self-determination is a 
subject of dispute, but some items are obviously. For example, everyone would agree that 
excruciating pain constitutes the lack of well-being. Everyone would also agree that 
freedom of movement constitutes self-determination. Being tied to a chair or confined in 
a house constitutes the lack of self-determination.61 
A polity, like an individual human agent, can harm someone’s well-being or impede 
someone’s self-determination. To recall, a polity is a composite agent(Met), which satisfies 
the following criterion: 
Several individual agents constitute an entity CA and CA is a composite 
agent(Met) if, and only if, 
1. each individual agent is directly related to at least one other agent in CA 
and indirect related all other agents in CA, and the direct relation(s) 
define the practical role(s) of each individual agent, 
2. (a) actions of an individual agent realizes the information states (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, etc.) of CA when she acts on the special quasi-
obligations associated with the practical roles mentioned in 1, and 
(b) these information states can be invoked to explain or predict actions 
of CA, and 
3. each individual agent is aware that other individual agent(s) in CA may 
act on the special quasi-obligations associated with their practical roles.62 
Citizens are members of the polity and their legal obligations are the quasi-obligations 
associated with their citizenship. By calling the legal obligations “quasi-obligations,” I 
leave open the possibility that the polity or its law is illegitimate, i.e. it lacks political 
                                                
61 Impediment to one’s self-determination can be understood as hindrance to one’s potential preferred course 
of action. “Potential” is added to the definition in order to avoid cases in which the agent change her 
preference in light of the hindrance to a course of action (e.g., a slave may choose to avoid doing things that 
she knows her master would not allow her to do).  
62 The criterion is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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authority. One may also think that the quasi-obligations associated with citizenship go 
beyond legal obligations (e.g., the civic duty to vote). But for my purpose I will only stay 
with uncontroversial cases—legal obligations—because everyone would agree that if a 
citizen has any quasi-obligation qua citizen, it must include what the law requires her to 
do. 
A polity acts when the government enacts and enforces laws and when the citizens 
(including both government officials and private citizens) comply with the law actively or 
passively. The polity cannot act if, for whatever reason, its citizens do not comply with the 
laws enacted by the government (consider the Democratic Republic of Congo, or any 
failed state in the world). 
The polity can harm someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-determination if 
the government enacts and enforces laws (with the compliance of its citizens) constituting 
policies that are detrimental to someone’s well-being or self-determination. For example, 
when the southern states enacted and enforced the Jim Crow laws, they harmed the well-
being and impeded the self-determination of their African American citizens. Some of the 
laws were detrimental to the self-determination of African Americans because they 
effectively disenfranchised the African Americans through poll taxes, literacy and 
comprehension tests, residency requirements, etc. Segregation laws were also detrimental 
to the well-being of African Americans, as they vastly reduced the quantity and quality of 
the public facilities available to African Americans. The result was detrimental to self-
determination as well, since it hurt the upward social mobility of African Americans. 
However, sometimes a polity can be justified in harming someone’s well-being or 
impeding someone’s self-determination. For example, the criminal justice system is 
designed to impede the self-determination of criminals. A polity is justified in doing so for 
retribution, the benefit of locking up criminals (e.g., to deter potential criminals, to remove 
dangerous criminals from the streets…), or some combination of both. Harming 
someone’s well-being or impeding someone’s self-determination is wronging someone 
only if it is unjustifiable. 
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Unjustifiability 
If a polity is an acting agent, then it can wrong someone by its action like a human 
agent can. Here, I am extending T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism to account for the 
unjustifiability of the actions of a polity. Scanlon thinks that one’s action is wrong if one 
cannot justify it to someone else—that is, the latter can reasonably reject the principle the 
former appeals to when the former tries to justify her action. Scanlon’s contractualism is 
the view that “an act is wrong if its performances would be disallowed by any set of 
principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a 
basis for informed, unforced general agreement” (153). Notice that unjustifiability is a 
sufficient condition—a justifiable act can be morally wrong for a different reason. Scanlon 
intends his account to be limited to “a narrower domain of morality having to do with 
our duties to other people, including such things as requirements to aid them, and 
prohibitions against harming, killing, coercion, and deception” (6). 
The purpose of invoking Scanlon’s account is to show a plausible link between 
political morality and morality from an individual perspective (including moral concerns 
from the so-called private sphere). Regardless of its merits as a metaethical theory, 
Scanlon’s account has at least carved out a domain of individual morality and provided a 
sufficient condition for something to fall within this domain (i.e. the sufficient condition of 
being wrong).63 My point is that institutional wrong, or wrongful actions performed by a 
political entity, falls within this domain as well. 
It is obvious that hitting someone with a car while driving drunk is unjustifiably 
detrimental to the victim’s well-being and self-determination. It also seems obvious that it 
is not unjustifiable for a polity to impede the self-determination of criminals as long as it is 
not excessive (although people may disagree on what the justification would be). 
                                                
63 Some (e.g., David Sosa) hold that Scanlon’s account is not a substantial metaethical account because 
unjustifiability, or negative moral judgment, does not explain wrongfulness; some may argue that it should 
be the other way around. Sosa also argues that it does not have a plausible theory of motivation. If these 
criticisms hold, then contractualism does not solve the dilemma it is set out to solve. These are not my 
concerns. I do not need the metaethical explanatory relation; I only need the sufficient condition. All I need 
for my purpose is that people can recognize the justificatory force of reasons (perhaps without being 
motivated by it) and that people can describe reasons without using the word “wrong.” 
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However, many cases are not as obvious. For example, suppose the marriage law of a 
polity only recognizes the union between a man and a woman. Is this polity unjustifiably 
harming the well-being and impeding the self-determination of homosexual couples and 
polygamists in the polity? Such a law is detrimental to the self-determination of these two 
groups of citizens, because they cannot form a type of socially-recognized, self-chosen 
familial relation that heterosexual monogamists can. The law is also detrimental to their 
well-being, as they cannot enjoy many legal and social protections that married couples 
enjoy. But is the law unjustifiably detrimental to their well-being and self-determination? 
On Scanlon’s contractualist view, there is no predetermined list of theories, principles 
or reasons of justification.64 Reasonable rejection may come in many different forms, and 
it involves taking into consideration the points of view of those who would be burdened or 
benefitted by the principles. Here is an example. Consider a principle that permits hitting 
someone with a car while driving drunk. Can anyone reasonably reject this principle, 
whatever that might be? Yes, the victim has strong reason to reject such a principle. Now, 
consider a principle that disallows hitting someone with a car while driving drunk (e.g., a 
principle that requires “one to prevent injury or death when one can easily do so” while 
“operat[ing] an automobile” (Scanlon 231)). Can anyone reasonably reject this principle? 
No. The potential victim, who would benefit from this principle, has no good reason to 
reject it. Neither can anyone whose interest may be harmed by this principle reasonably 
reject it. For example, imagine someone who rejects the principle by the follow reason: “it 
would be inconvenient for me if I can’t drive home and risk hitting someone on my way 
after I get drunk at the bar.” This rejection would be rather unreasonable, given what 
would happen to the victim while being hit by a car. One can reach this conclusion after 
comparing what would happen to the victim if drunk-driving is allowed and what would 
happen to the drunk driver if drunk-driving is forbidden. 
According to Scanlon, the reasons one appeals to in a reasonable rejection have to be 
personal reasons. The following example illustrates the distinction between personal and 
                                                
64 By contrast, according to, say, utilitarianism, one is justified in performing an action if and only if the 
action satisfies the principle of utility. 
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impersonal reasons. Suppose I reject a principle that permits burning up Van Gogh’s 
paintings for wanton pleasure. If the reason I appeal to is that Van Gogh’s paintings are 
intrinsically valuable, I am appealing to an impersonal reason. Whereas if the reason I 
appeal to is that if anyone burns the paintings, I would not be able to look at them and 
appreciate their beauty anymore, I am appealing to a personal reason. The strength of 
this personal reason (or whether it is a reason at all) depends partly on whether the 
paintings are intrinsically valuable and the intrinsic value of a particular kind of wanton 
pleasure (say, the wanton pleasure generated by burning up expensive paintings). That is, 
impersonal reasons can be the reasons that certain personal reasons are reasons at all.65 
Scanlon limits the appeal to reasons in a reasonable rejection to personal reasons because 
he is working on a limited domain of morality, namely, “what we owe to each other.” 
When I claim that no one should burn Van Gogh’s paintings for wanton pleasure because 
it is intrinsically valuable, I am appealing to an impersonal reason and not making a 
claim about what other people owe me. But when I say that no one should burn Van 
Gogh’s paintings because I want to look at them, I am appealing to a personal reason and 
making a claim about what other people owe me, namely, the obligation not to destroy 
Van Gogh’s paintings (at least not for wanton pleasure). 
In the case of gay marriage ban, one may consider the following. Can anyone 
reasonably reject the principles that sanction the ban? Yes. Gay couples can reasonably 
reject these principles because the principles do not provide good reasons for differential 
treatment.66 Opponents of gay marriage may try to provide a reason for differential 
treatment by arguing that allowing gay marriage constitutes a threat to their chosen way of 
                                                
65 Different philosophers may have different terminology for this distinction. For example, Jonathan Dancy 
would call impersonal reasons “enablers” (if they determine whether something is a reason or not) or 
“intensifiers” (if they determine the strength of a reason); cf. Ethics Without Principles. 
66 Here is an example of a good reason that justifies differential treatment: a color-blinded person cannot 
become a commercial pilot because she would not be able to “to perceive those colors necessary for safe 
performance of airman duties” (Federal Aviation Administration). 
A conservative may claim that gay people are not being treated differently because no one is allowed to 
marry a person of the same sex. My reply is that gay couples and heterosexual couples are being treated 
differently in terms of the restriction on their self-determination. Gay people cannot marry their romantic 
partners while heterosexual people can. 
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life, an appeal to a personal reason for rejecting principles that forbid the ban. I have a 
hard time fleshing out the threat-to-chosen-way-of-life argument; but if, unbeknown to 
me, someone can, then the account of moral unjustifiability here does not settle the issue. 
Otherwise, gay marriage ban is unjustifiably detrimental to the self-determination of gay 
people.67 
A polity, as an agent, also owes other creatures (including individual human agents) 
moral obligations of the sort described above. To name an obvious example: Nazi 
Germany wronged many German Jews during World War II by murdering them. What 
it means is not that Nazi Germany has exercised illegitimate authority over its Jewish 
citizens; it means that Nazi Germany has done something morally wrong to the Jewish 
citizens it murdered in the sense that a sadistic serial murderer has done something 
morally wrong to her victims. 
There is nothing in Scanlon’s account that prevents me from extending his account 
to include composite agents as wrongdoers. Scanlon defines “the range of creatures 
towards whom one can behave wrongly” (178) by the following list, which defines the 
range by narrowing it down: 
(1) Those beings that have a good; that is, those for which things can go 
better or worse 
(2) Those beings in group (1) who are conscious, and capable of feeling pain 
(3) Those beings in group (2) who are capable of judging things as better or 
worse and, more generally, capable of holding judgment-sensitive 
attitudes 
(4) Those beings in group (3) who are capable of making the particular kind 
of judgments involved in moral reasoning (Scanlon 179) 
This list defines who can be wronged, and it does not restrict the kind of agent that can 
do the wronging (e.g., the wrongdoer does not have to be an agent that can feel pain). 
                                                
67 I will leave this as it is because I do not want to reproduce the whole debate on gay marriage here. My 
purpose is merely to illustrate how the consideration about the wrongfulness of the action of the state may 
proceed. 
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I should also note that Scanlon rejects the following as a limitation on the range of 
creatures that can be wronged: 
(5) Those beings in group (4) with whom it is advantageous for [one] to 
enter into a system of mutual restraint and cooperation (ibid.) 
If (5) were included, one might argue that a polity cannot wrong anyone because there is 
no one with whom it is advantageous for it to enter into a system of mutual restraint and 
cooperation. With (5) excluded, the set of beings that a polity can wrong is not empty. 
When one uses the contractualist framework to decide whether a certain action of a 
polity is unjustifiably detrimental to the well-being or self-determination of someone, one 
needs to consider the points of view of those who would be benefited or burdened by the 
principles that disallow or permit the action. A polity is a composite agent. What would 
be considered as beneficial or burdensome to a human agent is quite different from what 
would be considered as beneficial or burdensome to a composite agent (e.g., the latter 
does not experience pain, so it cannot be burdened by painful experience; nor does the 
latter have conscious emotions).68 Therefore, when one uses the contractualist framework 
to decide whether a certain action of a polity is wrong, the consideration will be largely on 
the benefits or burdens on its members instead of the polity itself.69 
Scanlon’s account clearly has a connection with the social contract tradition (and 
thus the name “contractualism”).70 But it is an account of substantive moral principles 
rather than an account of public justification or public reason, even when the account is 
extended to characterize the wrongdoing of polities. 
                                                
68 Composite agents (or groups in general) do not have consciousness, which entails that they do not have 
conscious emotions. When a spokesperson of the Chinese government claims that certain comments made 
by the international community “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people,” the claim should be understood 
distributively. But Bryce Huebner argues that groups can have emotions nonetheless. 
69 The Supreme Court complicated things when it ruled that corporations are persons that have the 
freedom of speech (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission) and freedom of religion (Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby). It seems as though the self-determination of a corporation, a composite agent, and the self-
determination of a human agent, can be impeded in a similar fashion. While I believe that the Supreme 
Court was mistaken in both cases, I shall avoid a lengthy digression on this issue by focusing on cases that 
does not involve considering the benefit or burden on the polity itself. 
70 “The idea of a shared willingness to modify our private demands in order to find a basis of justification 
that others also have reason to accept is a central element in the social contract tradition going back to 
Rousseau” (Scanlon 5). 
 69 
An account of public reason describes how laws can be justified to all of those who 
are subject to the authority of these laws. It can also be seen as describing a method of 
conflict resolution—how citizens holding different, sometimes conflicting, values and 
opinions can come to an agreement about what the government should or should not do. 
The account often provides some criteria of what counts as a legitimate reason in political 
discourse in order to screen out reasons that cannot be accepted by everyone. For 
example, on John Rawls’s account, comprehensive doctrines cannot be used to justify the 
basic structure of society (the principles that govern the basic structure are not up for 
democratic deliberation), because they are not doctrines that everybody would agree to.71 
Citizens can appeal to reasonable comprehensive doctrines to support laws and policies 
only when they are not concerned with the basic structure.72 Gutmann and Thompson 
think that the considerations that one can appeal to in justifying laws and policies in the 
political discourse must satisfy certain “principles of preclusion,” including the 
requirement that “the argument for the position must presuppose a disinterested 
perspective that could be adopted by any member of a society” (Why Deliberative Democracy? 
72).73 Gerald Gaus’s justificatory liberalism requires that the public reasons are “stable in 
the face of acute and sustained criticism by others and of new information” (31). Some 
accounts of public reason may also exclude certain participants. For example, Rawls’s 
                                                
71 The basic structure is “a society’s main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit 
together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next” (Rawls, Political 
Liberalism 11). A moral, philosophical or religious doctrine is comprehensive “when it includes conceptions 
of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of 
familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our 
life as a whole” (Rawls, Political Liberalism 13). 
72 A reasonable comprehensive doctrine “covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of 
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner” and “singl[es] out which values to count as 
especially significant and how to balance them when they conflict” (Rawls, Political Liberalism 59). It 
“normally belongs to, or draw upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine.” (ibid.) A citizen can appeal to 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines to support laws and policies that are not concerned with the basic 
structure (Rawls, Political Liberalism 245–246). 
73 Unlike Rawls, Gutmann and Thompson believe that the justification of the basic structure should be 
settled by actual deliberation instead of Rawls’s ideal deliberation behind the veil of ignorance. However, 
they also want to exclude certain items from reaching the political agenda, e.g., racial discrimination, 
because they “deserve no place on the political agenda” (Why Deliberative Democracy? 70). Therefore, they use 
the principles that govern the process of deliberation to filter out positions on which people cannot 
reasonably disagree with one another. 
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account excludes those who do not accept the burdens of judgment from the public 
discourse.74 Jürgen Habermas does not specify the criteria of legitimate reasons; instead 
he proposes constraints on the process through which the exchange of reasons can take 
place. Robert Adams thinks pubic reason can only play a limited role in resolving political 
conflict and Ruth Chang has suggested that different conflicts in political discourse may 
call for different approaches of conflict resolution.75 
The extended contractualist account of unjustifiability is different from an account of 
public reason in both its aim and its content. Unlike an account of public reason, the 
contractualist account does not aim at providing a sufficient condition of justified laws. 
Rather, it provides a necessary condition. Or in other words, it provides a sufficient 
condition of laws that a polity ought not to have. 
Nor does it stipulate any rule to exclude any reason (or alleged reason, if a bad 
reason is not a genuine reason) from being a justificatory reason for laws. It does not 
provide a method to resolve conflicts within in social cooperation. Rather, it explains why 
people should commit themselves to resolving the conflicts in the first place. To recall, the 
enemy of my project is political apathy, the spectator-sports mentality in politics and 
social un-cooperation—each citizen acts unilaterally (or fails to act altogether) to the 
extent that the political institution allows her to, without regards of other citizens’ 
concerns. One of my main concerns is to show that there is a moral obligation to 
participate in social cooperation. The proponents of public reason are concerned with 
                                                
74 A person who rejects the burdens of judgment believes that moral disagreement is not reasonable. 
According to Rawls, there are two aspects of a reasonable person. First, she is “ready to propose principles 
and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others 
will likewise do so” (Political Liberalism 49). Second, she is willing “to recognize the burdens of judgment and 
to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political 
power in a constitutional regime” (Political Liberalism 54). A person may be willing to propose fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them, but she may also believe that the terms she proposes are the only 
possible fair terms and all reasonable people should recognize that. On Rawls’s account, this person is 
unreasonable and she cannot be a partner of fair social cooperation. 
75 According to Chang, “[r]easonable approaches to practical conflict seek to achieve substantive values 
that typically go beyond those at stake in the conflict itself, while rational approaches seek to conform to the 
norms governing intrinsic, well-functioning deliberation” (“Reflections” 138), and “the rationality of a social 
choice is determined neither simply by the objective social good nor simply by the people’s beliefs but by 
some combination of the two, what I will call the social value” (“Reflections” 151). Sometimes the structure of 
social conflict calls for a rational approach rather than a reasonable approach. 
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specifying the fair terms of social cooperation. Public reason does not give citizens reasons 
for cooperation; in fact, it may give certain citizens a reason not to cooperate by deeming 
certain classes of people unreasonable. It is not my goal to provide a complete account 
about how polarized citizens should resolve or reconcile their disagreement in politics. 
Later in this chapter, I will argue that citizens of democratic society are morally 
obligated to determine whether actions of their polity (the enactment and enforcement of 
laws) are unjustifiably detrimental to someone’s well-being or self-determination and try 
to change those actions if they are. This obligation requires them to consider whether the 
actions are disallowed by the principles that no one affected by the actions can reasonably 
reject. Before I can reach this conclusion, I need to explain why members of a polity have 
an obligation to avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated through the 
actions of the polity and the implication of this negative obligation. 
3.2 PARTICIPATING IN COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 
When a polity unjustifiably harms someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-
determination, what does that say about its members? Actions of a polity are not directly 
attributable to its members. Policymakers play crucial roles in determining actions of the 
polity—for example, lawmakers constitute Congress, which enacts laws—but actions of 
the lawmakers are not identical to actions of the polity (in fact, not even identical to 
actions of Congress). Suppose Congress declares a war on another country; individual 
members of Congress do not declare a war. Moreover, the declaration would not have 
any actual effect if the President does not act on the declaration of war, or if (as unlikely 
as it sounds) members of the military refuse to follow orders. Private citizens are even 
more removed from actions of the polity. What a private citizen does often has little 
impact in determining what her polity does, and the former is certain not to be identified 
with the latter. 
The relation between the wrongfulness of the actions of the composite agent(Met) and 
the obligations of its members is not straightforward. A composite agent(Met) acts when its 
members fulfill their quasi-obligations associated with their practical roles. There are 
several possibilities when a composite agent(Met) acts wrongfully (or fails to act rightfully). 
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It may act wrongfully because some of its members do not fulfill their quasi-obligations 
(e.g., corrupted judges are not doing their jobs so that the court system fails to check the 
abuse of power of the executive branch of the government through judicial review). Or it 
may act wrongfully because its members do fulfill their quasi-obligations (e.g., members of 
Nazi Germany obeyed their government so that Nazi Germany could successfully murder 
millions of people). Moreover, members may act (or fail to act) wrongfully with the full 
knowledge of what they are doing, or they may act (or fail to act) wrongfully out of 
negligence. Each scenario requires its own analysis. 
A citizen participates in the collective wrongdoing of her polity when she complies 
with its laws, or exercises her legal rights, in ways that help realize the collective 
wrongdoing.76 So for example, a citizen may participate in the collective wrongdoing 
perpetrated by her polity by paying tax if the tax revenue funds a genocide. Or a citizen 
may participate in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity by voting for 
someone who eventually takes office and uses her power to start a genocide.77 In order to 
avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity, one has to at 
least exercise one’s legal rights in ways that help prevent or stop the collective 
wrongdoing, or even refuse to comply with certain laws.78 With this working definition of 
participating in the collective wrongdoing of one’s polity, we may ask: is there a moral 
obligation to avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing of the polity? 
According to many normative theories, it is morally wrong to participate in collective 
wrongdoing in this sense, even when individual participation or abstinence has little or no 
                                                
76 When a citizen exercises her legal rights, it affects what others need to do in order to fulfill their legal 
obligations, which in turn affects how the polity acts. 
77 Notice that under this definition of participation, a person who breaks the law does not participate in the 
collective wrongdoing of the polity. For example, the elected official who starts a genocide by abusing her 
power (i.e. breaking some law) does not participate in collective wrongdoing by abusing her power. Her 
action does not constitute the participation of collective wronging, although it is still wrong for a different 
reason (e.g., using the polity as an instrument to cause great harm to others). 
78 To recall the analogy of driving: in order to fulfill to obligation to avoid hitting someone with a car, the 
driver needs to behave in ways that would prevent the car from running someone over. There may be 
questions about whether stopping the collective wrongdoing is sufficient for avoiding participating in 
collective wrongdoing (because one is already in the middle of it). But it seems that trying to stop the 
wrongdoing is at least necessary, because it can prevent further wrongdoing. 
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impact on the outcome. 79  However, this claim seems less obvious from the 
consequentialist perspective. While I do not endorse consequentialism, I want to show 
that a consequentialist should also accept my argument. In what follows, I will explain 
why both high-impact participation and low-impact participation are wrong (namely, no 
meaningful distinction can be drawn), and why a consequentialist should expand her 
focus on consequence from the consequence of individual actions to include the 
consequence of collective actions. 
High-Impact Participation and Isaacs’s Account 
Members of a composite agent(Met) do not commit the wrongful act done by the a 
composite agent(Met). The relation between actions of the former and actions of the latter 
is either causal or constitutive. A member’s obligation to do or refrain from doing 
something with respect to the wrongful acts done by the composite agent(Met) depends on 
her causal/constitutive relation with the wrongful acts done by the a composite agent(Met) 
as well as her attitudes towards the wrongful acts. 
Tracy Isaacs argues that members of an organization (a composite agent(Met) on my 
account) who are in positions of authority are morally responsible for actions of the 
organization, even though actions of the organization are not identical to actions of the 
executives. By contrast, the “rank and file” of the organization is not responsible for the 
actions of the organization per se, but they can be blameworthy for contributing to its 
wrongful actions. The distinction between those who are in position of authority and the 
rank and file is that, the former influences the outcome through participating in the 
decision-making of the organization, while the latter influences the outcome through 
other means (e.g., the implementation of the decision). Isaacs’s reasoning is that, although 
the executives of an organization often do not have complete control over the intention or 
action of the organization due to factors such as procedural constraints, their decisions 
have a much greater impact on what the organization would do; decisions of other 
                                                
79 For example, this is wrong according to Kantian ethics, because a maxim that tells one to participate in 
collective wrongdoing is not universalizable. Or one may say it is wrong because it violates a person’s 
integrity. 
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members have negligible effect on this matter. Therefore, the executives have a 
heightened responsibility compared to other members. However, other members are 
blameworthy if they know that the organization is doing something wrong and they fail to 
do what they can to stop it. In other words, the rank and file members who could have a 
high impact on the outcome would be blameworthy for not making such an impact, e.g., 
whistleblowing (Isaacs 97–129). 
If the executives are responsible for the wrong done by the organization, it follows 
that they have an obligation to avoid decisions that would lead the organization to do 
something wrong. If other members are blameworthy for being part of the wrong done by 
the organization, it follows that they have an obligation to avoid contributing to its 
wrongdoing. The obligation of the executives or the rank and file is defeated if it is 
impossible to do anything to avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing, or if the 
obligation is outweighed by other obligations. The obligation to avoid participating in 
collective wrongdoing may require one to actively do something or defy one’s quasi-
obligation, or both in the same time. For example, Isaacs thinks that whistleblowing is 
obligatory rather than supererogatory (Isaacs 136–137). 
I agree with Isaacs on what is said above, but I regard her account as inadequate 
because of how it handles low-impact participation and culpable ignorance. Consider the 
following test case: who were responsible or blameworthy for the Jim Crow laws? 
Powerful politicians in the South who supported these laws (namely, the white 
conservative Democrats) directly participated in the creation of these laws. It seems that 
they were responsible in a way that executives of an organization are responsible for the 
wrong done by the organization. How about the southern voters? On the one hand, these 
politicians would not have the political power to pursue the Jim Crow laws without the 
support of their electorates. On the other hand, each individual voter seemed to have 
negligible effect on the enactment and enforcement of the Jim Crow laws because the 
electoral support for these politicians was overwhelming among the eligible voters. 
Moreover, a voter might support these politicians for reasons other than the Jim Crow 
laws or racism (e.g., state right). Finally, there could also be eligible voters who did not 
bother to vote because they did not care or know enough about politics. 
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According to Isaacs’s account of organizational action, none of the eligible voters 
were blameworthy for contributing to the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the 
southern states through the enactment and enforcement of the Jim Crow laws. First, none 
of them could have changed the outcome because individual impact is negligible. Second, 
for those who did not care about the Jim Crow laws, they might not even know their 
votes (or the absence of their votes) would contribute to the enactment of the Jim Crow 
laws. 
I think this conclusion is wrong. If one cannot blame the voters for the reason stated 
above, one should not hold the politicians (or at least some of them) responsible either. 
The politicians could not have won enough electoral support if they did not support the 
Jim Crow laws. If a politician did not support the Jim Crow laws, someone else who 
supported the Jim Crow laws would have been elected. Then, it seems that an individual 
politician could not have made a difference in the political outcome either. But surely one 
should not conclude that no one could be blamed for the Jim Crow laws. 
Isaacs also has an account of goal-oriented collective, but this account is not 
applicable to the present case. A goal-oriented collective is a composite agent with the 
collective intention to achieve a common goal shared by all its members.80 Members of 
this collective are responsible for the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the composite 
agent if they share an immoral goal. For example, participants in the Rwanda Genocide 
constituted a composite agent that massacred hundreds of thousands of Tutsi people and 
each participant shared the goal of massacring the Tutsi people. All participants were 
culpable because they acted on the immoral goal (whereas members of an organization 
may not share the goal the organization or other member has).81 One may think that the 
southern voters and the politicians who supported the Jim Crow laws were morally 
culpable for the enactment and enforcement of the laws because they shared the immoral 
goal of oppressing African Americans. But this cannot be the full picture because 
individuals who contributed to the enactment and enforcement of the Jim Crow laws 
                                                
80 Isaacs’s goal-oriented collectives is a subset of composite agent(Norm); cf. Chapter 2. 
81 Cf. Isaacs 32–50 and 120–127. 
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need not share the goal of oppressing African Americans. For example, we could imagine 
that a politician voted for the Jim Crow laws in the legislature just for the sake of keeping 
his job, or a voter voted for a politician who supported the Jim Crow laws because the 
politician supported economic policies that would benefit the voter’s business.82 However, 
it seems that they were blameworthy for contributing to the enactment and enforcement 
of the Jim Crow laws, even though the oppression of African American was not their goal 
(it was a byproduct). In other words, this account cannot account for the wrongfulness of 
contributing to institutional wrongdoing as such. 
Isaacs also argues that participating in wrongful social practice can be wrong, despite 
the lack of an identifiable composite agent (156–176). For example, it is wrong to 
participate in the sexist culture by using sexist language, even though a culture is not a 
composite agent on her account. Similarly, Isaacs could say that southern voters and 
politicians were wrong for participating in a racist and oppressive political culture 
regardless of their motives. However, I think Isaacs’s argument about wrongful social 
practice implicitly appeals to a counterintuitive concept, namely, the concept of 
imperceptible harm. I shall return to this point after I introduce Derek Parfit’s view on 
moral mathematics and his discussion of this concept in the next section. 
I think a correct account for the case of the Jim Crow law should recognize that it is 
morally wrong to participate in collective wrongdoing even if one’s participation would 
have little impact on the outcome or have little chance to make a significant impact. I will 
draw on Derek Parfit’s discussion about moral mathematics to support this claim. I will 
discuss the issue of culpability (e.g., whether the voters who were ignorant about the Jim 
Crow laws or their wrongfulness were blameworthy for participating in a political 
institution that enacted and enforced these laws) in Section 4. 
                                                
82 For example, J. William Fulbright, the namesake of the Fulbright Program, was a Southern Democrat 
and a Senator from Arkansas. Despite his track record in supporting a progressive political agenda (e.g., he 
opposed McCarthyism and the Vietnam War), he joined other Southern Democrats in opposing the Civil 
Right Acts of 1957 and 1964. Back in the day racism was popular in Arkansas (while McCarthyism was 
not). Fulbright could have lost his seat if he supported the Civil Right Acts or showed support to the Civil 
Right Movement. 
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Low-Impact Participation and Parfit’s Account 
It seems that from the consequentialist perspective, there is nothing wrong about 
participating in collective wrongdoing if individual participation has a low impact to the 
outcome. One’s participation has low impact if its impact on the outcome is negligible 
(what Parfit calls “small or imperceptible harm or benefit”), its chance of changing the 
outcome significantly is very low, or it would not affect the outcome at all because of 
overdetermination. This is often the case when the number of participants is huge. 
However, according to Parfit, it is incorrect to think that individuals participating in 
collective wrongdoing share their responsibility for the outcome by dividing it up equally. 
It is not that if a group of a ten people together burn down a forest with a hundred trees, 
each of them is responsible for killing ten trees. Rather, when considering individual 
responsibility in relation to the outcome, the outcome has to be considered as a whole. If 
it is wrong to participate in the collective burning down of the forest, it is not because it is 
wrong to destroy ten trees, but that it is wrong to destroy a hundred trees. 
Parfit thinks that when a consequentialist tries to decide whether a course of action is 
wrong, she should compare the overall outcomes of different alternatives. Parfit uses two 
cases to illustrate the point: 
The First Rescue Mission. I know all the following: A hundred miners are 
trapped in a shaft with flood-waters rising. These men can be brought to the 
surface in a lift raised by weights on long levers. If I and three other people go 
to stand on some platform, this would provide just enough weight to raise the 
lift, and would save the lives of these hundred men. If I do not join this rescue 
mission, I could go elsewhere and save, single-handedly, the lives of ten other 
people. There is a fifth potential rescuer. If I go elsewhere, this person will 
join the other three and these four will save the hundred miners. 
The Second Rescue Mission. As before, the lives of a hundred people are in 
danger. These people can be saved if I and three other people join in a rescue 
mission. We four are the only people who could join this mission. If any of us 
fails to join, all of the hundred people will die. If I fail to join, I could go 
elsewhere and save, single-handedly, fifty other lives. (Parfit 67–68) 
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According to the faulty moral reasoning mentioned earlier, the number of lives “I” can 
save in a joint rescue mission is the total number of lives saved divided by the number of 
rescuers in the mission. “I” could personally save more lives by joining the mission in the 
first case and going elsewhere in the second case, but our intuition suggests that “I” 
should go elsewhere in the first case and join the mission in the second case. What 
explains the difference is the fact that if “I” goes elsewhere in the first case and join the 
mission in the second case, the number of lives saved everywhere would be maximized. 
The individual share of lives saved in a joint mission is irrelevant. 
What does this say about low-impact participation? Parfit considers three kinds of 
case: 
Small or imperceptible effect. Parfit believes that it is incorrect to ignore small or 
imperceptible effect on a large number of people when considering the wrongfulness of 
the action that produces the effect. Small effect and imperceptible effect are different. A 
very small dose of lead has a very small harmful effect on a person, but it is not 
imperceptible. An act has an imperceptible effect if and only if a token of this act benefits 
or harms someone in an unnoticeable way (for Parfit that means an imperceptible change 
in pleasure or pain, broadly construed); the effect of the act becomes perceptible when the 
same act is repeated many times by one or multiple agents. As Parfit himself 
acknowledges, the concept of an imperceptible pain or pleasure is counterintuitive for 
many people, although he thinks there are good reasons to accept this concept in order to 
avoid other metaphysically absurd claims.83 But he gives his argument both with and 
without the presupposition of this concept. The argument against ignoring imperceptible 
effect is essentially the same as the argument against ignoring small effect, except that 
there is no metaphysical worry about the existence of small effect. 
He considers the following cases: 
The Bad Old Days. A thousand torturers have a thousand victims. At the start 
of each day, each of the victims is already feeling mild pain. Each of the 
                                                
83 Parfit discusses those reasons briefly on 78–82. 
 79 
torturers turns a switch a thousand times on some instrument. Each turning 
of a switch affects some victim’s pain in a way that is imperceptible. But, after 
each torturer has turned his switch a thousand times, he has inflicted severe 
pain on his victim. 
The Harmless Torturers. In the Bad Old Days, each torturer inflicted severe pain 
on one victim. Things have now changed. Each of the thousand torturers 
presses a button, thereby turning the switch once on each of the thousand 
instruments. The victims suffer the same severe pain. But none of the 
torturers makes any victim’s pain perceptibly worse. 
The Single Torturer. One morning, only one of the torturers turns up for work. 
It happens to be true that, through natural causes, each of the victims is 
already suffering fairly severe pain. This pain is about as bad as it would be 
after the switches had been turned five hundred times. Knowing this fact, the 
Single Torturer presses the button that turns the switch once on all of the 
machines. The effect is the same as in the days when all the torturers act. 
More precisely, the effect is just like that when each switch is turned for the 
five hundred and first time. The Single Torturer knows that this is the effect. 
He knows that he is not making any victim’s pain perceptibly worse. And he 
knows that he is not a member of a group who together do this. (Parfit 80–81) 
Parfit thinks that each torturer in the Bad Old Days and the Harmless Torturers have done 
something wrong to the victims, although there may be some dispute about why it is so. 
In the Bad Old Days, it is clearly wrong for each torturer to flick the switch a thousand 
times to inflict the perceptible pain on the victims. In Harmless Torturers, the torturers 
together inflict perceptible pain on the victims. Given what is said earlier about the 
individual share of responsibility in collective wrongdoing, one should conclude that each 
torturer is wrong for being one of the torturers because together they inflict perceptible pain 
on the victims. However, some may reach this conclusion without believing that flicking 
the switch once is wrong, because they reject the concept of imperceptible effect. For these 
people, flicking the switch once is inconsequential when it is considered in isolation. 
Therefore, they would also think that the Single Torturer has done nothing wrong. He did 
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not inflict any pain on the victims (because there is no such thing as imperceptible pain), 
nor is he part of a group that inflicts perceptible pain on the victims. 
Now, we can return to Isaacs’s account about wrongful social practice. Isaacs thinks 
that one can be held responsible for participating in wrongful social practice without 
being identified as a member of any composite agent. In this kind of case, the wrong is 
supposed to consist in conforming to “unjust patterns of social practice” (Isaacs 158). 
However, I think Isaacs is implicitly appealing to the concept of imperceptible effect. A 
sexist culture is an unjust pattern of social practice because it, the whole practice, 
unjustifiably harms members of a particular gender. However, the harm of an isolated 
instance of sexist practice, like making a misogynous joke to a group of boys once, can be 
imperceptible. There are two possibilities: either the harm does not exist, or the harm is 
imperceptible. But surely Isaacs would want to say that telling a sexist joke at a bar with a 
bunch of male friends once is wrong, and the wrong is partly explained by the perceptible 
harm caused by the whole pattern of practice (e.g., if this joke-telling practice is done 
repeatedly, it can reinforce certain cultural prejudices against members of a particular 
gender). The perceptible harm caused by the pattern of practice explains the 
wrongfulness of an instance of the practice in either one of the following ways: the sexist 
joker is a member of the sexist composite agent that inflicts perceptible harm on members 
of a particular gender, or the sexist joker inflicts imperceptible harm on members of a 
particular gender. Since Isaacs rejects the former, she has to be committed to the latter.84 
But the concept of imperceptible effect is controversial. 
Therefore, I think it is preferable to identify the composite agent that inflicts 
perceptible harm on the victims whenever it is possible. In the case of political 
participation, the composite agent can be identified easily. This approach avoids the 
controversial metaphysical concept of imperceptible harm, and it provides a uniform 
account of participation in collective wrongdoing perpetrated by a polity. So instead of 
                                                
84 Isaacs could also reject consequentialism altogether, but that seems rather implausible. Many would think 
that oppressive social practice is morally wrong largely because of its consequence on the oppressed group. 
For example, racial segregation is morally wrong because it harmed members of a particular race, and this 
consequence was deemed unjust. 
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saying the southern voters and politicians inflicted imperceptible harm on the African 
Americans through participating in the enactment and enforcement of the Jim Crow laws, 
one can say that they participated in the collective inflicting of perceptible harm. 
Small chance. Parfit also thinks that it is incorrect to ignore small chances to make a 
difference because the difference can be very big. When one considers alternative courses 
of action by weighing possible outcomes, one should consider both the probability of 
achieving a particular outcome and the importance of that outcome. For example, a 
nuclear engineer cannot ignore the one-in-a-million chance that a component in a 
nuclear reactor may fail and cause a catastrophe. 
Parfit spends considerable space on discussing the voting paradox. It seems very 
unlikely that one out of a hundred million votes would make a difference in the electoral 
outcome, which may lead some people to conclude voting does not matter. But this is a 
mistake, according to Parfit, because the stakes of the electoral outcome may be high. 
Suppose there are two United States presidential candidates. One of them is a much 
better candidate than the other, and she would on average benefit the Americans if she 
becomes the President of the United States. Because the stakes are high, one should still 
vote, even though there is a very small chance that one’s vote can make a difference. 
Of course, one may interpret the voting paradox differently. Sometimes one can be 
very certain about the electoral outcome if one lives in a “deep red” or “deep blue” state. 
For example, if one lives in Texas, most of the time one can be very certain that the 
Republican presidential candidate will win in Texas; and when it is not certain (because, 
say, the Republicans have a very weak candidate), one can be very certain that the 
Republican presidential candidate will lose nationwide.85 The chance that one’s vote can 
make a difference is so low that it is practically zero. Coupled with this is the belief that 
the two presidential hopefuls may not be that different from one another—the difference 
is so small that it does not warrant the trouble of going to the voting booth. If one comes 
                                                
85 The last Democratic presidential win in Texas was 1976 (Jimmy Carter). The last time a Democrat won a 
statewide election was 1994. 
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to such conclusion after investing considerable time to educate oneself about politics and 
research on the candidates, one may be justified for not going to the voting booth.86 
Overdetermination. Parfit argues that it is incorrect to ignore small/imperceptible effect 
or small chance. But what if the outcome of the collective wrongdoing is overdetermined, 
i.e. there is no room for small/imperceptible effect or small chance? That is, one’s 
participation would make no difference to the outcome because other people would be 
producing the same effect regardless of the participation. For example, in The First Rescue 
Mission, having a fifth person standing on the platform would not change the outcome 
because four people on the platform would provide enough weight to raise the lift. Parfit 
does not say whether there is any obligation to refrain from participating in collective 
wrongdoing when the outcome is overdetermined. But he does say that one has no moral 
reason for participating in the collective benefiting of someone when the outcome is 
overdetermined and one knows that the outcome is overdetermined. There may be an 
asymmetry between refraining from participating in collective wrongdoing and 
participating in collective benefiting, but the asymmetry cannot be explained in 
consequentialist terms. One may either conclude that participation in the overdetermined 
case is not wrong, or it is wrong for an inconsequentialist reason (i.e. consequentialism is 
incorrect or inadequate). 
Without adjudicating which conclusion is correct (because even though I am not a 
consequentialist, I am selling my argument to the consequentialist!), I will say the 
following. In the case of voting, if one is absolutely certain that one’s vote would not make 
a difference in the electoral outcome, it seems that one has no all-things-considered 
obligation to cast (or not cast) one’s vote. It may be because the voting question becomes 
morally irrelevant from the consequentialist perspective, or because the inconsequentialist 
moral reason for casting (or not casting) the vote is so weak that it can be easily defeated 
                                                
86 But if one comes to this conclusion without educating oneself about politics and researching on the 
candidates, one may be guilty of epistemic negligence and culpable ignorance, an issue that I will discuss in 
Section 4. 
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in almost all circumstances (after all, voting is not costless). There may be no pre-theoretic 
intuition about whether there is any defeasible obligation to cast or not cast the vote. 
However, unlike voting, in the case of participating in democratic deliberation, one 
can never be certain that one’s participation has zero effect on the outcome. For example, 
suppose I weigh the pros and cons of the minimum wage law in terms of its effect on 
businesses and their employees. At the moment, I have not made any impact in the 
world—I am simply thinking. But it may have an effect later. When a bill is introduced in 
the state legislature to raise the minimum wage, I can, say, call my state representative to 
press her to support it. Or if I cannot make up my mind about whether I should support 
the minimum wage law, I can still explain what I think to my friends, which may help 
inform their political actions. In this example, my effort certainly has low impact, but it 
does not mean that I can simply neglect my defeasible obligation to put in the effort (that 
is, if I indeed have the defeasible obligation to avoid participating in the collective 
wrongdoing by participating in democratic deliberation). 
Finally, I shall note that Frank Jackson rejects Parfit’s intuition about the torturer 
cases as well as his treatment of the whole subject matter. Jackson thinks that no 
individual has done anything wrong in the Harmless Torturers case and the Single Torturer 
case, even though one’s intuition may incline one to think otherwise. He also rejects the 
presupposition that “if a group act is wrong, surely at least one of its constituent acts is 
wrong” (101). 
Jackson provides a sort of game-theoretic counterexample to the presupposition, and 
here is one of them: 
The morning traffic example There is a steady stream of traffic going to work. 
Everyone is driving at 80 kilometers per hour. I would be safer if everyone 
was driving at 60. The right group action is for everyone together to drive at 
60. But what about each person, should he or she drive at 60? The answer 
may well be no; for it may well be the case that if he or she were to drive at 60, 
everyone else would still drive at 80, and so a lot of dangerous overtaking 
would result. For each individual the right action is to keep driving at 80, so 
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avoid dangerously disrupting the traffic flow; yet the right group action is for 
everyone to drive at 60. (Jackson 102) 
Setting aside whether (i) “everyone driving at 80” is a group action in a meaningful sense, 
I do not think that it is the wrong action. It is more dangerous (worse) than (ii) “everyone 
driving at 60,” and safer (better) than (iii) “one person is driving at 60 while everyone else 
is driving at 80.” And if a driver believes that other people are driving at 80 and she still 
drives at 60 (how can she not know?), she helps realize (iii) instead of (ii). 
What if there is a prisoner’s dilemma sort of case, in which every participant acts on 
her most rational and reasonable judgment and together they realize the worst outcome? 
And further suppose that the choice situation is shaped by certain established social 
institution, so that one can say there is a composite agent(Met) causing the worst outcome. 
Even so, it would not be a counterexample to the presupposition if the causing of the worst 
outcome is not wrong—it is simply unfortunate. Jackson has yet provided such an example. 
From Avoiding Collective Wrongdoing to Participating in Democratic Deliberation 
Let’s take stock. So far I have argued that a citizen has an obligation to avoid 
participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity. To recall, a citizen 
participates in the collective wrongdoing of her polity when she complies with its laws or 
exercises her legal rights in ways that help realize the collective wrongdoing. To avoid 
participating in the collective wrongdoing, one has to at least exercise one’s legal rights in 
ways that would help prevent or stop the collective wrongdoing, or even refuse to comply 
with certain laws. A citizen has the obligation even when the impact of her participation 
or abstinence is low. 
In order to exercise one’s legal rights in ways that would help prevent or stop 
collective wrongdoing, one has to determine how the polity may unjustifiably harm 
someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-determination, and what one can do 
about it as a citizen. In order to determine how the polity may unjustifiably harm 
someone’s well-being or impede someone’s self-determination, one has to determine how 
its laws may harm the well-being or impede the self-determination of certain people and 
whether these people can reasonably reject the principles that saction the harm or 
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impediment. In the next section, I will use some examples to illustrate how that may 
work. 
3.3 PARTICIPATING IN DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: A CASE STUDY 
There are two main ways to participate in the collective wrongdoing of a polity: 
complying with its laws and exercising legal rights. An example of the former is paying 
tax: the government may use the tax revenue to fund policies or enforce laws that are 
unjustifiably detrimental to someone’s well-being or self-determination. An example of 
the latter is voting (or abstaining from voting): elected officials use the power bestowed on 
them to pursue policies or enforce laws that are unjustifiably detrimental to someone’s 
well-being or self-determination. 
In what follows, I will discuss a case that involves participating in the collective 
wrongdoing of a polity in the aforementioned ways. I will use this case to explain why one 
needs to avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing by participating in democratic 
deliberation. I will also explain how the obligation to participate in democratic 
deliberation can be defeated by other obligations. 
The Militarization of the Police 
According to a New York Times report by Matt Apuzzo in June 2014, local police 
departments across the United States have been acquiring a large amount of military 
equipment, such as heavy armored vehicles, machine guns, camouflage uniforms, night-
vision equipment, silencers, etc., over the past two decades at little or no cost. Many of the 
items acquired obviously exceed the needs of a local police force (e.g., why would a local 
police officer need a silencer? A police officer is not allowed to shoot anyone silently—not 
even a SWAT member.). According to Peter Kraska, the militarization of the police 
includes over-armed police officers and a boom of SWAT raids, from 3000 per year in 
the 1980s to 45000 per year in the 2000s (6). 
What goes hand in hand with this trend is the excessive use of force by the police. 
According to a report by American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in only 7% of the time 
were SWAT teams used for their original purposes (hostage and barricade situations). In 
most cases, SWAT teams were used to search for a small amount of drugs, unnecessarily 
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endangered and injured bystanders and other innocent people.87 According to Matt 
Apuzzo of the New York Times, SWAT teams were used for liquor inspection and 
crackdowns on illegal barbering. Another manifestation of the excessive use of force is the 
police crackdown on dissent, in which the police uses inappropriate equipment for crowd 
control. Examples include the Occupy Protest in Oakland, California in 2011 and the 
protest over police killing in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014. In the Oakland case, the 
Oakland police department used direct-fired SIM (specialty impact weapons, e.g., bean 
bag rounds and rubber bullets) to disperse the crowd, which critically injured one of the 
protestors. The victim sued the Oakland police department and the City of Oakland 
settled the case with him by paying him $4.5 million.88 In the Ferguson case, the 
Ferguson police department used armored vehicles and heavily armed officers (with 
military outfit and assault rifles) to suppress peaceful protests,89 which also escalated the 
situation into series of riots. The excessive use of force by the police is clearly detrimental 
to the well-being and self-determination of its direct victims and those who are indirectly 
threatened by it (e.g., those who stay at home out of the fear for police violence). 
The militarization of the police made the excessive use of force described above 
possible—for example, without the influx of equipment, the police simply could not 
conduct that many SWAT raids. While the psychological and financial incentives to 
abuse police power always exist, the militarization of the police makes the abuse more 
likely to happen and more damaging.90 Moreover, although we should not let the 
criminals outgun the police, the militarization seems utterly unnecessary. Police officers in 
the United States are not battling Afghan insurgents or Mexican drug cartels. Therefore, 
                                                
87 For example, according to Alecia Phonesavanh’s article on Salon, in a misinformed drug raid in Georgia, 
the SWAT team threw a flashbang grenade into a crib with her toddler sleeping inside, blowing a hole in 
his chest. The target of the raid did not even live in the house. 
88 For an overview of the case, see, for example, Amanda Holpuch’s article on the Guardian. 
89 Here is a description of the scene circulating on social media from Jay Caspian Kang of the New Yorker: 
“policemen with dogs and AR-15 assault rifles standing in a Stygian, blue-lit cloud of tear gas; crowds of 
protesters with their hands in the air, screaming ‘Hands up, don’t shoot’; members of the press being 
removed from the scene…” 
90 It can also be argued that militarization itself creates a psychological incentive for abuse, because the rise 
of SWAT teams changed how police officers view themselves and their relation with the communities they 
serve. For simplicity, I will not pursue this line of argument. 
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at first glance, the militarization of the police seems unjustifiably detrimental to the well-
being and self-determination of the victims of police brutality, because it seems that the 
victims can reasonably reject the considerations that favor the militarization of the police 
(more on this point later). 
The militarization of the police is a wrongdoing perpetrated by the United States as a 
polity. For one thing, it is closely related to the decisions of elected officials. The 
militarization of the police was fueled by the National Defense Authorization Act in 1990 
and the anti-terrorism funding after the 9/11 attacks. According to Emma Roller of 
National Journal, “Congress passed a National Defense Authorization Act with a clause 
allowing the ‘transfer of excess personal property’ from the Defense Department to local 
law enforcement—otherwise known as Section 1208. The clause was included in response 
to the surge of violent crime and the War on Drugs in the late 1980s.” Under this law, 
local law enforcement can acquire military surplus from the Department of Defense for 
free. Moreover, according Alec MacGillis of The New Republic, since the 9/11 attacks, the 
Department of Homeland Security has been providing generous funding to local law 
enforcement to “support terrorism preparedness.” Local law enforcement uses the money 
to acquire more military equipment, including a $280,000 mine-resistant BearCat 
(armored vehicle) that patrolled a pumpkin festival in New Hampshire. It is worth noting 
that in 2014, a House Representative has tried to introduce an amendment to partially 
de-fund the military surplus transfer program sanctioned by Section 1208, but 355 of his 
colleagues in the House voted against the measure. Therefore, the militarization of police 
was heightened (and continuously supported) by federal legislation and funded by federal 
tax revenue.91 This shows that the militarization of the police is not merely a problem of 
accountability of bureaucrats. Much of it is also a consequence of the decisions made by 
elected officials. 
                                                
91 I am focusing on the federal level, and so the polity that is said to be unjustifiably harming someone’s 
well-being or self-determination is the United States, but of course we can describe the issue on the state or 
local level as well, and in that case the polity that we are concerned with would be a state or a municipality. 
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A citizen of the United States would have participated in the militarization of the 
police (understood as a collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the United States) by, say, 
paying federal tax or voting for elected officials who supported the militarization of the 
police, if they have not acted in ways to avoid such participation. There are at least two 
ways to avoid participating in the militarization of the police. First, one may avoid paying 
federal tax (i.e. disobey the law). Second, one may try to influence the legislature by voting 
for political candidates who object the militarization of the police, pressuring one’s 
senator or house representative to change the law, campaigning for a change of the law, 
etc. 
If there is any defeasible obligation to avoid participating in the collective 
wrongdoing perpetrated by one’s polity, a citizen would have a defeasible obligation to 
avoid participating in the militarization of the police. It follows from the consequent that 
a citizen would have a defeasible obligation to break the federal tax law or try to influence 
the legislature. Now, breaking the federal tax law may not be the best way to fulfill this 
obligation because that would undermine one’s ability to fulfill other moral obligations. 
Just to name a few: the federal tax revenue is also used to fund other public services (e.g., 
the Food and Drug Administration helps prevent massive food poisoning), without which 
one cannot, say, properly care for oneself or one’s family; after breaking the law, one can 
be punished by the criminal justice system, which would also prevent one from caring for 
oneself or one’s family; one ought not to undermine a political institution that is by and 
large protecting the rights and freedoms of most people; so on and so forth. It seems 
uncontroversial to say that one ought to maximally fulfill one’s moral obligations, i.e. 
fulfill the most important bunch and fulfill as many of them as one can. Therefore, one 
should fulfill the disjunctive obligation to break the federal tax law or try to influence the 
legislature in ways that would not hinder one’s ability to fulfill other obligations. Although 
there would be times in which civil disobedience or even revolution is called for, under 
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normal circumstances, one should fulfill the obligation by trying to influence the 
legislature.92 
If one wants to avoid participating in collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity 
by trying to influence legislation or policy, one would need to determine how the polity 
has unjustifiably harmed someone’s well-being or impeded someone’s self-determination 
through its laws or policies.93 One would need to determine how the laws affect people of 
different sociological or economical backgrounds, what considerations different people 
may have for rejecting the laws, and what considerations prevail. Moreover, to reiterate a 
point I made earlier when I discussed Scanlon, when one tries to determine whether 
certain considerations prevail, one need not consider whether the individuals affected by 
the laws are parties of social cooperation. 
To illustrate how this may work, consider the following (admittedly an overly 
simplified description of how it should work). The militarization of the police harms 
victims of police brutality. The victims clearly have a reason to object the militarization of 
the police: it is extremely detrimental to both their well-being and self-determination. But 
their objection is reasonable if, and only if, the harm is unjustifiable. Their objection 
would not be reasonable if, for example, the harm is fairly distributed to them.94 Now, 
let’s consider what the supporters of the militarization of the police may say to justify their 
position. First, suppliers of the military equipment and police administrators have a 
reason to support the militarization of the police—they benefit from it. The suppliers are 
making more money, and the police administrators are gaining more power. However, 
they clearly cannot justify their position to the victims of police brutality with this self-
serving reason (whereas the latter can justify their position to the former—that the former 
                                                
92 The two disjuncts in the disjunctive obligation is not mutual exclusive. The purpose of civil disobedience 
is to influence political outcomes (e.g., the overturning of a bad law) by breaking some law. 
93 In fact, one would need to determine how the polity has unjustifiably harmed someone’s well-being or 
self-determination through its laws or policies before starting a revolution as well, but because revolution is 
not a means to influence the outcome of a political process (it is a means to reestablish a new political 
process), I will leave it aside. 
94 For example, when the state drafts someone and sends her into war, it is severely harming that person. 
However, this can be a fairly distributed harm if the draft is for a greater good (e.g., a genuine need in 
national security) and the draft is executed in a fair manner (e.g., the state does not just draft poor citizens). 
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cannot profit from the suffering of the latter). Second, some may support the 
militarization of the police because they believe it makes the community a little bit safer 
in general. Whether their support (i.e. an objection to their opponent’s position) is 
reasonable depends on whether the tradeoff between security of the community and the 
potential suffering of the victims is reasonable. Given the fact that the increase in the 
security of the community is negligible, it is unreasonable to put the potential victims of 
police brutality under a huge risk of police violence—the tradeoff is not reasonable. At 
this point of the discussion, it seems that the militarization of the police is unjustifiably 
detrimental to the well-being and self-determination of the victims of police brutality, 
while the harm to well-being suffered by those who can profit from the militarization of 
the police is justifiable. 
A few words about why the tradeoff is not reasonable in the case I just described. In 
saying that the tradeoff is not reasonable, one is appealing to the idea that everyone’s life 
is more or less equally valuable. If anyone wants to maintain that the tradeoff is 
reasonable, she has to explain why the victims’ lives value less than the lives of those who 
enjoy a negligible increase of security—much less, because the gain from sacrificing them 
is so little. She cannot reasonably expect the victims to be convinced. It seems that the 
victims would also be unreasonable if they are convinced by such a reason. Even though 
extreme forms of altruism and self-sacrifice can be reasonable, it is not because the 
altruistic person is much less valuable than others.95 
The deliberation described above illustrates how democratic deliberation on the issue 
of the militarization of the police may proceed. What I have shown is just one possible 
way the deliberation may unfold and it does not have to end at where I end it. Perhaps I 
have missed some important considerations that favor the militarization of the police. My 
point is simply to show that anyone who wants to avoid participating in the collective 
                                                
95 Perhaps what is operative in the background here is equality, but I take it that there is no need to clarify 
what exactly the principle or requirement of equality is (e.g., equality of what?) in order to see why one 
would be unreasonable to do what is described in this case.
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wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity by trying to influence legislation and policies needs 
to engage in this sort of deliberation. It is a necessary condition. 
Defeated Obligations 
The obligation to participate in democratic deliberation is limited in scope for the 
following reason. The sort of reasoning described in the case study above is also 
applicable in many other political issues that involve unjustifiably detrimental laws and 
policies, ranging from mass incarceration to the massive budget cut to the funding for 
medical research. This immediately raises a problem. It is impossible to keep up with all 
the political problems in one’s polity. How can one be obligated to participate in the 
democratic deliberation on all of them (which implies knowing all of them)? Surely one 
cannot, and therefore the scope of one’s obligation to participate in democratic 
deliberation has to be limited. There are several factors to consider. 
I will first illustrate the point on an abstract level. Let’s label all the political issues 
that involve unjustifiably detrimental laws and policies one by one, from P1 to Pn. Suppose 
there is a defeasible obligation to participate in the democratic deliberation on P1, P2… 
and Pn. It entails that there are defeasible obligations to participate in the democratic 
deliberation on all the subset of {P1, P2… Pn}.96 The obligation to participate in the 
democratic deliberation on the whole set is defeated in all circumstances because no one 
is capable of doing so. The obligations to participate in the democratic deliberation on 
some of the subsets are also defeated for a similar reason.  However, for most individual 
citizens, there would be some manageable subsets, both in terms of intellectual capacity 
and the resources one can appropriate for the deliberation. In that case, the obligations to 
participate in the democratic deliberation of those subsets are not defeated. 
Now, suppose Amy only has enough resources to participate in the democratic 
deliberation on two issues. She has the defeasible obligations to participate in the 
democratic deliberation on P1 and P2, P1 and P3, and P2 and P3 (and the obligation to 
deliberate on the subsets of each of these sets of issues). Further suppose that Amy decides 
                                                
96 By introducing the symbolism I do not mean to suggest that political issues can individuate in any definite 
and precise manner. I just mean to use it as a convenient heuristic. 
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to participate in the democratic deliberation on P1 and P2. That leaves her no resources to 
participate in the democratic deliberation on other issues. Then, her obligations to 
deliberate on issues other than P1 and P2 are defeated. Before she commits to any of the 
subsets, she has a defeasible obligation to participate in the democratic deliberation of 
each of them; it is only after she is committed to one subset that her obligations to 
deliberate on issues outside of the committed subset are defeated. 
It is possible that all the obligations to participate in democratic deliberation are 
defeated by the moral obligations that have nothing to do with democratic deliberation. A 
single working parent may get too busy for fulfilling her obligation to care for her children 
that her obligation to participate in the democratic deliberation on any issue is defeated. 
What seems implausible is that a substantial portion of the citizens have their obligations 
to participate in democratic deliberation defeated for most of their lives. 
It is also possible that the choice between which obligation(s) to fulfill or, more 
generally, which values to pursue, is a hard one. Again, consider an oversimplified 
example: should someone devote a particular block of time and resources to participate in 
the democratic deliberation on the legalization of marijuana (which is a very complex 
issue with implications for both domestic and foreign policies, like the war on drugs in 
South America), or split it between the democratic deliberation on whether the city 
should build a new light rail, more homeless shelters, etc.? Or should someone create a 
piece of extraordinary artwork, something of high aesthetic value, instead of fulfilling any 
of her moral obligation to participate in politics? These choices may be incomparable or 
“on a par” (cf. Chang, “The Possibility of Parity”), and what it takes to determine what to 
choose would be beyond what morality dictates. However, one should not take this as a 
concession to the libertarian view that political participation is merely one of the many 
activities or even hobbies that a citizen may pursue, just as a citizen can choose to become 
a chef, a fashion expert, a volunteer at a local animal shelter… or a beach bum (surely a 
person can value being a beach bum as such—cannot rule that out without an argument!). 
First, the value of political participation is a moral one (while the value of, say, pursuing 
cooking as a hobby or a career in fine dining is probably non-moral). Second, the value of 
political participation is a moral value of a specific sort. It is, for example, a negative 
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obligation to avoid participating in collective wrongdoing instead of a positive obligation 
to be a good Samaritan. Therefore, the choice between whether to participate in politics 
or to take a cooking class in a community college after work is different from the choice 
between whether to take a cooking class or to practice drumming at home after work. 
Deference and Intellectual Division of Labor 
Political issues are complicated and an intellectual division of labor is needed. For 
example, in order to fully understand the problems associated with the militarization of 
the police, one needs some in-depth knowledge in politics, political economy, sociology, 
etc. Everyone, including experts in one field, would need to rely on expert testimony on 
things outside of her own expertise to a certain extent. In that case, one defers to someone 
else’s judgments on certain aspects of the issue. 
There may be people who need to defer to someone else’s judgment on the entire 
issue (e.g., whether the militarization of the police is a collective wrong and what has to be 
done about it) because they cannot make up their own mind on the issue. It may be 
because they believe they do not know enough to make a good judgment about it, or 
because they believe that it is a genuinely hard choice and they cannot come down to a 
decision one way or another. They have fulfilled their obligation to participate in the 
democratic deliberation on the issue as long as their deference is reasoned. That is, they 
have thought about the issue and they have reasons for believing that the person they 
defer to is in a better position to make the judgment. Turning a blind eye to the issue with 
the hope that someone else would volunteer and make a judgment for them does not 
constitute participation.97 
Citizens can participate in democratic deliberation in any form of democratic 
political institution. In particular, citizens can participate in democratic deliberation even 
when they do not make laws directly. There are two ways to conceive of the role of a 
representative in a representative democracy. On one view, representatives are thought of 
                                                
97 How about someone who defer to the judgment of the wrong person for the wrong reason? Depending 
on the detail of this person’s circumstance, she may or may not have fulfilled her obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation. I will revisit this point in the next section. 
 94 
as delegates: they speak for their constituents and they are supposed to have no voice of 
their own. On another view, representatives are thought of as trustees: their constituents 
entrust them the power to make political decisions for the constituents. The 
representatives deliberate on behalf of their constituents instead of being their 
mouthpieces. On the model of delegation, it is easy to see how the constituents may 
participate in democratic deliberation through their representatives: they participate 
through a proxy who expresses their preferences and reasoning for them. On the model 
of trustee, the constituents defer to the judgments of the trustees. They have participated 
in democratic deliberation if and only if their deference is reasoned in the way described 
above. In reality, we often have a mix of both models: the constituents expect their 
representatives to pursue certain general policy goals the former prefers (e.g., more gun 
control, more restriction on abortion…), but the former may defer to the latter on the 
details about how these goals should be pursued or how to prioritize the goals. In either 
case, citizens can influence actions of the representatives through voting, campaigning 
(e.g., writing a letter to a senator), expressing political opinions in public media… or 
through some other indirect routes, e.g., informing other citizens about certain political 
issues or persuading other citizens to take certain political actions. 
3.4 CULPABLE IGNORANCE AND EPISTEMIC NEGLIGENCE 
The aim of the argument presented in the previous sections is to show that there is a 
defeasible obligation to participate in democratic deliberation and for most people, the 
obligation is undefeated (although the scope of its requirement varies with individual 
circumstances). However, the argument would be rather pointless if it turns out that 
citizens are almost always excused for fulfilling this obligation even when it is undefeated. 
One may think that although citizens are obligated to avoid participating in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity, they may be ignorant about the 
wrongdoing itself or the relation between their individual actions and the collective 
wrongdoing. Therefore, one may argue, most citizens can be excused for their lack of 
participation in democratic deliberation because they can be excused for their 
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participation in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity. Acting from 
ignorance is culpable only if the ignorance is culpable. 
In what follows, I will draw on the debate between Michael Zimmerman, Gideon 
Rosen and Alex Guerrero on culpable ignorance to show that (i) ignorance in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by one’s polity is often culpable and (ii) even if one’s 
ignorance is inculpable, their participation in the collective wrongdoing may still be 
culpable. I will first present Zimmerman and Rosen’s views, and then Guerrerro’s 
refutation. 
The Debate between Zimmerman, Rosen and Guerrero 
Zimmerman and Rosen hold that if an agent acts from ignorance, she is culpable 
only if the ignorance is culpable. Zimmerman further argues that ignorance is often 
inculpable because one has no control over whether to be ignorant or not. One cannot be 
in control over whether one is ignorant about a certain thing—to be in control, one needs 
to know about that thing. If the ignorance itself were culpable even when one is not in 
control, it must be because the cause of ignorance is culpable—“carelessness and 
inconsiderateness” (Zimmerman 416), or “inattentiveness” (Zimmerman 417). However, 
one has no control over these things either. First, “[c]arelessness and inconsiderateness 
typically involve a failure to believe (at the time) that one is being careless or 
inconsiderate” (Zimmerman 416). Second, failing to pay attention to something is itself a 
form of ignorance (Zimmerman 417). Therefore, more often than not, ignorance is not 
culpable. 
However, one might object that carelessness and inconsiderateness typically involve a 
failure to believe that one is being careless or inconsiderate. Rather, one might think 
carelessness and inconsiderateness typically involve a failure to believe that being careless 
or inconsiderate in certain circumstances is morally wrong. Isn’t the latter culpable? 
Gideon Rosen argues that it is not. 
Rosen argues, independently of Zimmerman’s account, that ignorance in moral 
facts, i.e. ignorance “about the reason giving force of moral consideration” (Rosen 75), is 
also inculpable. On Rosen’s view, if an agent acts from ignorance in moral facts, she is 
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culpable only if the ignorance is culpable; “[i]t is unreasonable to expect people not to do 
what they blamelessly believe they are entitled to do” (Rosen 74). As for blameless 
believing, Rosen thinks that “[i]t is reasonable to expect a person to meet his epistemic 
obligations in coming to a view about what to do (provided he knows what they are and 
has the capacity to meet them),” and “it is reasonable to expect a person to do his best to 
act in light of his considered view about what he has most reason to do” (Rosen 79). If a 
person has met these expectations and still believes in falsehood, she should not be 
blamed for that. 
Rosen discusses the case of Ancient Slavery at length and relies heavily on it to support 
his view: 
In the ancient Near East in the Biblical period the legitimacy of chattel 
slavery was simply taken for granted. No one denied that it was bad to be a 
slave, just as it is bad to be sick or deformed. The evidence suggests, however, 
that until quite late in antiquity it never occurred to anyone to object to 
slavery on grounds of moral or religious principle. So consider an ordinary 
Hittite lord. He buys and sells human beings, forces labour without 
compensation, and separates families to suit his purposes. Needless to say, 
what he does is wrong. The landlord is not entitled to do these things. But of 
course he thinks he is. Moreover, we may imagine that if he had thought 
otherwise, he would have act differently. In that case he acts from moral 
ignorance.98 (Rosen 64–65) 
In this case the Hittite slaveholder is said to be inculpable of his moral ignorance, 
regardless of whether he reflects on the morality of slavery or not. If he does not reflect, 
“[t]he institution of chattel slavery was simply taken for granted,” and “one is normally under 
no obligation to rethink the uncontroversial normative principles that form the 
framework for social life” (Rosen 65). If he does reflect and come to the false conclusion 
that slavery is morally permissible, “his failure to discover them need not signal 
                                                
98 This case is also discussed by Michael Slote. Slote claims that ancient Greek slaveholders were “unable to 
see what virtue required in regard to slavery” (72). 
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recklessness or negligence on his part” because the moral arguments against slavery are 
obscure to him (Rosen 66). Rosen thinks that this case is akin to a case of American sexist 
in the 1950s (Rosen 66–67).99 
Guerrero’s refutation of Zimmerman and Rosen’s views has two main parts. First, 
Guerrero argues that whether ignorance is culpable depends on the moral significance of 
the consequence of acting from that ignorance (“moral epistemic contextualism”). Second, 
Guerrero argues that acting from ignorance can be culpable even if the ignorance itself is 
inculpable. 
Moral epistemic contextualism is the view that “[h]ow much one is morally required 
to do from an epistemic point of view with regard to investigating some proposition p 
varies depending on the moral context—on what actions one’s belief in p (or absence of 
belief in p) will license or be used to justify, morally, in some particular context” (Guerrero 
69). For example, one’s moral obligation to avoid believing in falsehood depends on the 
moral consequence of acting on that belief. The higher the stakes, the more demanding 
the moral obligation would be, and the agent would be expected to do more to avoid 
believing in falsehood. To motivate the view, consider the following pair of examples 
(modified from Guerrero’s): 
a. Amy is a salesperson of Herbalife and she comes across a house that 
looks empty. She knocks on the door, yells, “is anyone home” several 
times, and gets no response. She believes the house is empty, and she 
moves on to another house. 
b. Billy gets a job from his client to demolish a house and the house looks 
empty. He knocks on the door, yells, “is anyone home” several times 
                                                
99 For a case like this, Cheshire Calhoun would argue that even if the Hittite slaveholder’s ignorance is 
excusable, his action is not and he should be reproached for it. This is because the moral ignorance about 
slavery was widespread in the Hittite society and the lack of reproach would be “interpreted as sanctioning” 
(Calhoun 401). The same reasoning applies in the case of sexism (the subject of Calhoun’s article) as well. 
Rosen does not mention or consider Calhoun’s view at all, but his response would probably be that “it is 
unreasonable to subject people to sanctions when it would be unreasonable to expect them to have acted 
differently” (Rosen 75). 
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and gets no response. He believes that the house is empty, and he 
proceeds to demolish the house. 
Amy and Billy are in the same epistemic situation with regard to their beliefs, in the sense 
that they have the same evidence available to them and they have done the same thing to 
gather the evidence. However, it seems that Billy should have done more to make sure 
that the house is empty because if it turns out that his belief is false, he would kill someone. 
When he does not do enough in this sense, he has failed to fulfill a moral obligation and he 
is culpable for that.100 If he did kill someone out of ignorance, he would be culpable for 
the killing as well. 
On Guerrero’s view, it is not obvious that the Hittite slaveholder is inculpable of his 
moral ignorance. Because the stakes are so high (the severe suffering of numerous slaves), 
one cannot conclude that the Hittite slaveholder is inculpable of his ignorance about the 
morality of slavery simply because it would be too hard for him to know the truth. If, for 
example, the slaveholder has not done enough to consider whether it is morally wrong to 
enslave a human being in the sense that Billy has not done enough to find out whether 
there is anyone in the house, the slaveholder is culpable for his ignorance. 
Moreover, as Guerrero points out, it is not that hard for the Hittite slaveholder to 
realize that slavery is morally wrong, as Rosen makes it out to be. It is very plausible that 
the Hittite slaveholder remains in ignorance by choice. Michelle Moody-Adams has 
discussed this at length.101 
Moody-Adams disputes the empirical status of the so-called “inability thesis,” which 
is “the claim that sometimes one’s upbringing in a culture simply renders one unable to 
know that certain actions are wrong” (293). A culture is defined as “the way of life of a 
given social group, that will be shaped by more or less intricate patterns of normative 
expectations about emotion, thought, and action” (Moody-Adams 295). In the case of 
                                                
100 One should not confuse Guerrero’s view with the sort of view presented by Jason Stanley in Knowledge and 
Practical Interests, in which Stanley argues that whether one knows something depends on one’s practical 
interest. On Guerrero’s view, the issue is not whether the agent knows or is justified in believing in 
something, but whether the agent has done enough (i.e. actions of some sort) to determine whether her 
belief is justified. 
101 Rosen does not mention or consider Moody-Adams’s argument either. 
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Ancient Slavery, one should be skeptical about the claim that the Hittite culture renders the 
Hittite lord unable to see that slavery is wrong for the following reasons. First, although 
there is no literature from the period that questions the morality of slavery, one should 
remember that the surviving literature was preserved by those who had an interest in 
maintaining the institution of slavery.102 The surviving literature does not represent and 
record all aspects of the Hittite society. Second, even if normative expectations about 
emotion, thought, and action regarding slavery in the Hittite society is that slavery is an 
acceptable practice, individual members of the society could still see the wrongfulness of 
slavery because the harm inflicted on the slaves was very severe. If they did not see it, it is 
very plausible that they “cho[se] not to know what one can and should know” (Moody-
Adams 296). Citing evidence collected in the Milgram Experiment, Moody-Adams argues 
that people can be aware of their responsibility for cooperating in collective wrongdoing, 
even when they are reassured by social norms and authority figures that their cooperation 
is acceptable or required. In the Milgram Experiment, the subjects were asked to 
administer electric shock to another person, starting from mildly painful and progressing 
to severely painful. When the subject turned a switch, the ‘victim’ would pretend that she 
was shocked and under severe pain. It was observed that most subjects were willing to 
obey the experimenters and administer severe ‘pain’ to the ‘victims’, even when they saw 
the ‘victims’ acting as if they were under severe pain. Stanley Milgram’s explanation is 
that the obedient subjects were unable to refuse the order of the authority. However, 
Moody-Adams provides a different interpretation of the observation. It was noted that 
many cooperating subjects became agitated after seeing the ‘painful’ reactions from the 
‘victims’: “Persons were observed to sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, and groan as 
they found themselves increasingly implicated in the experimental conflict” (Stanley 66). 
Some verbally expressed grave concerns over the well-being of the ‘victims’ and were 
reluctant to carry on (although they did carry on). Some subjects “averted their eyes from 
                                                
102 Moody-Adams reiterates this point from M.I. Finley (119–120). But one may also speculate that no one 
in the Hittite society produced any anti-slave literature because people were either slave-owners or illiterate 
(or both). 
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the person they were shocking” (Stanley 67). Some of them explained that they did not 
want to know the consequence of what they have done. Moody-Adams believes that this 
is a manifestation of affected ignorance. 
In the case of Ancient Slavery, the slaveholder either (i) never thinks about whether 
slavery is wrong, or (ii) he does, but comes to the conclusion that slavery is fine. Rosen 
thinks that in case (i) the slaveholder is not culpable for his ignorance if it is reasonable for 
him not to think about it, and in case (ii) the slaveholder is not culpable for his ignorance 
if he makes a reasonable effort to figure out whether slavery is wrong. Guerrero thinks 
that whether the slaveholder is reasonable in not thinking about the morality of slavery or 
whether he has made a reasonable effort in figuring out whether slavery is wrong depends 
on the moral context. Because slavery is so wrong, and the slaveholder is able to see the 
wrongfulness (as the observation from the Milgram Experiment suggests), it is 
unreasonable for the slaveholder to not think about the morality of slavery. That is, other 
people can reasonably expect the slaveholder to think about the morality of slavery. In 
case (ii), whether the slaveholder has made a reasonable effort depends on what exactly 
he has done (which should be a lot). 
Now I shall turn to Guerrero’s claim that acting from ignorance can be culpable even 
if the ignorance itself is inculpable. He considers the following case: 
Douglas is contemplating killing a pig for dinner (imagine that the pig is 
currently still alive and healthy). Though not thinking in these explicit terms, 
he is able to understand the idea of moral status, and is questioning whether 
or not the pig has significant moral status—moral status such that it would be 
wrong to kill the pig in order to eat it. If he knew the pig did have significant 
moral status of this sort, Douglas would not kill it. After some effort, he is still 
unable to come to an answer to this question—he doesn’t know whether the 
pig has significant moral status. His reasons for wanting to kill and eat the pig 
are straightforward: he likes the taste. There are plenty of other food options 
that he knows are morally permissible, which would be nutritious and which 
he would enjoy eating, and which would not require killing pigs or any other 
animals. Still unable to decide the question, he goes ahead and decides to kill 
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and eat the pig, and does so successfully. For ease of exposition, let us 
stipulate that pigs in fact have significant moral status, such that it is wrong to 
kill them in order to eat them. (Guerrero 76) 
In this case, Douglas remains ignorant about whether it would be wrong to kill the pig in 
order to eat it after making a reasonable effort to figure that out (if anyone thinks that 
Douglas has not made a reasonable effort, just add to the story that he takes an animal 
ethics class, reads animal ethics books, interviews Peter Singer and other philosophers 
specialized in animal ethics, etc.). Therefore, he is not culpable for his ignorance. However, 
he is culpable for killing the pig because he knows it could be the case that killing the pig 
is wrong. That is, he decides to take the risk of committing a moral wrong despite the fact 
that it is easy for him to avoid taking the risk, and so he is culpable for committing the 
moral wrong (Guerrero 76–78). 
The Culpability for Ignorance in Politics  
On Guerrero’s view, there are three sets of sufficient conditions for culpability of 
acting from ignorance. First, if the agent completely neglects to reflect on the moral 
significance of her action while the moral context calls for such reflection, she is culpable 
for ignorance and she is culpable for acting from ignorance. Second, if the agent tries to 
figure out whether her action is morally wrong before she acts but the effort is not 
sufficient in the moral context, she is culpable for ignorance and culpable for acting from 
ignorance. Third, if the agent tries to figure out whether her action is morally wrong 
before she acts, does not reach a conclusion about it after taking sufficient effort required 
by the moral context, but acts anyway, she is not culpable for ignorance but culpable for 
acting from ignorance. 
Here is how these conditions work in the case of participating in the collective 
wrongdoing perpetrated by one’s polity. Consider a case that satisfies the first set of 
sufficient conditions. Amy is a person who has absolutely no interest in politics. She 
understands how the government works because she was required to take and pass the 
American Government course when she was in college, but as soon as she finished the 
course, she stopped paying attention to politics or social affair whatsoever. She says, “I 
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don’t like to watch TV news or read the newspaper; it’s depressing.” It does not occur to 
her that she may have an obligation to participate in democratic deliberation, because she 
does not contemplate the relation between the impact of laws and policies on people and 
the depressing news on television and newspapers—but clearly she is able to do so. In this 
case, Amy is like many of the subjects in the Milgram Experiment who looked away from 
the ‘victims’ to avoid knowing the consequence of their actions. 
Next, consider a case that satisfies the second set of sufficient conditions. Like Amy, 
Billy knows how the government works and does not read the news; but unlike Amy, he 
does think about the relation between the impact of laws and policies on people’s lives 
and the depressing news on television and newspapers once in a while. However, his 
thought always stops at something like the following: “Reading the news is work! I have 
work enough at my job; I rather flip through funny video clips on Vine for hours after 
work or binge-watch Arrested Development for the whole weekend.” In this case, Billy 
has not done enough to figure out whether he needs to do anything to avoid participating 
in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by his polity and what he would need to do if he 
does need to do something.  
Now, consider another case that satisfies the second set of sufficient conditions. Cindy 
is an evangelical Christian who grew up in an evangelical Christian community. 
Members of the community believe that the only thing that matters is to make everyone 
lives a life that satisfies their Christian moral code and they should pursue that end via 
political means. Growing up in the community, Cindy takes this for granted. So, for 
example, she protests in front of the Supreme Court with her fellow church-goers for 
issues like anti-abortion, holding signs like “God’s law is above Men’s law,” etc. When 
protesters who disagree with her try to explain to her why she is supporting laws and 
policies that hurt the well-being of the poor and place an unfair economic burden on 
them, she just brushes it off—“tough luck, but God’s morality is the highest and those 
people just have to deal with it; don’t just come up with excuses for leading a sinful life!” 
In this case, Cindy may believe that what she does constitute avoiding the participation of 
the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity, but she has not done enough to 
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confirm that this is the case because she fails to consider whether “God’s morality” indeed 
sanctions or justifies the harm to the poor. 
Consider also a variant of Cindy’s case. Denny does not grow up a religious person, 
but at some point of his adult life he begins to have a strong desire for absolute, black-
and-white moral truth—he has a strong need for cognitive closure in the psychological 
sense. He discovers that Cindy’s religious community can offer the sort of firm answers to 
moral questions that he desires. So he joins her community before investigating whether 
those answers are indeed correct. In virtue of repeated exposure and confirmation bias, 
he comes to believe what Cindy believes and acts on the beliefs like Cindy does. Like 
Cindy, Denny has not done enough to consider whether “God’s morality” indeed 
sanctions or justifies the harm to the poor.103 
Finally, consider a case that satisfies the third set of sufficient conditions. Eddie is a 
philosopher who spends a lot of time to think about the obligation to avoid participating 
in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity. He wonders whether he has any 
obligation of this sort, but he cannot make up his mind. He decides to suspend his 
judgment about this and act as if he does not have this obligation. In this case, Eddie is 
inculpable for his ignorance of the obligation to avoid participating in the collective 
wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity, but he is culpable for participating in the collective 
wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity—he takes the risk. 
Eddie’s case should not be confused with the following case. Freddy is another 
philosopher who spends a lot of time thinking about the obligation to avoid participating 
in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity. But Freddy is uncertain about 
what he can do in order to avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated 
                                                
103 This case is inspired by Chris Mooney’s report about Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed, two young 
British nationals who tried to join the jihadist movement in Syria and pleaded guilty to terrorism offences in 
the United Kingdom, on Mother Jones. It was revealed that Sarwar and Ahmed purchased Islam for 
Dummies and The Koran for Dummies online before they left for Syria. So instead of being motivated by 
religious faith to join the extremist group, they desired to join the extremist group before knowing the 
content of the religious faith. Psychologist Arie Kruglanski explains in his interview with Mooney that 
young people like Sarwar and Ahmed are motivated by a need for cognitive closure, “a disposition that 
leads to an overwhelming desire for certainty, order, and structure in one's life to relieve the sensation of 
gnawing—often existential—doubt and uncertainty.” 
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by the polity. So Freddy does not take the possible obligation to avoid participating in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity into consideration when he acts, because 
that would provide no guidance on how he ought to behave anyway. In this case, Freddy 
is not culpable for participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity. He 
does not take the risk of participating because there is no “safe” option for him. 
Clearly individual circumstances vary greatly and one has to evaluate culpability case 
by case. Moreover, there are many controversial cases in which one cannot decide 
whether any set of the sufficient conditions is satisfied. My point is simply to give several 
plausible cases to show that the culpability for participating in the collective wrongdoing 
perpetrated by one’s polity is quite common. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I provided an argument for the claim that there is a defeasible 
obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. A democratic polity can perpetrate 
collective wrongdoing by unjustifiably harming someone’s well-being or impeding 
someone’s self-determination, where the harming or impeding is unjustifiable because the 
person being harmed or impeded can reasonably reject the considerations that justify or 
sanction the harming or impeding. A citizen may participate in the collective wrongdoing 
perpetrated by her polity by obeying the law or exciting her legal rights in ways that 
would help realize the harm. In order to avoid participating in such collective 
wrongdoing, a citizen needs to exercise her legal rights (e.g., voting, free speech…) to help 
prevent or stop the harm or impediment; on rare occasion, civil disobedience may be 
called for. To help prevent or stop the harm or impediment, she needs to understand how 
laws and policies may harm certain people and whether these people have good reasons 
to reject the considerations that justify these laws and policies. Therefore, in order to 
avoid participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated by her polity, she needs to 
participate in democratic deliberation. Since there is a defeasible obligation to avoid 
participating in collective wrongdoing, there is a defeasible obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation (assuming that the situation is not so dire that a revolution is 
called for). 
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I also discussed the conditions under which the obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation can be defeated and how the scope of the obligation is limited. 
No one is obligated to participate in the democratic deliberation on every political issue 
because no one is capable of doing so. However, many people are obligated to participate 
in the democratic deliberation on certain political issues, depending on individual 
circumstances (e.g., how much leisure time a person has, her areas of expertise, what other 
moral obligations she has, etc.). It is very plausible that a single parent working two full-
time jobs in order to feed her children would have her obligation to participate in the 
democratic deliberation trumped by other obligations. However, it seems perverted for 
an emergency room physician or a social worker to claim that she has no obligation to 
form some informed opinions about the Affordable Healthcare Act or how Medicaid is 
supposed to work. 
Towards the end I discussed the culpability of being ignorant about politics or one’s 
obligation to participate in politics. Because political outcome has a huge impact on many 
people’s lives, the stakes are high. Therefore, a person needs to put in a considerable 
effort to determine whether she is participating in the collective wrongdoing perpetrated 
by her polity and how she can avoid that. She is culpable for her ignorance if she does not 
do enough. Under some circumstances, a person can be culpable for participating in the 
collective wrongdoing perpetrated by the polity even though she is not culpable for her 
ignorance about politics.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE SUFFICIENT FREEDOM ARGUMENT 
What is the relation between political freedom104 and democracy? Isaiah Berlin 
famously argues that there is none. They are distinct kinds of value and they can conflict 
with one another. John Rawls recognizes this conflict and tries to find an appropriate 
tradeoff between them. Philip Pettit argues for a different conception of negative freedom 
(freedom as non-domination) and that democracy is partially constitutive of freedom: 
democracy is logically necessary for non-domination from the state and non-domination 
is freedom. 
I shall argue, contrary to Berlin, that democracy is a practical necessity of political 
freedom (understood as a negative freedom) and the obligation to participate in 
democratic deliberation can be derived from the other obligations an individual already 
has.105 The argument roughly goes like this. The minimally adequate level of political 
freedom is a level at which individual citizens are free enough to fulfill the obligations 
they already have.106 The obligations citizens already have require them to create the 
conditions in which they can fulfill these obligations, to the extent that they can or they 
should (e.g., without doing something outrageously immoral). Among these conditions is a 
minimally adequate level of political freedom. Therefore, citizens have a derived 
obligation to participate in democratic deliberation, the process through which they can 
shape their political institution into something that would provide for such freedom.  
Moreover, the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation includes the 
obligation to support a democratic political institution. Democratic deliberation is a 
method of generating political outcome in the abstract sense (the weighing, giving, 
rejecting and accepting of reasons, etc.). Democratic political institution is an actual set of 
                                                
104 I use “political” to signify a sort of freedom that is distinct from what one may call “freedom of the will” 
in the compatiblist/incompatiblist debate. Unless otherwise specified, “freedom” means “political freedom” 
in this chapter. Besides, I will be using “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably. 
105 Unless otherwise stated, “obligations” means defeasible moral obligations. 
106 One might think that the bar set by this definition is too low—it does not sound very free if individual 
citizens are only free enough to fulfill their moral obligations but, say, not free enough to pursue their non-
moral life goals (e.g., to become a musician). My point is that the bar set here only indicates the minimal 
level of freedom without which one cannot be regarded as politically free. 
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formal and informal rules through which democratic deliberation can happen. To 
support the political institution is to help defend or create rules that are indeed consistent 
with democratic values and to comply with them.107 I will discuss the argument in detail 
in Section 1. 
Contra Pettit, I think there is no need to conceive of freedom as non-domination in 
order to establish any relation between freedom and democracy. Moreover, Pettit’s own 
account falls short of establishing the logical relation between democracy and freedom as 
non-domination, and we have reason not to conceive of political freedom as non-
domination. I will present Pettit’s view and my critique in Section 2.  
Contra Rawls, I think the obligation to support a democratic political institution 
should be derived from the other obligations an individual already has (which fall under 
what Rawls would call “existing comprehensive doctrines”). If prescriptive claims from 
political philosophy are to have any grip on the individual level, they have to be a sort of 
applied ethics. I shall argue that the political conception of justice cannot serve as the 
“bridge” between individual obligations and individual actions in politics (e.g., what laws 
one ought to support). Moreover, the so-called unreasonable conceptions of the good 
should not be preemptively excluded from politics through institutional design. Rather, 
one should reason with the unreasonable within the political process and try to win their 
heart there. I will discuss the argument for these claims in detail in Section 3. 
4.1 THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT 
The obligation to participate in democratic deliberation can be derived from other 
obligations an individual already has. The argument begins with three premises. First, 
one has many obligations in virtue of being a person and standing in various special 
relations with other people. Second, one cannot live without being hindered by 
                                                
107 Under this definition, civil disobedience could be understood as part of the political process. Unlike 
outright revolution, civil disobedience breaks the law without rejecting the authority of the legal system. A 
person who engages in civil disobedience in order to change a law that is inconsistent with democratic 
values is supporting the democratic political institution.  
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government policies in some way.108 Third, one’s obligation to do or to refrain from 
doing something requires one to create or sustain the conditions that would enable one to 
fulfill this obligation, to the extent that it is possible to create or sustain the conditions, or 
that doing so does not conflict with other weightier obligations (or reasons in general). If it 
is impossible to create or sustain the conditions, or if doing so would conflict with other 
weightier obligations, then the original obligation is defeated. From these premises it 
follows that one needs to participate in democratic deliberation to make sure that political 
interference does not prevent one from fulfilling one’s undefeated obligations. In what 
follows, I will explain the premises and moves in detail. 
a. One has many obligations in virtue of being a person and standing in various special relations with 
other people. The obligations one has in virtue of being a person are universal obligations 
that apply to all persons. They can be duties to the self (e.g., taking care of oneself), duties 
to others (e.g., shalt shall not kill), or neither (e.g., the obligation to avoid destroying 
something with intrinsic value109 for no reason—that seems to be an obligation that is not 
owed to any person).110 The obligations one has in virtue of standing in various special 
relations with other people are special obligations that are isomorphic to those special 
relations. 111  The obligations can be consensual (e.g., the obligation generated by 
promising someone to do something) or nonconsensual (e.g., the obligation to care for 
one’s family). Some believe that there are no genuine nonconsensual special obligations; 
for example, one may think that the obligation to care for one’s family is either 
consensual or derivable from universal obligations.112 Regardless of one’s view on special 
obligation, it should be clear that the set of obligations one has varies with one’s station in 
                                                
108 The second premise does not assume that government is justified by such necessity. See footnote 22. 
109 E.g., paintings by Van Gogh, the ancient Assyrian artifacts destroyed by ISIS, Amazon rainforest, etc. 
110 I am using “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably. See footnote 14. 
111 What it means is that, it could be that special relations are grounded in special obligations (e.g., there is a 
contractual relation between Amy and Billy because they owe contractual obligations to one another), that 
special obligations are grounded in special relations (e.g., a parent has an obligation to care for her child 
because of the parental relation), or that both of them are grounded in something else (that is, we cannot 
determine the direction of the grounding relation between special relation and special obligation). 
112 Diane Jenke argues for a voluntary model of associative obligation in “Special Relationships and the 
Problem of Political Obligations.” Robert Goodin argues that special obligations are derivable from 
universal obligations in “What Is so Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?”. 
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life. One’s obligations can be different from those of others in terms of kind (e.g., a 
childless person has no parental obligation) or content (e.g., different parents have the 
obligations to care for different children). 
b. One cannot live without being hindered by government policies in some way. As a matter of 
empirical fact, one cannot live outside of the jurisdiction of any authority. Regulative laws 
are designed to limit the range of options people have (e.g., traffic laws limit options about 
which side of the road you can drive). Tax laws take away the money one could otherwise 
spend freely. Even the laws that do not limit options directly may encourage certain kinds 
of behavior of the people (domestic or foreign) that would result in a change of options 
available to certain individuals (e.g., government subsidies can skew market operation and 
make certain business models unprofitable).113 To follow Isaiah Berlin’s terminology, 
these government actions are political interference, while being free from such 
interference is political freedom. 
Political interference like government regulation can interfere with one’s ability to 
fulfill one’s obligations. For example, LGBT adoption is not a legal option in many parts 
of the world. Imagine a case in which a child’s parents die in an accident and the child’s 
only surviving family member is her gay uncle. The uncle has a special obligation to take 
care of his niece, and placing a child with her close relative is often in the child’s best 
interest. However, the law forbidding LGBT adoption prevents the uncle from fulfilling 
his obligation. 
The case described above is an obvious one. Sometimes the conflict between 
individual obligations and political interference may be subtler. For example, in order to 
benefit manufacturers that derive most of their profit from export, a government may 
devalue its currency, which causes inflation. Coupled with stagnant wages, working class 
                                                
113 Here is a domestic example: the Dutch government makes high quality heroin freely available to drug 
addicts at government-run clinics, and this policy effectively reduces illegal drug trade. Another domestic 
example: federal subsidies to corn farmers encourage overproduction of corn. This floods the market with 
high fructose corn syrup, making it harder for consumers to buy any processed food without it. Finally, a 
foreign example: coordinating with foreign countries to maintain a high production of cruel oil around the 
world can depress energy price at home (and everywhere else). 
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parents need to work longer hours to pay for food and housing, cutting the time they 
would have to tend to the psychological needs of their children. 
c. One’s obligation to do or to refrain from doing something requires one to create or sustain the 
conditions that would enable one to fulfill the obligation… Consider the first half of the third 
premise with the following example. Amy has an obligation to deliver some grocery from 
point A to point B by her car. She acquires this obligation by making a promise to her 
friend. That means she is obligated to, among other things, make sure that her car has 
enough gasoline to travel from A to B. But when Amy makes the promise to her friend, 
her car only has enough gas to travel to the nearest gas station, not to deliver the grocery. 
Without adding gasoline, it is impossible to deliver the grocery. In this case, instead of 
thinking, “oh, then Amy has no obligation to deliver the grocery because it’s not allowed 
by her present circumstances,” we would conclude that Amy has an obligation to add 
gasoline (assuming that she is capable of doing so). This is because Amy’s obligation 
requires her to create the conditions that would enable her to fulfill the obligation. 
Similarly, one’s obligations may require one to support or oppose certain 
government policies that are conducive to the fulfillment to those obligations. For 
example, a parent has an obligation to support, say, laws against child molestation, 
because this is conducive to her obligation to protect her child. 
Notice that the consideration from a, b and c (the first half of the third premise) alone 
does not give rise to the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. If there is no 
limit on how far one needs to go in order to fulfill one’s defeasible obligations, then one 
only needs to support policies that are conducive to the fulfillment of these obligations 
without needing to determine whether these obligations are defeated by reasons arise 
from the needs or rights of others. For example, the obligation to protect one’s child 
requires one to support laws against child molestation, and one need not engage in any 
collective-deliberative activity to figure this out. The parent may fulfill this obligation by 
supporting a law that requires judges to sentence child molesters to death (“the sure way 
to eliminate these pests from society!” the parent might think). In doing so, the parent has 
not taken into consideration things like the human rights of the child molesters, the social 
cost of having this law and its effects on other (non-molesting) members of society, etc. 
 111 
This seems problematic, and hence the third premise is incomplete without the second 
half of it. 
d. … to the extent that it is possible to create or sustain the conditions, or that doing so does not 
conflict with other weightier obligations (or reasons in general). Consider the second half of the 
third premise with the following example. Imagine that Amy, the grocery deliverer, has 
no money. The only way she can get the tank filled would be to rob a pedestrian for cash 
or to rob the gas station for gasoline directly. Given that she is physically capable of 
robbing a pedestrian or a gas station, is she obligated to rob because of her obligation to 
deliver the grocery? No, because she also has the obligation not to rob anyone, and this 
obligation defeats her obligation to deliver the grocery. She may still deserve blame for 
making a promise that she does not fulfill,114 but we can hardly say that she ought to fulfill 
the promise, all things considered. 
Or consider the obligation to care for one’s child. There is an obligation to feed one’s 
child, but if the only way to fulfill this obligation were to kill another person, then the 
obligation not to kill any person would defeat the obligation to feed one’s child. We may 
say that a parent has the obligation to feed her child to the extent that she does not need 
to kill another person, among other things. 
What follows from a to d is that one needs to help create or sustain at least some of 
the conditions in which either (i) government interference does not prevent one from 
fulfilling one’s obligations or (ii) the interference is supported by obligations (or reasons in 
general) that defeat the obligations mentioned in (i). Let’s say that satisfying (i) and (ii) 
provides a sufficient level of political freedom. 115  To help create or sustain these 
conditions, one needs to support and participate in a political institution that has its 
policy-making process guided by these concerns. That is, one needs to participate in 
democratic deliberation and support a political institution that makes democratic 
                                                
114 Or she tried to make a promise but failed—it turns out there is no promise because it was impossible to 
make one. As A.P. Martinich would argue, she is blameworthy for conversationally implying there is one 
(i.e. implying something false). 
115 Again, the sufficient level of political freedom is the political freedom necessary for fulfilling one’s 
undefeated obligations. 
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deliberation possible.116 Such a political institution would protect and promote political 
freedom of the familiar sorts: the freedom of expression, the freedom of association, the 
freedom from fear, the freedom to education, etc. To support such an institution is to help 
defend or create the rules that are indeed conducive to political freedom and to comply 
with them. The relation between democracy (understood as a democratic political 
institution) and political freedom is that, democracy is a practical necessity of political 
freedom, where political freedom is a practical necessity for fulfilling the existing 
obligations each individual citizen has. 
At this point, someone may object to the move from the need of a political institution 
that aims at the appropriate combination of (i) and (ii) to the need of democratic 
deliberation. According to the objection, an ideally rational absolute monarch can 
determine the appropriate combination of (i) and (ii). My response is that, this ideal 
absolute monarch would be akin to God, who is more or less omnipotent, omniscience 
and omnibenevolent. A non-ideal absolute monarch would not have the capacity to know 
everyone’s life circumstances and the obligations that follow from them, as well as how 
obligations of different people interact with each other, even with the help of a team of 
technocrats.117 Moreover, a non-ideal absolute monarch would not have the incentive to 
care about whether all people can maximally fulfill their obligations (whereas in the case 
of democratic deliberation, each participant is not expected to care about whether all 
people can maximally fulfill their obligations—each participant is expected to care about 
whether she can maximally fulfill her obligations; other people’s obligations are relevant to 
the extent that they determine what constitutes “maximal fulfillment”). It is precisely 
because we are not governed by a God-like sovereign, nor can we approximate such a 
God-like sovereign by a technocracy, that we need democratic deliberation to determine 
the appropriate combination of (i) and (ii).118 
                                                
116 This obligation is independent of the legitimacy of the government. 
117 The rationale behind this claim is similar to Frederick Hayek’s argument against centrally planned 
economy in “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” 
118 One may prefer a stronger version of this claim: We need democratic deliberation to determine the 
appropriate combination of (i) and (ii) even if a God-like sovereign is possible, because self-government is a 
 
 113 
Of course, democratic deliberation does not always determine the appropriate 
combination of (i) and (ii). It is conceptually and practically impossible. It is conceptually 
impossible because the range of options one needs to choose from can be equally good, 
incomparable (e.g., supported by incommensurable values), or, in Ruth Chang’s word, on 
a par. That is, it is conceptually possible that some conflicting combinations of (i) and (ii) 
are equally good, incomparable or on a par. It is practically impossible because of the 
volume and complexity of political decisions that need to be made as well as the number 
of citizens involved in the process.119 When democratic deliberation cannot determine the 
appropriate combination of (i) and (ii), decisions can be made through some less 
deliberative or democratic means, and the methods used to make this sort of decisions 
can itself be determined through democratic deliberation (if it is possible). 
The account presented in this section superficially resembles Philip Pettit’s account 
about political freedom and democracy. Both of us attempt to derive the need of a 
democratic political institution from the fact that citizens need to be sufficiently free. 
However, unlike Pettit, I follow Berlin in conceiving of political freedom as non-
interference and acknowledge that any political interference is detrimental to the freedom 
of the person being interfered with. By contrast, Pettit argues that we should conceive of 
political interference as non-domination and political interference is not detrimental to 
freedom if it is not dominating. In the next section, I will discuss Pettit’s response to 
Berlin’s view on political freedom and argue that Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-
domination is not more preferable than freedom as non-interference. 
4.2 CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION 
According to Isaiah Berlin, political theorists use the concept of freedom (or liberty) 
in two different senses. In the negative sense, being free means “unobstructed,” not being 
“prevented from attaining a goal by human beings” or “non-interference” (Berlin 122). In 
                                                                                                                                            
moral responsibility. To avoid controversies about what constitutes self-government and whether it is 
indeed a moral responsibility (or intrinsically valuable, or something like that), I will not pursue this line of 
argument here. 
119 The limitations of deliberative democracy are discussed in Appendix A. 
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the positive sense, freedom means self-directedness, self-mastery or autonomy (Berlin 
131–134). It is acting in accordance with one’s rational will, social self, or “the real self” in 
any substantive sense, and it often involves imposing limitations on one’s behavior by 
oneself or others. For example, acting from the moral law in the Kantian sense would be 
imposing limitations on one’s behavior by oneself. According to Rousseau, freedom is 
“obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves” (quoted in Berlin 136). 
Berlin argues that negative freedom and positive freedom are two different kinds of 
value, and only the former deserves the name “freedom.” Negative freedom concerns 
questions like “What am I free to do or be?”, while positive freedom concerns questions 
like “by whom am I ruled?” or “Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or 
do?” (Berlin 130). Although things like self-directedness can be intrinsically valuable and 
perhaps people should pursue them at the expense of (negative) freedom, it should not be 
confused with freedom as such. Moreover, consent to interference does not transform 
interference into freedom. Interference with consent is still interference, which is 
necessarily a deprivation of (negative) freedom. For these reasons, there is no necessary 
connection between individual liberty and democracy, and they can at times be 
incompatible with one another. 
Pettit agrees with Berlin that only negative freedom is genuine freedom and that 
freedom as non-interference is necessarily in conflict with democratic rule (because non-
interference necessarily conflicts with any political rule). However, he argues that there is 
another conception of negative freedom, namely, freedom as non-domination, of which 
the “republican democracy” is necessary. 
According to Pettit, a hindrance blocks one’s physical or cognitive access to an option 
about what to do. For example, if someone locks me up, I am physically blocked from 
going out; if someone pursues me to believe that the door is locked while it is not, I am 
cognitively blocked from going out. An option is blocked if it is completely removed from 
the choice situation, e.g., cannot drive a car because the car is destroyed, or if it is so 
heavily penalized to the point that it changes its nature fundamentally, e.g., cannot drive a 
car because the government introduces a law to make it prohibitively costly (Pettit 52–54). 
An invasion is a hindrance that specifically affects a particular action, e.g., driving a car 
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into the city center, and it is “triggered by” attempting the action, e.g., using the car for 
the purpose of getting into the city center (Pettit 38). This can happen when, for example, 
there is a law that forbids the action, or “others may be tempted by your action to 
emulate you” (ibid.), which prevents one from completing the action.120 By contrast, an 
instance of vitiation is a “generic” hindrance, e.g., the car lacks fuel, engine fails, etc.121 
Only invasion, not vitiation, can be a deprivation of freedom. 
However, not every hindrance that specifically affects a particular action being 
triggered by attempting the action is an invasion. If one’s choice is invaded, one is being 
subject to someone else’s will, whether it is the will of an individual or a composite agent (e.g., 
the state). That is, it is not up to one to decide whether a hindrance in place; someone else 
decides it. Pettit calls the status of being subject to someone else’s will “domination.” By 
contrast, if it is up to one to decide whether there is the hindrance in place, then one’s 
choice is not invaded. For example, 
Suppose you wish to restrict your alcohol consumption and hand over the key 
of your alcohol cupboard to me, making me promise to return the key only at 
twenty-four hours’ notice and not in response to a request for its immediate 
return. When I refuse a request for immediate return of the key, I interfere 
with your choice, removing the option of having a drink now. I deny you the 
possibility of choosing according to your current will. But do I subject you to 
my will? Do I impose my will on you, for example, in a way that might 
reasonably trigger resentment? Surely not. (Pettit 57) 
In this case, there is interference in Berlin’s sense, but no invasion or domination in 
Pettit’s sense. There is no domination because the interference is “controlled” by the 
person being interfered.122 
                                                
120 E.g., when everyone tries to drive to the city center, one would be stuck in traffic 
121 Of course, the lack of fuel or the breakdown of the engine would be an invasion rather than vitiation if it 
is caused by a law designed to prevent people from driving to the city center. 
122 On a related note: Jon Elster has a theory that explains the rationality of individual precommitment and 
its analogue in the political realm (constitutional democracy). 
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Domination without actual interference is also sufficient for invasion. The mere 
possibility of interference from someone can alter one’s perception of the choice situation 
and subsequently blocks the cognitive access to certain options about what to do.123 Think 
about self-censorship under some totalitarian regime—the authority does not need to 
make explicit about what kinds of materials they would ban and people would withhold 
their opinions before the authority actually confronts them. Pettit calls this kind of 
situation “invigilation” (Pettit 60–62). 
Pettit has two arguments for thinking that freedom should be understood as non-
domination instead of non-interference. First, it is invasion that we actually care about, 
and invasion varies with domination, not interference. Second, Berlin’s argument for his 
conception of freedom as non-interference can be extended to support freedom as non-
domination. 
The significance of invasion is that it causes resentment. Hindrance in general often 
cause frustration, but one would not resent anyone for, say, the impact of bad weather on 
one’s plans, or by one’s “lack of certain skills or knowledge” (Pettit 43).124 Resentment 
arises only when the hindrance results from the imposition of someone else’s will, as the 
following example illustrates: 
Suppose that as you park your car in an unknown part of town, someone 
warns you that if you leave your car there, it is likely to be damaged by a 
coming hailstorm. Imagine the worry about the hailstorm—and the gratitude 
for the information provided—that the warning would trigger. And now 
think by contrast about the reaction that you would have in the parallel case 
where the person makes a threat, if you leave your car there, to impose a 
similar level of damage. You will be anxious about the damage of which you 
                                                
123 Pettit insists that this is the case even if the dominator is benevolent and the person dominated believes 
that it is extremely unlikely that the former would actually interfere (Pettit 60). I will dispute this point later 
in this section. 
124 I actually think one can resent oneself for the lack of certain skills or knowledge if one believes that the 
lack of skills or knowledge is the result of one’s previous decision (e.g., believing that one’s previous self has 
wronged one’s current self). On Pettit’s account, this would be unreasonable because the result is not from 
someone else’s will. 
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are warned in the first scenario but, unless you are not as other people, you 
will be outraged about the damage with which you are threatened in the 
second. The warning alerts you to a cost that it is certainly important to take 
into account in deciding whether to park your car. But while the threat 
reveals your exposure only to a similar cost, it also does more besides. It 
shows that you are not acting under your own will in adjusting to your 
environment; you are in a situation where another will presumes to rule over 
your actions. (Pettit 43) 
Of course, one may think that the potential damage from hailstorm does not involve 
any human activity, and so there is no object of resentment. But we can easily add to 
Pettit’s story that the hailstorm, like many other weather phenomena, is caused by human 
activity through some sort of butterfly effect. In that case, one still would not resent the 
people who unwittingly cause the hailstorm, and this is because the potential damage 
from hailstorm does not involve the imposition of the will of anyone. 
If it is invasion that actually matters and invasion is constituted by domination 
instead of interference, non-domination is a better conception of political freedom than 
non-interference. Domination is the potential of being interfered with, where the 
interference depends on the will of the interfering party rather than the will of the 
interfered with. The important question about freedom is “who is in the position to 
interfere” rather “is there any interference,” directly contradicts what Berlin says. 
However, Pettit argues that Berlin should have reached the same conclusion. Berlin 
has an argument against Thomas Hobbes’s conception of freedom as non-interference. 
According to Hobbes, one is free as long as one is not prevented from doing things she 
intends to do: “A free man, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is 
able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to” (139; pt. 2, ch. 21, sec. 2). Then, 
paradoxically, according to Hobbes, one can have more freedom by intending to do less. 
Berlin thinks this is absurd because this is not what liberation means. Pettit reconstructs 
Berlin’s argument as follows: 
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1. Suppose with Hobbes that you enjoy freedom in a choice between X 
and Y just in case you avoid hindrance in the option that you actually 
choose; suppose that non-frustration is enough for freedom. 
2. By that supposition, you do not enjoy freedom of choice in that case 
where I hinder X, not Y, and you choose X. 
3. But, by supposition, you would enjoy freedom of choice in that case, if 
you were to choose Y. 
4. If you know the situation, therefore, it appears that you can give yourself 
freedom of choice, without constraining my hindrance, just by adapting 
your preferences and choosing Y. 
5. But this is absurd. You cannot make yourself free in the choice just by 
accommodating yourself to my disposition to hinder your choice. 
6. Thus the original supposition that non-frustration is enough for freedom 
of choice must be false. (Pettit 31)125 
Pettit thinks that if one accepts the reasoning in the argument above, one should also 
accept the following argument: 
1. Suppose with Berlin that you enjoy freedom in a choice between X and 
Y just to the extent that you avoid interference; suppose that non-
interference, with or without domination, is enough for freedom. 
2. By that supposition, you do not enjoy freedom of choice in the case 
where I have a power of interference and, being ill-willed, am disposed 
to interfere with one or the other option. 
3. But, by supposition, you would enjoy freedom of choice in that case if I 
were disposed, notwithstanding my power of interference, to interfere 
with neither. 
                                                
125 Berlin’s original argument can be found on page xxxix. 
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4. If you know the situation, then, it appears that you can give yourself 
freedom of choice, without reducing my power of interference, just by 
ingratiating yourself with me and getting me to let you have your way. 
5. But this is absurd. You cannot give yourself freedom of choice just by 
accommodating yourself to my power of interference. 
6. Thus the original supposition that non-interference is enough for 
freedom of choice must be false. (Pettit 64–65) 
The point is that “neither adaptation nor ingratiation counts as a means of liberation in a 
given choice” (Pettit 65). If Berlin thinks that Hobbes’s conception of freedom is 
inadequate because adaptation is not a means of liberation, he should also think that 
freedom as non-interference is inadequate because ingratiation is not a means of 
liberation either. 
After arguing that non-domination is the preferred conception of freedom, Pettit 
moves on to argue that democratic rule is necessary and sufficient for non-domination 
from the state (which is a composite agent on Pettit’s account) and other fellow citizens.126 
It is necessary because any non-democratic rule is necessarily dominating and without 
any political authority to enforce a certain social order, one can be dominated by other 
powerful fellow citizens.127 It is sufficient because democratic rule gives each citizens 
control over how she would be interfered by the state. 
When one has control over how one is to be interfered with, one is not dominated. 
This is obvious in the one-on-one cases. If one instructs a friend not to return the key to 
the alcohol cupboard without the twenty-four hour notice in advance, one has control 
over how one will be prevented from accessing the alcohol cupboard. When the friend 
withholds the key, she is merely following instructions without imposing a will of her own. 
In the case of democratic rule, the people have control over how the law would interfere 
                                                
126 Pettit, like Hobbes, thinks that the state (constituted by all citizens) acts when the government acts on 
behalf of it. 
127 Pettit thinks that social order cannot be maintained by spontaneous social norms; it has to be maintained 
by the law. Moreover, he thinks that (quoting Francis Fukuyama) “the rich tend to get richer, in the absence 
of state intervention” (Pettit 135). In that case, the rich would dominate the poor. Cf. Pettit 132–136. 
 120 
with them, assuming that they all get involved in the process of policy-making (e.g., voting). 
Therefore, a (truly) democratic state does not dominate its citizens. 
However, there is a gap between the one-on-one case and the many-on-one case. For 
example, in the latter case, the instruction of interference is not determined by one citizen 
but the people as a whole. What does it mean to say that one of the people (a citizen) has 
control over political interference through democratic rule? Pettit thinks that control 
comes in degrees, and a citizen has control as long as she has influence over the political 
process, where influence can be understood as raising the likelihood of a certain outcome 
(153–156). 
One may think that since a citizen has no choice as to whether she is to be interfered 
with by the state or not, she is dominated by the state. Pettit’s response is that, her lack of 
choice over whether to be interfered with by the state is not state domination or a result of 
it. Rather, it is a result of the fact that one is born into a state and it is difficult to emigrate, 
which is “a product of the existing world order, not the result of a dominating presence in 
[one’s] life” (Pettit 162). This fact is not determined by the will of the state. It is akin to 
“having to live in the presence of gravity” (ibid.). 
To summarize: Pettit argues that the appropriate conception of political freedom is 
non-domination, and democracy is both necessary and sufficient for freedom as non-
domination. Now, I will argue that Pettit’s account should be rejected for the following 
reasons. 
First, that the state will interfere with everyone that is born into the state is a decision 
made by the state (or its people as a whole). This is because it is possible for a truly 
democratic state to decide to abolish all its laws or to dissolve itself (whether there will be 
something else that fills the power vacuum afterward is a separate issue). It is one thing to 
say that this is extremely unlikely to happen in real life, while it is quite a different thing to 
say it is a nomological necessity like gravity. The Earth cannot decide whether to keep or 
abolish its gravity. 
If Pettit insists that the state cannot decide whether to interfere with its people or not 
because it is a “historical and political necessity” (162), why should we think that it could 
decide whether to interfere with its people in one way and not the other? Why aren’t its 
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policies also products of historical and political necessity? After all, political scientists have 
argued that certain ranges of policy outcome are often determined by the existing 
structure of the political institution (e.g., a two-party electoral system favors centralist 
policies). In that case, the state no longer looks like an acting agent; it is more like the 
Earth. The Earth is not an acting agent; when there is an earthquake, the Earth is not 
interfering with the lives of its inhabitants. If the state is not regarded as an acting agent, 
then by definition it is not dominating. Then whether there is democratic control over the 
state would be irrelevant to the problem of political freedom on Pettit’s account. 
Second, “control” is ambiguous. When Pettit talks about democratic control, 
“control” means influence and it comes in degrees; whereas when he introduces the case 
of alcohol cupboard, he suggests that “control” entails complete determination of the 
outcome: the interfering friend “perform[s] like a robot that is programmed to satisfy 
[one’s] instructions” (Pettit 57).128 If anyone is enticed by the claim that one is not 
dominated when one has control over the interference, “control” must be understood in 
the latter sense. 
Moreover, if having some influence over the outcome is control (in the former sense), 
ingratiation is also a form of control. Ingratiation is, by definition, “to establish (oneself or 
someone else) in the favor or good of someone, especially by deliberate effort” 
(dictionary.com). When one ingratiates oneself with someone to get the latter to let one 
has one’s way, one is influencing the outcome. But if ingratiation is a form of control in 
the sense of influence, and it does not constitute non-domination, it follows that control in 
the sense of influence does not necessarily constitute non-domination. 
The analogy between the alcohol cupboard case and the case of the state is at best 
like the following: like the person who gives the key to her friend and instructs the friend 
what to do, the state has control over the government that acts on its behalf. The state is 
not dominated. However, the alcohol cupboard case is not like the case of the state 
because it indicates nothing about whether each member of the state is dominated or not. 
                                                
128 I take it that Pettit takes the analogy of robot and programming quite seriously because of his view on 
group agents, which is presented and discussed in detail in Group Agency by List and Pettit (1–73). 
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The state is distinct from each of its members. To infer that a citizen is not dominated 
because the state is not dominated is to commit the fallacy of division. 
Third, the reason for preferring non-domination to non-interference as the 
appropriate conception of freedom is weak. It seems that domination does not always 
trigger resentment. For example, consider members of Abrahamic religions, who 
conceive of God as essentially dominating everything. They do not resent God or his 
authority to control everything. Perhaps Pettit would say it would be reasonable for them 
to resent someone like God; but it would also be reasonable for them not to resent God 
(because God is supposed to be benevolent, omnipotent, etc.). This is similar to what we 
would say about interference: people do not always resent interference; sometimes it is 
reasonable to resent and sometimes it is not. Therefore, non-domination has no obvious 
advantage over non-interference in terms of capturing people’s intuition about freedom. 
The first and second points show that democratic rule does not constitute non-
domination. The third point shows that non-domination is not a better conception of 
freedom in terms of capturing people’s intuition about freedom. Therefore, I conclude 
that Pettit’s account should be rejected. 
4.3 EQUAL LIBERTIES AND REASONABLENESS 
In the first section of this chapter, I argue that the obligation to support a political 
institution that is democratic and free in relevant ways can be derived from the universal 
and special obligations an individual already has. In Rawls’s own terminology, this 
amounts to saying that we should “look to the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist 
and then draw up a political conception [of justice] that strikes some kind of balance of 
forces between them” (Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 188).129 This is precisely what Rawls 
                                                
129 The philosophical, moral or religious doctrines that specify a particular conception of the good (one’s 
view about life, the higher power, right and wrong, intrinsic values, etc.) are called “comprehensive 
doctrines.” One’s comprehensive doctrines give rise to one’s universal and special obligations (e.g., one may 
believe that murder is wrong (universal obligation) and one has an obligation to honor one’s parents (special 
obligation) because of the Ten Commandments (religious doctrine)). 
When I claim that the obligation to support a free and democratic political institution can be derived from 
the universal and special obligations an individual already has, I am making a moral realist assumption: an 
individual can only have genuine moral obligations. A white supremacist’s “obligation” to drive out all 
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rejects. He thinks that we should first determine the content of the fair terms of social 
cooperation and then explain why people would have reasons to support this sort of social 
arrangement. 
Rawls and I have different theoretical goals. I am trying to show why almost 
everyone has reasons—obligations are reasons—to participate and support democratic 
deliberation, while Rawls is trying to characterize a social arrangement that is fair and 
stable, at the expense of excluding certain people (i.e. the unreasonable) from the political 
process (“excluding” in the sense of preemptively ruling out certain political outcomes by 
entrenched institutional design). However, the theoretical disagreement still needs to be 
addressed because Rawls and I have competing conceptions of freedom and equality of a 
person. On my view, the content of the conception is that each individual citizen is free 
enough to fulfill the obligations she acquired from her personhood (universal obligations) 
or social roles (special obligations), which is to be determined by actual democratic 
deliberation. On Rawls’s view, the content of the conception is expressed by the choice 
anyone would make in the original position: the principles of justice, which has the 
consequence of excluding certain citizens from politics. These views are competing views 
because both of them claim to provide guidance on how a citizen should engage in 
politics. 
I shall argue that my conception of freedom and equality of a person is more 
plausible than Rawls’s. In what follows, I will first discuss Rawls’s political conception of 
justice, which characterizes the relation between liberty and democracy (equal liberty and 
the principle of participation) and what constitutes a fair trade-off between individual 
freedom and the overall freedom of the community. After that, I will discuss the 
implausibility of the political conception of justice. 
                                                                                                                                            
people of color from the States is not a genuine moral obligation. In Rawls’s terminology, “the 
comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist” need not be real in this sense, but democratic deliberation can 
be understood as the process that “strikes some kind of balance of forces between them,” where the right 
balance would be such that obligations that are not real would be more or less defeated. 
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Justice as Fair terms of Social Cooperation 
Rawls follows Gerald MacCallum to conceive of liberty as a triadic relation: “the 
agents who are free, the restrictions or limitations which they are free from, and what it is 
that that are free to do or not to do” (A Theory of Justice 202) and considers the distinction 
between negative and positive freedom as unnecessary. Political liberty (“liberty in 
connection with constitutional and legal restrictions”) is “a certain structure of institutions, 
a certain system of public rules defining rights and duties” (ibid.). For example, one has 
liberty of conscience if one is “free to pursue [one’s] moral, philosophical, or religious 
interests without legal restrictions requiring them to engage or not to engage in any 
particular form of religious or other practice, and when other men have a legal duty not to 
interfere” (A Theory of Justice 202–203, my emphasis). 
According to Rawls, the requirement of equal liberties follows from the first principle 
of justice and the fact that the first principle has priority over the second principle.130 The 
principles of justice are 
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
(A Theory of Justice 250) 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principles, and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. (A Theory of Justice 302) 
Basic liberties are “the right to vote and to be eligible for public office,” “freedom of 
speech and assembly,” “liberty of conscience and freedom of thought,” “freedom of the 
person along with the right to hold (personal) property,” and “freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law” (A Theory of Justice 61). The 
                                                
130 Rawls argues for the priority of the principles in A Theory of Justice 541–548. 
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first principle requires that all citizens enjoy the same basic liberties, and a basic liberty 
(that is equally accessible to everyone) “can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself” (A 
Theory of Justice 204), e.g., to maximize the total liberties accessible to everyone. 131 
Moreover, because the first principle has a higher priority than the second principle, 
limitation on basic liberties cannot be justified by equality of social or economic benefits 
(cf. A Theory of Justice 63). For example, freedom of speech cannot be limited for reasons 
like it promotes social and economic inequality (e.g., discriminatory speech against poor 
people can harm the career opportunity of the poor); it can be limited only if it 
undermines other basic liberties (e.g., how hate speech may threaten public safety, which 
would in turns threaten freedom of speech and assembly). A political institution that 
satisfies the principles of justice constitutes the fair terms of social cooperation. 
In a society with equal liberties, citizens should have equal access to the right of 
political participation—“the right to vote and to be eligible for public office” and 
“freedom of speech and assembly.” Rawls calls this “the principle of (equal) participation” 
(A Theory of Justice 221): “all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to 
determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which 
they are to comply” (ibid.). Therefore, for Rawls, the relation between freedom and 
democracy is this: part of what it means to be free is to be a member of a society with a 
free political institution, which is, among other things, democratic. 
The right of political participation is limited, ideally to the equal extent for everyone. 
First, the political institution that is designed to guarantee basic liberties (i.e. constitution) 
is not negotiable. It cannot be changed through politics. Second, political institution 
concerning social and economic equality has to be justified by the second principle of 
                                                
131 Rawls maintains, “the basic liberties must be assessed as a whole, as one system,” because “the worth of 
one liberty normally depends upon the specification of the other liberties” (A Theory of Justice 203). He gives 
the following example: “certain rules of order are necessary for intelligent and profitable discussion. 
Without the acceptance of reasonable procedures of inquiry and debate, freedom of speech loses its value” 
(ibid.). However, it seems that the worth of one liberty is distinguished from the relative worth of a liberty to a 
certain individual. Two individuals may have the same liberty, but it may be worth less to one of them 
because she lacks the capacity to take advantage of it. The requirement of equal liberties does not require 
equal worth (cf. A Theory of Justice 204). 
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justice. This limits what reasons a citizen can use to justify her political preference to 
others in the political process. The political institution that is regulated by the principles 
of justice, or “the political conception of justice,” is “the basic structure of society” (Rawls, 
Political Liberalism 11).132 
At this point, one may wonder whether “equal liberties” in this sense indeed captures 
the most relevant conception of equality. As Rawls himself points out, in addition to being 
free and equal, citizens should also be regarded as having “the [moral] capacity to have, 
to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good,” which is “an ordered family 
of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is of value in human 
life” (Justice as Fairness 19). Some of these conceptions can conflict with the principles of 
justice. For Rawls, political pluralism (pluralism of conceptions of the good allowed by the 
political institution) is justified to the extent that it does not undermine the principles of 
justice, which specify the fair terms of social cooperation. That means citizens are not 
allowed to pursue conceptions that are incompatible with the principles of justice in a just 
(i.e. fair) political institution. In that case, one may say that “equal liberties” are not really 
equal for everyone: citizens with certain conceptions of the good are less free in terms of 
pursuing their own conceptions of the good. Rawls would agree with this—the freedom to 
pursue one’s conception of the good is not a basic liberty—and this is a limitation on 
overall liberty. Moreover, although neither the reasonable nor the unreasonable can 
appeal to their own conceptions of the good to justify the basic structure, the latter has no 
chance to reconcile their conception of the good with the law. 
But this sort of “inequality” would not bother Rawls for the following reason. Rawls 
believes that a fair social arrangement that treats everyone as free and equal is only 
possible among those who are rational133 and reasonable. A reasonable person is the one 
who is “ready to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles 
                                                
132 There are parts of the political institution that are not concerned with basic liberties or social and 
economic equality. The limitation from the principles of justice does not apply. Cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness 
245–246. 
133 A rational person is the one who has self-interests to pursue and is able to pursue the means to those 
interests. 
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needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation” (Justice as Fairness 
6–7) and she would honor these principles at the expense of her own interests. Since the 
principles of justice are the fair terms of social cooperation, pursuing a conception of the 
good that is incompatible with the principles (i.e. an unreasonable conception of the good) 
would clearly makes one unreasonable. 
Moreover, a reasonable person would recognize that the principles of justice are the 
fair terms of social cooperation a priori. A reasonable person would accept the fact that 
there can be reasonable disagreement between different conceptions of the good (“the 
burdens of judgment”), because “among reasonable persons are the many obstacles to the 
correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary 
course of political life” (Justice as Fairness 35).134 These obstacles include 
a) The evidence—empirical and scientific—bearing on a case may be 
conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate. 
b) Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are 
relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different 
judgments. 
c) To some degree all our concepts, and not only our moral and political 
concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases. This indeterminacy 
means that we must rely on judgment and interpretation (and on 
judgments about interpretations) within some range (not sharply 
specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ. 
d) The way we assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is 
shaped (how much so we cannot tell) by our total experience, our whole 
course of life up to now; and our total experiences surely differ. So in a 
modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its many 
divisions of labor, its many social groups and often their ethnic variety, 
                                                
134 Notice that “reasonable” is used in two different senses. In one sense, a reasonable person is someone 
who is willing to engage in social cooperation on fair terms and a reasonable conception of the good is a 
conception of the good that is compatible with the fair terms. In another sense, a reasonable disagreement is 
a disagreement that results from the burdens of judgment—what we often call “arguable.” 
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citizens’ total experiences differ enough for their judgments to diverge to 
some degree on many if not most cases of any significant complexity. 
e) Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different 
force on both sides of a question and it is difficult to make an overall 
assessment. (Justice as Fairness 35–36) 
Because there can be reasonable disagreement between different conceptions of the good, 
a fair political institution should not interfere with the pursuit of a particular conception 
of the good for reasons derived from another conception of the good. Even if there is a 
fact of the matter as to whether one is pursuing the “genuine” conception of the good, 
one is only lucky enough to be in the position of getting it right; it is unfair to restrict one’s 
freedom to pursue one’s conception of the good only because of the lack of luck.135 
Rather, a fair political institution can interfere only when the conception conflicts with 
the principles of justice, the fair terms of social cooperation. The fair terms are not 
derived from any particular conception of the good (but perhaps derivable from some 
reasonable conception of the good, a set of conceptions that would constitute the 
reasonable overlapping consensus; cf. Rawls, Justice as Fairness 37). 
An unreasonable person may pursue her unreasonable conception of the good to the 
extent that it does not interfere with other people’s pursuit of their reasonable conceptions 
of the good. By contrast, a reasonable person may pursue her reasonable conception of 
the good to the extent that it interferes with other people’s pursuit of their unreasonable 
conceptions. That is because the unreasonable person is unwilling to cooperate on fair 
terms while the reasonable person is willing.136 For example, “an intolerant sect has no 
title to complain of intolerance” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice 218). It does not immediately 
follow that “tolerant sects have the right to suppress them” (ibid.): “Whether the liberty of 
the intolerant should be limited to preserve freedom under a just constitution depends on 
                                                
135 The original position is supposed to bring out this point. 
136 There is an apparent gap in Rawls’s reasoning: an unreasonable person may be willing to cooperate on 
what she considers to be fair terms, but she rejects the burdens of judgment (which makes her 
unreasonable). I will discuss this later. 
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the circumstances” (A Theory of Justice 219), like whether the intolerant sect poses an 
immediate threat to the basic liberties of the tolerate sect. 
Why would anyone support a political institution that is fair in this sense? Early 
Rawls (A Theory of Justice) thinks that supporting a fair political institution is a “natural 
duty” (which, in my terminology, is a universal moral obligation).137 It is an unconditional 
moral principle that can be recognized as such in the original position, without appealing 
to any particular conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine (A Theory of Justice 
333–355). However, later Rawls (Justice as Fairness and Political Liberalism) comes to realize 
this natural duty cannot realistically justify a fair political institution to all of those who 
are subject to the institution.138 The principles of justice can be satisfied in multiple ways, 
and there can be reasonable comprehensive doctrines that are incompatible with one 
another (i.e. cannot be tolerated in the same political institution to the same extent). 
Therefore, even if there is a natural duty to support a fair political institution, it does not 
follow that there is a natural duty to support any fair political institution.139 In response to 
this problem, Rawls takes a different approach to answer the question in the beginning of 
this paragraph and introduces the distinction between “comprehensive philosophical and 
moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain of the political” (Political Liberalism 
xv). Instead of relying on the notion of the natural duty (which is a sort of comprehensive 
doctrine) to support a fair political institution, he asks what sort of grounds one can 
appeal to so that all disagreeing reasonable persons can settle on a fair political institution 
and tolerate one another.140 The sort of grounds one can appeal to in settling political 
dispute is the political conception of justice. 
                                                
137 The duty has two parts: “first, we are to comply with and to do our share in just institutions when they 
exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do 
not exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice 334). 
138 Rawls describes the evolution of his view in Political Liberalism xv–xvii. 
139 Jeremy Waldron suggests that one can avoid this problem by weakening the natural duty to support a 
just political institution to the natural duty of not undermining such a political institution. The duty of not 
undermining the political institution does not give rise to the obligation to participate in politics. 
140 Rawls formulates the question in a slightly different way: “what are the grounds of toleration so 
understood and given the fact of reasonable pluralism as the inevitable outcome of free institution?” (Political 
Liberalism 4). 
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Rawls’s answer in Political Liberalism can be understood as follows. We should mark a 
sharp distinction between the sort of reasons that justify political actions (what the 
government does through its law, which is shaped by its constitution, among other things) 
and the sort of reasons that justify moral actions more generally. The principles of justice 
“[exemplify] the content of a liberal political conception of justice” (Rawls, Political 
Liberalism 6), and one can appeal only to the political conception of justice to support or 
reject a political institution. The political conception of justice does not regulate any 
action outside of the political domain. Within this framework, reasonable persons can 
avoid political disagreement generated by incompatible comprehensive doctrines, and so 
they can settle on a fair political institution. The exact arrangement defined by the 
political institution would be contingent on the historical development of the institution. 
And Rawls believes that reasonable persons would be willing to accept these constraints: 
at first out of self-interests (social cooperation can maximize self-interests), and then out of 
respect for the democratic liberal political culture that is developed over time (cf. Political 
Liberalism 133–168). 
Here ends the overview of Rawls’s political liberalism. Next, I will present a critique 
of Rawls’s view. In short, the critique is that the political conception of justice is either 
superfluous or irrational, and the unreasonable should not be excluded from the political 
process by an arrangement that is stipulated a priori. 
The Implausibility of the Political Conception of Justice 
Suppose a reasonable person is willing to cooperate with others on some instantiation 
of the fair terms. There are two possibilities: social cooperation on this particular 
instantiation of the fair terms is conducive to the pursuit of her own conception of the 
good, or that it is not. If it is conducive to the pursuit of her own conception of the good, 
she can reconcile her comprehensive doctrines with the political conception of justice. But 
in that case she does not need the political conception of justice to justify the political 
institution—the political conception seems superfluous.141 
                                                
141 Robert Adams raises a similar point. 
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If social cooperation on fair terms is not conducive to a reasonable person’s pursuit of 
her own conception of the good, then either the political conception of justice requires 
her to do something irrational, or it has to be a comprehensive doctrine that always 
defeats other competing comprehensive doctrines. For Rawls, a rational person is 
someone who has self-interests to pursue and is able to pursue the means to those interests. 
If someone chooses to cooperate with others on some instantiation of the fair terms at the 
expense of abandoning her own reasonable conception of the good, then either she is 
being irrational for not pursuing her highest self-interests (as defined by her conception of 
the good), or she is pursuing her highest self-interests by cooperating with others on some 
instantiation of the fair terms just for the sake of it. The latter disjunct implies that the 
political conception of justice is itself a sort of comprehensive doctrine, something that 
can defeat other comprehensive doctrines in the same moral domain. This is exactly what 
later Rawls rejects. So we are left with the first disjunct: the person would be irrational. 
But that goes against the political conception of a person, which regards a person as both 
reasonable and rational. 
Therefore, the political conception of justice is either superfluous or irrational when 
it comes to guiding individual actions. In either case, it does not seem to solve the 
problem that Rawls has set out to solve. Suppose Amy believes that Holocaust denial 
should be legal because of freedom of speech, and Billy believes that Holocaust denial 
should be banned because it is a perpetration of Anti-Semitism.142 They both have a 
point. On the one hand, Holocaust denial can threaten the basic liberties of the Jewish 
people by inciting racial and religious hatred, at least to some extent. On the other hand, 
banning Holocaust denial is a limitation on one basic liberty. Amy and Billy have a 
reasonable disagreement about which fair political institution to choose that cannot be 
settled by the political conception of justice. If Amy wants to convince Billy to accept a 
political institution that allows Holocaust denial, she has to appeal to something else—
comprehensive doctrines that Billy would accept, or the fact that Billy’s position is 
                                                
142 Holocaust denial is illegal in 17 countries; all of them are democratic. 
 132 
incompatible with the comprehensive doctrines he already accepts. If any of these 
strategies works, then there is no need to restrict acceptable justification in politics to the 
political conception of justice in the first place. If Amy can reconcile her comprehensive 
doctrines only with a political institution that allows Holocaust denial (e.g., she believes 
that free speech should be absolute) and Billy can reconcile his only with a political 
institution that bans Holocaust denial, then there is nothing either of them can do. It does 
not mean that it would be rational for either one of them to start a riot on the street 
whenever she does not get the law she wants. But it would be irrational for either one of 
them to cooperate on fair terms if not cooperating on fair terms is the only way to get the 
law they want (e.g., use money to manipulate the mass media and suppress opposing 
opinions, a way to cause unequal access to freedom of speech). To recall, one of the moral 
powers a person has is “the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a 
conception of the good” (Rawls, Justice as Fairness 19, my emphasis). On Rawls’s view, one 
is not supposed to regard a person engaging in social cooperation as lacking this moral 
power. Therefore, one cannot expect Amy or Billy to be irrational for the sake of being 
reasonable. Besides, one cannot expect an irrational person to be able to see, from the 
original position, that the fair terms of social cooperation are the principles of justice.  
Therefore, what early Rawls says about the principles of justice is actually more 
plausible: there is a natural duty to support a political institution that satisfies the 
principles of justice. In that case, we would also need to conclude that when the natural 
duty cannot settle which political institution one ought to support, other comprehensive 
doctrines can be used to settle political disagreement. That means disagreeing parties can 
appeal to other comprehensive doctrines in public debate, or they can use a dispute-
settling mechanism that is justified by other comprehensive doctrines. 
However, once we conceive of supporting a political institution that satisfies the 
principles of justice as a natural duty, we open up the possibility that it can be defeated by 
other duties and moral reasons in one’s moral deliberation. We can grant Rawls that the 
duty is universal—in fact, we can even grant Rawls that people would identify it as the 
most important natural duty from the original position. However, it does not mean that it 
is always the highest principle in the hierarchy of moral principles of real people who 
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know their places in society. The following example will illustrate the point. Suppose 
there is a natural duty of “helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that 
one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself” (Rawls, A Theory of Justice 114). This 
may conflict with a parent’s special moral obligation to provide for her child. For example, 
imagine that a person has a choice between spending her money on saving some starving 
children in a remote developing country, or on feeding her own child, who is growing up 
in an affluent country (i.e. the child would not starve to death even if her mother does not 
feed her—the government could take over). Most people would think that the duty to aid 
starving children in the remote developing country does not trump the special obligation 
to care for one’s child.143 
If the natural duty to support a just political institution can be defeated by other 
duties and moral reasons, then it seems arbitrary to exclude the unreasonable from the 
political process (“exclude” in the sense that the institution is designed to ensure that the 
unreasonable cannot influence the political outcome). Because of the burdens of 
judgment, there can be a reasonable disagreement about whether the natural duty to 
support a political institution that satisfies the principles of justice is defeated by, say, a 
special obligation to support a political institution that does not satisfy the principles. 
Now, imagine the following case. Suppose Cindy also believes that Holocaust denial 
should be legal, but it is not because she believes in freedom of speech. Rather, it is 
because she is anti-Semitic: she believes that racial and religious hatred towards the 
Jewish people is justified because it can significantly maximize the overall happiness of the 
world (a faulty appeal to a comprehensive doctrine). Given my argument above, there can 
be a reasonable disagreement about whether the natural duty to support a just political 
institution trumps the (alleged) natural duty to support a political institution that 
                                                
143 Some people may think that the “special obligation” to care for one’s child is in fact a natural duty 
(universal obligation) applied in specific circumstances. For example, one might say that special obligation 
to care for one’s child is derived from the principle of utility and the fact that a parent is in a better position 
than other people to care for her own child. These people would deny that there is any genuine special 
obligation that is not derivable from universal moral principles. In that case, I would say that it is not clear 
to me why the natural duty to support a fair political obligation is always the most important natural duty. 
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significantly maximizes overall happiness. However, it seems better to reason with Cindy 
then to exclude her from political discourse. 
In describing how to apply the political conception of justice correctly, Rawls says, 
… we suppose a constitutional democratic regime to be reasonably just and 
workable, and worth defending. Yet given the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
how can we frame our defense of it so that it might win wide support and thus 
achieve sufficient stability? 
To this end, we do not look to the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist 
and then draw up a political conception that strikes some kind of balance of 
forces between them. … Instead, [justice as fairness] elaborates a political 
conception as a free-standing view working from the fundamental idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation and its companion ideas. (Rawls, Justice 
as Fairness 188–189) 
My argument in this section is to the effect that there is no such “free-standing” view. We 
have to look to the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist and then draw up 
something that “strikes some kind of balance of forces between them.” What we need to 
do is to determine what kind of balance of forces we want to strike. I described how this 
can be done in Section 1. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I presented an argument for the claim that a citizen has an obligation 
to participate in democratic deliberation and an obligation to support a political 
institution that would provide and protect the political freedom necessary for democratic 
deliberation (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, etc.). The argument outlines 
how the obligations can be derived from other moral obligations a citizen already has qua 
person, parent, sibling, child, teacher, doctor, driver, grocery shopper, etc.: 
1. One has many obligations in virtue of being a person and standing in 
various special relations with other people. 
2. One cannot live without being hindered by government policies in some 
way. 
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3. One’s obligation to do or to refrain from doing something requires one 
to create or sustain the conditions that would enable one to fulfill the 
obligation to the extent that it is possible to create or sustain the 
conditions, or that doing so does not conflict with other weightier 
obligations (or reasons in general). 
4. From 1, 2 and 3: Therefore, one needs to help create or sustain the 
conditions in which either (i) government interference does not prevent 
one from fulfilling one’s obligations or (ii) the interference is supported 
by obligations (or reasons in general) that defeat the obligations 
mentioned in (i). 
5. From 4: Therefore, one has an obligation to participate in democratic 
deliberation. 
6. From 3 and 5: Therefore, one has an obligation to support a political 
institution that would provide and protect the political freedom 
necessary for democratic deliberation. 
This argument also shows that a certain type of democracy (namely, the deliberative type) 
is a practical necessity for political freedom, even if we understood political freedom in 
the negative sense. This contradict Berlin’s claim that there is no relation between 
freedom and democracy. 
I argued that my account about the relation between freedom and democracy is 
more plausible than Pettit’s. I explained why Pettit’s conception of freedom as non-
domination is not better than freedom as non-interference. First, Pettit’s aim is to show 
that democratic rule is a logical necessity for freedom as non-domination, but he fails for 
reasons detailed in Section 2. Second, non-domination is not a better conception of 
freedom in terms of capturing people’s intuition about freedom. 
I also argued that my account about the obligation to support an existing free and 
democracy political institution is more plausible than Rawls’s account. The political 
conception of justice, understood as something distinct in kind from comprehensive 
doctrines, is either superfluous or irrational when it comes to guiding individual actions. 
That is, it cannot play any role in explaining why one has any obligation to support the 
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free and democracy political institution one is in. However, if the principles of justice and 
their implications are understood as comprehensive doctrines, they cannot settle political 
disagreements that are motivated by other conflicting comprehensive doctrines. 
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APPENDIX A: THE MERITS OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 
In this appendix, I will review some of the considerations that favor democratic 
deliberation as the best practice of democracy. I should stress that the positive arguments 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 do not depend on these considerations. I review these 
considerations in order to provide a context for my project. 
What should anyone take democratic deliberation seriously in the first place, let 
alone regards it as an obligation? The answer begins by explaining what democracy is 
and what it is for in the first place. Most people identify democracy, a form of 
government, with majority rule. Some of them would also further specify that everyone 
should get exactly one vote, understood as an expression of equality in political power. It 
is to be contrasted with monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, technocracy, etc., in which the 
majority of the people do not have formal power on political decision. However, some 
people find that majority vote alone is an inadequate definition or implementation of 
democracy, and here is why. 
Liberal democracy assumes that everyone is equal, and it is supposed to be closely 
related to individual liberty and freedom. According to one argument, it is rational, at 
least for the majority of the people, to support a democratic form of government. This is 
because, given that no one can escape the coercive power of at least some laws and 
policies of government, one would rather have some means to influence how the coercive 
power would affect one’s life than have none. Perhaps democracy is the best way to 
minimize coercion because it is built into the political institution that each individual gets 
some opportunity to contest laws and policies that curtail their liberty. Moreover, 
democracy is the only form of government that, in principle, allows the majority of the 
people to rule themselves. The authority of laws and policies (or lawmakers and 
policymakers) is legitimized by the endorsement of the people (or the majority of them) 
who are subject to these laws and policies. One may think that it is also essential to 
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liberty, that one cannot be free if one is subject to authority not somehow endorsed by 
oneself.144 
However, if the criterion of democracy is majority rule only, or more generally, 
aggregation of individual preferences, it is unclear whether democracy is indeed 
conducive to individual liberty and freedom. First, there is nothing in the aggregation of 
individual preferences itself that guarantees that no one would be oppressed by unjust law 
and policies. Since Antiquity many thinkers have been worried by the mob rule that 
might result from a democratic form of government.145 The founding fathers of the 
United States recognized the threat of “the tyranny of the majority” and engineered a 
nondemocratic branch of government, namely, the Supreme Court.146 Second, it has 
been shown in rational choice theory that “there is no rule for aggregating individual 
preferences that is obviously fair and rational” and “every rule is subject to strategic 
manipulation” (Miller 187).147 If the aggregated preferences do not coincide with the 
preferences of most individuals and the former is not justified by the voting process itself 
(because the method is either unfair—it can be gamed—or irrational), then it is unclear 
why the law or policy determined by the voting outcome can be seen as endorsed by the 
majority. 
                                                
144 In both cases, liberty is understood in the negative sense: it is the absence of something (whether it is a 
physical barrier or hegemony) that makes one free. 
One may also think that it is rational for individuals to support majority rule because the majority, guided 
by human desires and needs, will enact the best law. However, it is not immediately obvious as to why this 
argument favors majority rule over some other non-democratic forms of government, e.g., technocracy. 
Even if the majority is guided by human desires and needs, they often lack expert knowledge in social 
sciences to judge what the best law would be. It seems that experts and perhaps the elite portion of society 
are in a better position to make this kind of judgment, and so other people should defer to them. Nor can 
we simply assume that experts or the elite portion of society would not be guided by human desires and 
needs as much as other people would. 
145 For example, in Book VIII of The Republic, Plato describes the cycle of government and reasons that 
democracy would cause lawlessness and poor governance, because citizens have an insatiable desire for 
individual liberty. 
146 James Madison addresses the problem of “factions” in Federalist 10: “A pure democracy… can admit no 
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will… be felt by a majority of the whole… 
and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party.” 
147 Kenneth Arrow has a proof for the first claim. Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite have proofs for 
the second claim. 
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Moreover, Jules Colemen and John Ferejohn argue that aggregated preferences 
cannot even be used as an effective veto device against bad governance envisioned by 
W.H. Riker. As I have already mentioned above, social choice theory shows that electoral 
outcomes are meaningless and Riker rejects the idea that there is a popular will that can 
be discovered by voting. Rather, the utility of voting from the liberal perspective is that it 
is “the veto by which it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny,” even though 
such a kind of veto would be “intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse” (Riker 
244). The idea is very simple: if a political leader is tyrannical and as a result becomes 
very unpopular, citizens in a liberal democracy would have a chance to vote her out of 
office. However, if Riker’s characterization of popular veto is correct, then a veto can 
sometimes empower official tyranny by removing officials who actually defend people’s 
liberty.148 As Colemen and Ferejohn point out, “[u]nreasoned removal from office is 
precisely what follows if Riker is correct in interpreting the instability results of social 
choice theory as demonstrating the meaninglessness of voting” (22). Then, aggregation of 
preferences is not even a good way to minimize coercion. 
Perhaps the issue discussed in the last two paragraphs can be recast in the following 
way. When individuals express their individual preferences through their votes, they do 
not provide any reason or justification for their preferences. When individual preferences 
and the preferences of the majority diverge, the former is simply drowned out by the 
latter, instead of being defeated by some reasons or compromised by bargains of any sort. 
Here, the problem is twofold. First, individual personhood is not respected as intended by 
the democratic institution because individual preferences are not acted on or countered 
                                                
148 Here is a possible real-life example. Justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court are selected by statewide 
elections. In the 2008 election, Michael Gableman defeated Incumbent Justice Louis Butler. Gableman’s 
campaign ran a series of negative ads accusing Butler for “work[ing] to put criminals on the street” because 
he “found a loophole” while he worked as a public defender and defended a child molester. Butler 
convinced the court to overturn his defendant’s conviction because some evidence in the case should have 
been excluded. Now, it was within Butler responsibility as a public defender to ensure that his defendant 
received a fair trial. Therefore, the negative ads publicized groundless accusation against Butler and grossly 
misrepresented the function of the criminal justice system. If Butler was defeated because his constituents 
believed in the negative ads (which is debatable), it would be an example of an “unreasoned removal from 
office.” 
 140 
by reasons; they simply vanish in the process of determining the outcome, as if they never 
have existed. Both John Rawls and Robert Nozick have criticized utilitarianism on the 
ground that it neglects the separateness of persons (Rawls, A Theory of Justice 25; Nozick 
33). The same criticism seems to apply in the case of aggregated preferences. Second, 
considerations that would make the aggregated preference justified or reasonable are not 
playing an adequate role in the determination of laws and policies. Rather, either the 
irrational electoral outcomes motivate irrational laws and policies, or laws and policies are 
moved by the interests of those who have money and the right strategies to game the 
political system.149 That makes it less likely for ordinary people to have their justified 
preferences fulfilled, rendering them less free. 
Therefore, the deliberative democrat argues, in additional to voting, the 
determination of law and policies should also be guided by the exchange of reasons 
among those who can vote. Here comes the supposed virtues of democratic deliberation. 
Deliberation is democratic if everyone gets to participate in the exchange of reasons, 
either directly or through some proxies (e.g., representatives in the legislative body). 
Individual personhood is respected when individuals can demand reasons or justification 
behind other people’s preferences—that is, individuals can expect others to try to 
convince them by reason when there is any conflict of preferences. Assuming that the 
political outcome would track the deliberative results when the institution is properly 
designed, individual preference is respected even if it is defeated by reason.150 Moreover, 
laws and policies would be better grounded if they are reached through deliberation, 
because ideally democratic deliberation would bring to light the considerations that 
                                                
149 The latter is currently the reality in the United States. A recent study in political science by Martin Gilen 
and Benjamin Page “indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests 
have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based 
interest groups have little or no independent influence” (564). 
150 For example, suppose Amy works on jobs that would only pay her a minimum wage and she prefers the 
government to raise the minimum wage to 35 dollars per hour. If she can have it her way, then her 
preference is certainly respected. But if she does not have it her way, then she would expect someone to 
explain to her why she cannot have it her way (e.g., it would hurt the economy, which would in turn hurt all 
the minimum wage earners—by the way I am just saying this for the sake of argument). If she does not get 
any good explanation, then she is simply ignored as a person with preferences and the capacity to reason. 
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actually justify or favor them, or it would lead people to pursue a different law or policy 
that is actually justified or favored by these considerations.151 Democratic deliberation 
can better legitimize the coercive power of government. 
Bargaining of private interests does not do better than aggregated preference in 
guiding laws and policies. As a matter of logic, bargaining between individual citizens 
cannot guide laws and policies that regulate non-excludable goods. I cannot trade my share 
of clean air for your share of the legal right to gun ownership, because laws and policies 
affect everyone. Either we all have clean air or the legal right to gun ownership, or we do 
not. Moreover, political bargaining between lawmakers and policymakers in the 
government does not represent the bargaining of private interests between their 
constituents. Suppose Lawmaker A’s constituents mostly want more gun control. A may 
support a bill that deregulates air pollution in exchange for Lawmaker B’s support for A’s 
gun control bill. However, many of A’s constituents may want both clean air and gun 
control, and some may prefer clean air more than gun control. They may not regard A’s 
bargain with B as a good bargain, and when A makes that bargain on their behalf, A is 
not representing their preferences. 
One may conclude from the previous paragraph that it is better to minimize 
government intervention and let private citizens arrange their business among themselves 
through contracts. According to this line of reasoning, perhaps there should not be any 
legal restriction on air pollution or gun ownership. One may argue, if people really want 
clean air, they would pay others not to pollute the air, or they would create other 
incentives for others to reduce air pollution (e.g., create and sell products that are energy-
efficient). When laws and policies have little impact on people’s lives, we can worry less 
about what guides them. But this line of reasoning for minimal government is flawed. The 
existence of a complex and well-functioned market depends on the existence of laws and 
                                                
151 The problem of this idea is that democratic deliberation can never be done in an ideal way (e.g., 
misinformation and manipulation in the process of deliberation). One may think that more harm than 
benefit would be done when we try to approximate an ideal that can never be achieved. I will discuss this 
worry in the next section. 
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law enforcement. I will discuss why it is wrong to think that these laws and their 
enforcement have little impact on people’s lives towards the end of the next section. 
Objections and Rejoinders 
Complaints against democratic deliberation in general can be roughly divided into 
two sorts. First, there are worries about the burden democratic deliberation would place 
on its participants and its practicality. Second, some argue that democratic deliberation 
does not have the virtues its proponents claim to have. Attempts to resolve a complaint of 
one sort often leads to a complaint of the other sort. This may lead the opponents of 
democratic deliberation to conclude that democratic deliberation is an ideal that can 
never be achieved, and perhaps attempting to approximate the ideal will make things 
worse. 
To begin with complaints of the first sort, it seems that democratic deliberation 
would place a tremendous burden on its participants because collective deliberation is 
costly and it can expose its participants to various risks. It is costly, both in terms of time 
and resources, just to get together to deliberate, and the preparation required for an 
effective deliberation is even more costly—for instance, how much education does one 
need in order to fully understand the debate about global warming and its practical 
implications? One may also suffer undesirable consequences for revealing one’s political 
view to others. Many employers are already researching job candidates on the Internet. 
According to many career coaches and consultants, recruiters often regard strong political 
opinions as red flags.152 CEOs who publicize their unpopular political views may also face 
severe backlashes.153 Moreover, the burden is obviously heavier on those who lack money 
or power in society, resulting in an unfair distribution of political power. While the CEO 
                                                
152 For example, according to Dan Schawbel’s article on Time Magazine in 2012, 73% of recruiters will 
check out job applicants’ social network profiles. They “are inspecting social profiles to weed out candidates 
and to get a sense of whether a particular applicant is likely to fit into the culture or not.” Alison Doyle, a 
columnist on the job search section of About.com, advises job applicants not to share their political 
opinions. She specifically advises job applicants to use pseudonyms in case they blog about their “radical” 
political views, because “[r]adical and the corporate world usually don’t mix.” 
153 A recent example would be the case of Brendan Eich, who was forced to step down as the CEO of 
Mozilla after his financial support of California’s Prop 8 surfaced in the media. 
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of Chick-fil-A may lose some of his annual bonus over his anti-gay statement, an ordinary 
Joe may lose his family-supporting job for doing something similar. Consequently, the 
latter faces a greater pressure to keep his opinion to himself. 
Besides, it is simply impractical to get all citizens to deliberate together on every 
social or political issue that needs to be addressed through legal or administrative means 
in a modern state. Unlike the city-state of Athens, a modern state often consists of millions 
of citizens. Democratic deliberation of a modern state cannot be modeled after the ekklesia 
of ancient Athens, because that would involve too many people with too much 
information needed to be communicated and processed. It seems that an Athenian type 
of democratic deliberation is only possible in a small polity, like a rural township. Then, 
democratic deliberation would have a very limited application. 
Now, proponents of democratic deliberation may argue that these difficulties can be 
avoided or remedied by a carefully designed institution. For example, the government 
can introduce measure to protect the identity of the participants of democratic 
deliberation, so that a particular opinion cannot be traced back to a particular participant 
(for example, participants can deliberate in small groups and the opinions can be 
presented as the deliberative outcome of the groups rather than individuals). Instead of 
having all citizens to deliberate together on every law or policy, the government may set a 
limit on duration or the number of people that actually deliberate on a given issue at any 
given time. 
However, it seems that any attempt to avoid or remedy the difficulties mentioned 
above would compromise the advertised virtues of democratic deliberation (that is, its 
characteristics of being deliberative and democratic). Robert Goodin conveniently 
summarizes and analyzes the strategies to avoid or remedy the difficulties into four kinds, 
and he explains the shortcomings of each of them. 
The first strategy is “disjointed deliberation” (Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation 
Within” 56), which was first suggested by Aristotle in Politics154 and further developed by, 
                                                
154 Politics, 1298a10-13: 
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for example, Jürgen Habermas, as well as Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel. The idea is 
that, citizens are divided into subsets and subsets of citizens deliberate in different times, 
locations and contexts. The opinions that emerge from the small groups are somehow 
blended together through some meta-deliberative process. The problem with this strategy 
is that, it is unclear how the process of blending the opinions can be both democratic and 
deliberative. In particular, small group discussion often leads to group polarization, a 
phenomenon that “members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more 
extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies” 
(Sunstein 81). If one blends together the polarized opinions that emerge from different 
groups by simple aggregation, then the procedure as a whole becomes less deliberative. 
But if there is some sort of gatekeeper that puts together the opinions in some reasoned 
method, then the procedure as a whole becomes less democratic. 
The second strategy is “ersatz deliberation” (Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation 
Within” 58). The idea is to have a representative subset of citizens to deliberate together. 
The deliberation of the subset can substitute the deliberation of the whole population if 
different views and reasons in the latter are fairly represented in the former. Examples of 
this strategy include the deliberation of the legislative body in a representative democracy 
(cf. Gutmann and Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?), “citizens’ juries” (cf. Coote and 
Lenaghan) and James Fishkin’s “deliberative polling.” The difficulty with this strategy is 
to create a subset that is indeed representative, or to ensure the “continuing 
representativeness of the subset” (Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation Within” 58). The 
problem posed by the latter is that the opinions of the individuals in the initially 
representative subset can change over the course of deliberation, and this change may not 
approximate the change that would happen in the deliberation that includes the whole 
population. 
                                                                                                                                            
That all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy; this is the sort of equality 
which the people desire. But there are various ways in which all may share in the government; 
they may deliberate, not all in one body, but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the 
Milesian. 
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The third strategy is “emaciated deliberation” (Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation 
Within” 59). The idea is to restrict how much information each participant can 
communicate to other participants—“restricting input”—in order to reduce the burden 
of deliberation on each participant. For example, a legislative body may have rules that 
limit speeches to those that are germane to the issues being deliberated. The problem of 
this strategy is that, whatever procedures in place impose these limits may screen out 
inputs that are relevant and important, rendering the whole process less deliberative. 
The fourth strategy is “blinkered deliberation” (Goodin, “Democratic Deliberation 
Within” 59): let participants express their opinions in the public sphere, where they can 
also pick up each other’s opinions and decide what to do with them. The public sphere 
can be a coffee house of 18th century London, Hyde Park in London, a broadsheet 
newspaper, the “Wall of Democracy” in Beijing in the 80s… and, most recently, the 
Internet. The problem is, there is no guarantee that there would be any uptake or 
engagement of each other’s opinion, and shouting marches instead deliberations often 
occur in these venues. 
Finally, Goodin himself suggests that one can cope with the problems posed by mass 
deliberation by supplementing restricted democratic deliberation with imagined 
deliberation. The idea is that, one can put oneself into other citizens’ shoes and deliberate 
from their points of view. Therefore, if one is empathetic enough, one could approximate 
the collective deliberation one would have with other citizens in one’s head. Goodin 
thinks that empathy can be cultivated by getting to know the lives of people in different 
parts of society through, say, arts, literature and mass media. Of course, as Goodin 
himself notes, imagined deliberations cannot replace collective decision procedures 
because only the latter can confer legitimacy to decisions. Rather, the former informs the 
latter. 
The problem of Goodin’s suggestion as I see it is that, if information overload is a 
worry, his suggestion does not seem to be an improvement over the fourth strategy. If 
citizens would not engage with the opinions of others in the public sphere because, say, 
they are closed-minded or because they are too busy to try to understand those who 
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disagree with them, one cannot expect them to reach out to understand the lives of others 
because of the same reasons. 
In short, any coping strategy that limits the number of people that actually 
participate in deliberation would have a representative problem, namely, some views or 
positions are not represented. Any coping strategy that limits the exchange of reasons 
between participants would make the process less deliberative and more aggregative, i.e. 
less rational (for the reasons discussed in the beginning of the appendix). Therefore, ideal 
democratic deliberation can never be achieved. 
But proponents of democratic deliberation can live with that. Approximating the 
ideal is still a good thing to do even if the ideal can never be achieved. An ideal political 
theory can help set an aim for politics in the non-ideal world. Having imperfect 
democratic deliberation is still better than having no democratic deliberation, because 
citizens’ individual personhood would be more respected while law and policies would be 
justified to a greater extent. That a certain ideal can never be fully realized is not in itself an 
objection against trying to approximate the ideal. 
A real objection to democratic deliberation should be that trying to approximate the 
ideal actually makes things worse—citizens’ individual personhood would be less 
respected or law and policies would be justified to a lesser extent. There are several 
possible ways to run this sort of objection, and I will explain why they are all unsuccessful. 
First, one may argue that democratic deliberation renders laws and policies less 
justified. Ian Shapiro argues that democratic deliberation undermines consensus instead 
of promoting it because it brings out the disagreements that people otherwise might not 
notice. The uncovered disagreement makes laws and policies more controversial. People 
who oppose these laws and policies to begin with would oppose them even more, 
rendering them less justified. The proper response to this objection is that, laws and 
policies are not merely justified by consensus (although from a democratic perspective 
people’s actual attitudes towards laws and policies should play some important role in 
justifying them). A law or policy is not well justified if it is merely supported by consensus 
resulting from misrepresentation of facts or bad reasoning. Therefore, it is incorrect to 
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think that democratic deliberation renders laws and policies less justified simply because it 
can undermine consensus. 
This brings us to the second objection. Democratic deliberation is bad, one may 
argue, because it fosters practices that tend to mislead citizens to support laws and policies 
that are unjustified or detrimental to their own interests. Guido Pinione and Fernando 
Tesón argue that discourse failure is inevitable in democratic deliberation. In 
redistributive politics, politicians and interest groups have huge incentives to provide 
misleading/false information and manipulative argument in political discourse (i.e., 
“posturing”) so that resources would be redistributed in ways that can hugely benefit 
them. Other participants in political dialogue who would not have this kind of gain lack 
the incentive to invest time and resources to overcome misinformation and manipulation 
(i.e. “rational ignorance”).155 The perverted structure of incentives would persist as long as 
there is a redistribution of resources by the government. Democratic deliberation would 
not improve majoritarian politics because the mere fact that voters are exposed to more 
considerations and arguments does not necessarily make votes more informed. It is the 
quality of information, not its quantity, that matters. To make things worse, people are by 
nature more attracted to “vivid explanation” rather than theories that are opaque or 
counterintuitive. It takes time and resources (i.e., studies a subject like an expert would) to 
overcome the cognitive bias. For example, according to Pinione and Tesón, Argentinians 
favor protectionist policies and disfavor free trade while there are established economic 
studies showing that protectionism harms these people economically. They support 
economic policies that actually harm their interests because they are attracted by the vivid 
                                                
155 Anthony Downs has already argued that a rational voter would not vote because individual influence on 
the outcome of the poll is not worth the effort required to learn how to vote intelligently. Russell Hardin 
argues that a rational agent may still vote because they may not understand the rational choice argument 
against voting and it is rational for them not to understand rational choice theory (in the sense that it is 
rational for them not to understand the Theory of General Relativity); but a rational agent would not 
bother to learn how to vote intelligently. 
Derek Parfit argues that one ought to participate in collective good deeds even though each individual 
participation itself would have little impact on the outcome. This may give one reason to vote, regardless of 
whether it is rational from the point of view of decision theory. I discussed this point in Chapter 3, Section 
2. 
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explanation (e.g., a narrative about how greedy rich people eliminate jobs for the poor in 
order to boost profit) offered by left-wing propaganda, and technical economic theories 
are difficult for ordinary people to comprehend. One may go further than Pinione and 
Tesón to argue that democratic deliberation would worsen the situation because it may 
foster a false impression among the people that they are well-informed when they are not. 
Then, democratic deliberation does not make its participants more free; to the contrary, 
being manipulated or lied to make one less free. 
Pinione and Tesón think that discourse failure can be overcome only by eliminating 
the biggest incentive of posturing and rational ignorance—redistributive politics. People 
in society should allocate resources through voluntary exchanges rather than majoritarian 
rule. According to their proposal, a “Framework Contractarian Society” is a marketplace 
for “Voluntary Communities,” subsocieties that people can join and exit under mutually 
agreed conditions. The Framework Contractarian Society would only set and enforce 
rules (sometimes by force) about contracts, the right of exit from the Voluntary 
Communities, and basic rights to life and security.156 A Voluntary Community has its 
own rules to regulate some of the things that are not regulated by the Framework 
Contractarian Society. For example, there can be a Voluntary Community that uses 
representative politics to determine how to distribute the resources within the Voluntary 
Community, and there can be another Voluntary Community that let its members “vote 
for transparent subsidies, taxes, and regulations, on a case-by-case basis” (Pinione and 
Tesón 231). Or there can be a Voluntary Community that bans religious reasons in the 
collective deliberation on its communal affairs, and there can be another Voluntary 
Community that allows religious reasons. The collective deliberation within a Voluntary 
Community that uses collective deliberation to regulate its internal affairs should be of 
better quality because its members are those who care about deliberation, eliminating the 
incentive of rational ignorance; those who do not care would have joined a different 
Voluntary Community. 
                                                
156 As Pinione and Tesón note, this proposal is very similar to Nozick’s proposal for a “framework for 
utopia.” 
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I think this is not a successful objection to democratic deliberation for two reasons. 
First, the perverted incentives in democratic deliberation can be reduced without 
abandoning redistributive politics. Second, Pinione and Tesón’s proposal seems rather 
implausible. 
The incentives of posturing and rational ignorance are not unique to political 
discourse; they exist in other realms of discourse, including academic discourses, as well. 
The perverted incentives can be reduced—or at least Pinione and Tesón have to admit 
that it can be. Pinione and Tesón’s favorite example is the supposed discourse failure in 
debates about economic policies. We all know that economics as an academic discipline is 
not immune to discourse failure. For example, Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth and Gerald 
Epstein study the potential conflicts of interests among academic economists. Among 19 
prominent economists who had publicly proposed financial reform measures after the 
2008 financial crisis, 15 of them “work in some capacity with private financial 
institutions”; 13 of them failed to disclose these affiliations in their academic publications 
and 8 of them failed to disclose these affiliations when they wrote for the general media or 
spoke in interviews (Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein 45). In fact, every science that has 
any bearing on practical matters is vulnerable to discourse failure—including the so-
called hard sciences like medicine and nutritional science. 157  For example, 
pharmaceutical companies, biotech firms and the scientists they fund have huge 
incentives to mislead other scientists about the effect of certain drugs or procedures they 
create, while journal editors and reviewers have incentives of rational ignorance (they are 
volunteers and they get little in return for scrutinizing the submissions). If Pinione and 
Tesón treat natural sciences and social sciences equally, regard consensus in economics as 
established scientific truths and use economics to show that political discourse suffers from 
discourse failure, then they also have to accept that discourse failure in political discourse 
can, at least in principle, be overcome to the extent that we can comfortably live with it. 
                                                
157 For example, see the investigative reports from David Colquhoun of the Guardian on the corruption of the 
peer-review system and Kiera Butler of Mother Jones on corporate sponsorships in nutritional science. 
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Of course, as Pinione and Tesón would argue, discourse failure would be worse in 
political discourse than in science because many participants of political discourse do not 
have expert knowledge in political economy; they are more vulnerable to vivid 
explanations. However, these problems can be overcome at least partially. For example, it 
seems that the advancement in information technology and empirical psychology, as well 
as the expansion of higher education, would help bringing the cognitive capacity and 
knowledge of the general public closer to the expert level. In other words, reducing the 
cost and increasing efficiency of gathering and processing information can make 
ignorance less rational. Moreover, in any given academic discipline, no one is an expert 
on everything, and experts defer to other experts when they need to. Participants of 
political discourse can do the same. 
In short, discourse failure in political discourse is not as dire as Pinione and Tesón 
suggest. Now, I want to point out that, compared to academic discourse, we have 
additional reason to tolerate the epistemic imperfection of political discourse. 
Democratic deliberation is not about discovering the scientifically correct way to 
govern or to live. Rather, it is (mostly) about deciding how citizens want to live together in 
society, in which one cannot completely avoid the consequences of other citizens’ actions. 
The decision should be informed by sciences (both social and natural), but it should be 
determined by individual’s values and desires, as well as their capacities as a free moral 
agents. No expert can make judgments of the latter sort on behalf of other people (no, not 
even moral philosophers). Medical ethics provides an apt analogy here. The dominant 
view in the health care professions (at least in the western world) rejects paternalism and 
respects patient autonomy. Most likely, no matter how educated the patient is, she would 
not have more medical knowledge than her physician (unless the patient is a physician 
specialized on her own illness). But the patient still has the final say on treatment decision, 
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and the physician has an obligation not to manipulate the patient into the physician’s 
preferred course of action.158 
The fact that one cannot completely avoid the consequences of other citizens’ actions 
should also lead one to question the plausibility of Pinione and Tesón’s contractarian 
proposal. One cannot completely avoid the consequences of other citizens’ actions, 
including those who are members of different Voluntary Communities. Suppose 
members of the Environmentalist Voluntary Community believe that clean air and water 
is more important than anything else, while members of the Industrialist Voluntary 
Community believe that they should generate more electricity to meet their insatiable 
energy need at the expense of polluting air and water. In the Framework Contractualist 
Society, they have to settle the disagreement by contract. The Environmentalists may pay 
the Industrialists cash to stop polluting, or they may develop some kind of technology to 
reduce pollution and entice the Industrialists to use it, etc. The need of contract is where 
the private preference of members of a Voluntary Community meets the law of the 
Framework Contractarian Society, which gives rise to a worry about whether the free-
market approach can avoid the eventual rise of corporatism or crony capitalism. 
While libertarians argue for minimal government, they cannot eliminate government 
altogether. Without something like a government, people who violate a contract cannot 
be sued in court and property rights cannot be enforced; there would be no market 
without sales contract or property right. But the government defines the content of 
property right and contract law (e.g., three hundred years ago there were no such things as 
intellectual property and anyone could play J. S. Bach’s music for free) and it decides how 
                                                
158 Ezekiel Emanuel and Linda Emanuel describe four models of physician-patient relationship. In the 
paternalistic model, the doctor acts on the best interest of the patient and dictates treatment decision. In the 
informative model, the doctor provides all the relevant information to the patient and leaves the latter to 
make treatment decisions on her own. In the interpretive model, the doctor elucidates what the patient 
really wants or values and then help the patient to make treatment decisions that would achieve these wants 
or values. In the deliberative model, the doctor deliberates with the patient to make treatment decisions. In 
addition to elucidating the patient’s wants and values, the doctor would also put forth her own value 
judgment about whether certain course of action is worth pursuing. All models except the paternalistic 
model prohibit manipulating the patient into the physician’s preferred course of action. It is widely 
accepted that the paternalistic model is justified only when it is impossible to obtain the patient’s informed 
preference (e.g., in a medical emergency). 
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to enforce it. Deciding how to enforce property rights includes making various decisions 
about laws and policies. For example, in order to protect one’s exclusive right to use a 
piece of land, the government needs to have a police force. Even if the government allows 
landowners to guard their own lands by force, it still needs a police force to regulate those 
private forces. To maintain a police force, the government needs to raise money to fund 
it. This raises a host of questions about who and how to tax, how the police force is 
managed, how to make sure everything is done properly (i.e. no abuse of power), etc., and 
these questions would in turn raise more legal and political questions that need to be 
addressed. Big corporations and wealthy people with special ties with government officials 
can influence the government to act in ways that would promote the financial interests of 
the rich, often at the expense of the less rich. As the rich get richer, they get more power 
to dictate the terms of social cooperation, and further limit the options available to the 
less well off. This sounds like a decrease rather than increase of liberty, even on the 
libertarian standard. 
Pinione and Tesón would, conceivably, reject my speculation and hold onto their 
own. They would insist that the contractarian society they envision would not have these 
problems if the proposal is implemented properly. The disagreement between Pinione 
and Tesón and me is to be settled by empirical facts about political economics, social 
psychology, scientific and technological advancements, the effect of these advancements 
on society, so on and so forth. So Pinione and Tesón’s objection to democratic 
deliberation is rather uninteresting from the philosophical point of view. Consider the 
following analogy. Suppose Amy and Billy have a debate about the morality of death 
penalty. Amy opposes the death penalty because many innocents were executed as a 
result of miscarriage of justice. Billy has no problem with death penalty because he thinks 
that miscarriage of justice in death penalty cases is very rare. Then their disagreement 
boils down to how many of the executed were actually innocent. This is not an interesting 
disagreement from the philosophical point of view because it cannot be settled in the 
realm of philosophy. Pinione and Tesón’s objection is uninteresting from the 
philosophical point of view in this sense. 
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I conclude that the objection on the ground that democratic deliberation is not 
conducive to the liberal ideal of democracy fails. Practical difficulties of democratic 
deliberation can be overcome or remedied by technology and institutional design to a 
certain extent. Even though democratic deliberation cannot be done perfectly, 
approximating the ideal can still promote individual liberty and freedom. 
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APPENDIX B: WHAT EXACTLY IS SEARLE’S THEORY OF POLITICAL 
OBLIGATION? 
John Searle explains the existence of social facts, including rules and obligations, by 
collective intentionality. Political obligations exist because it is collectively recognized to 
be so. Collective intentionality does not depend on the common interest; rather, it 
depends on everyone having a special kind of intention, namely, a we-intention. 
But there are some interpretive issues in Searle’s work. Searle has developed the 
theory of collective intentionality and social reality over the last three decades and he 
applies his theory to explain political power and obligation in his latest book. His view has 
evolved over time, although sometimes he does not explicitly acknowledge these changes. 
In what follows, I will discuss what I take to be the most plausible interpretation of his 
theory of political obligation. 
Before we can discuss Searle’s view on political obligation, we need to understand 
what he means by reasons for action. Searle thinks that a reason for action is a “factive 
entity” that causes action when the agent acts on it, meaning that a reason for action is a 
candidate of the reason for which one acts. Factive entities that can serve as reasons for 
action include beliefs, desires, obligations, needs, etc. (Making the Social World 41). Searle 
rejects the internalism of reason, which holds that all reasons are psychological states 
(which include but are not limited to beliefs and desires) or some combinations of them 
(e.g., a motivational sets). He uses the future desire of a smoker as a counterexample 
(Rationality in Action 129–131): a young smoker knows that smoking will shorten her life 
span and she knows her future self will desire to live beyond 60. However, she has no 
desire to live beyond 60 now. An internalist would need to say that (i) the smoker’s future 
desire gives her no reason to quit smoking, or (ii) that knowledge of the future desire gives 
rise to a present second-order desire to quit smoking (which is a reason to quit smoking). 
Searle thinks that this is absurd. In (i), one is guilty of irrationality for failing to consider 
one’s future desire in one’s deliberation. In (ii), the internalist identifies the wrong item as 
the reason for action: the second-order desire (or to be precise, the state of being 
motivated) is grounded in a reason, namely, the future desire; the present second-order 
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desire is not itself a reason.159 In other words, “the reason is the ground of the desire; the 
desire is not the ground of the reason” (Rationality in Action 126). Therefore, Searle 
concludes, there exists desire-independent reasons and they are external reasons for 
action. 
Searle acknowledges the internalist intuition that a reason for action should be 
something that motivates an agent to act, but he does not think that the reason itself 
needs to be internal in order to do the job; rather, it needs only to be represented by some 
intentional state of the agent (Rationality in Action 114–115). A reason is always a reason for 
an intentional state, and a reason for action is a reason for a prior intention or an 
intention-in-action (Rationality in Action 114). A reason for action motivates the agent once 
the agent recognizes it as such and acts on it—that is, acting on the recognized reason 
causes a prior intention or an intention-in-action.160 The agent would be irrational if she 
fails to recognize the reason as such. Searle calls this “recognition rationality”: 
Rationality may require that an agent under certain epistemic conditions 
simply recognize a fact in the world such as the fact that he has undertaken 
an obligation or that he has a certain need, or that he is in a certain kind of 
danger, etc., even though there is no rational process, no activity of 
deliberation, leading to the rational result (Rationality in Action 117). 
Now we may turn to a brief initial statement of Searle’s view on political obligation. 
Political obligation, like other obligations and duties, are desire-independent reasons for 
action. However, Searle seems to have two different accounts about how political 
obligation comes to be. I will discuss each account and suggest how to reconcile them. 
                                                
159 Sometimes Searle uses the term “reason” casually. For example, he says “if I decide to carry an umbrella 
because I believe that it is raining, my belief is an internal reason, but it is a valid reason only if it 
corresponds to an external reason, only if it is, in fact, raining” (Rationality in Action 115). To avoid confusion, 
I will keep the terminology strict and use only “reason” for entities that do not require such correspondence 
(so the belief in the raining case is not what I would call a reason; sometimes psychological facts can be 
reasons, but not in the internalist sense).	  
160 Obviously Searle has a problem of agent causation here. He thinks that rationality presupposes free will 
and so there must be a gap between recognizing a reason and the formation of any intention. In other 
words, the intentional state that represents the reason cannot be the sufficient cause of the intention. The 
agent bridges the gap by acting on the reason. However, what exactly does he mean by “acting on”? Cf. 
Rationality in Action 111–112.	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In Rationality in Action, Searle seems to think that there are only two kinds of desire-
independent actions, namely, future prudential reasons and reasons created by an agent 
“committing himself in various ways” (Rationality in Action 168). Political obligation falls 
under the second category. 
Here, “committing” or “commitment” is to be understood in a broad and technical 
sense. Commitment (the act of committing) is “the imposition of conditions of satisfaction 
on conditions of satisfaction” (Rationality in Action 212). The second occurrence of 
“conditions of satisfaction” refers to intentional content—the conditions are satisfied if 
and only if the content and the world have the right sort of correspondence. The first 
“conditions of satisfaction” refer to a sort of “status function” (Rationality in Action 173), 
which includes a direction of fit and some standard of correctness concerning the agent 
(i.e. whether the agent does something correctly). A direction of fit is a relation between 
the world and intentional content. Something has a content-to-world direction of fit if 
and only if the content corresponds to the world as it already is (e.g., belief, assertion, etc.). 
Something has a world-to-content direction of fit if and only if the world is to be made to 
correspond to the content (e.g., desire, command, etc.). There are things that have both 
directions of fit (e.g., intention, declaration). 
In Searle’s terminology, to assign a function to something is to assign some aim, 
purpose or use to that thing, so that the thing can be “assessed as good or bad” with 
respect to the aim, purpose or use assigned (The Construction of Social Reality 14). For 
example, once we assign the function of hammering to a hammer-shaped thing, we can 
regard the thing as good if it hammers well. Or once we assign the function of pumping 
blood to a heart, we can regard the heart as bad if its cardiac muscle is too weak to 
squeeze out enough blood for the body. Or, to put it differently, something with a 
function assigned to it is “a cause that serves a purpose” (Making the Social World 58).161 
                                                
161 In the original text Searle says “a function is a cause that serves a function” (Making the Social World 58). 
But obviously he must mean the thing, or the category of things, with the function assigned. A heart is 
something that causes the blood to move through the circulation system through pumping. It is a thing with 
a function assigned to it, not the function itself.	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The function gives rise to an evaluative dimension, so that people can evaluate the thing 
with the function assigned with respect to this dimension. 
Now, to impose a status function on something is to impose “a collectively recognized 
status to which a function is attached” (The Construction of Social Reality 41) on that thing.162 
For example, members of a village may impose the status of the boundary of one’s home 
to the outer wall of one’s brick house, for the purpose of separating every family’s private 
space from the public space—people know not to walk into someone’s home causally. 
Here are some examples of commitment. In the case of assertion, there are two 
conditions of satisfaction imposed: the content-to-world direction of fit and that the agent 
is correct if and only if the content corresponds to the world. In the case of promise, there 
are two different conditions of satisfaction imposed: the world is to be made to correspond 
to the content (world-to-content direction of fit), and that the agent is correct if and only if 
the agent makes the world corresponds to the content herself. 
Why is the imposition of these conditions the imposition of a status function? An 
utterance being an assertion, promise or other kinds of commitment as opposed to, say, a 
tune sung in the shower, is a collectively recognizable status. If my utterance of “it’s 
raining now” has the status of being an assertion, other people can recognize it as such. If 
it is in fact not raining, they can rightly point out that I am wrong. By contrast, if I just 
sing “Thunder only happens when it’s raining” (lyrics from a pop song in the 70’s), other 
people cannot say that I am wrong. Now, whether my utterance has the status of being an 
assertion depends of my intention as a speaker, and other people can recognize the status 
by recognizing my intention. And once people recognize what sort of thing the utterance 
is, they can check and see whether it is “good” as an assertion, i.e. whether it is true. 
When I utter “it’s raining” and intend it to be an assertion, I impose a particular kind of 
status function (with the two conditions of satisfaction mentioned above) on the content of 
my utterance and people can assess my utterance accordingly. 
                                                
162 Notice that “collectively recognized status” is ambiguous. Is the status recognized by every member of 
some group individually, or is it recognized by an entity constituted by every member of that group?	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Similar things could be said in the case of promise. When I utter “I promise that I 
will return the book next week,” I impose a particular status function on my utterance 
and people can assess it accordingly. Moreover, by imposing the status function, I create 
an obligation to return the book next week for myself. An obligation is a reason for 
action, and this is a reason that I would not have if I did not so promise. In other words, I 
create a reason for action for myself by making a promise. 
Given how Searle defines “commitment,” a commitment need not be an internal 
state or mental attitude, as suggested by Bernard Williams and Donald Davidson 
(Rationality in Action 168–170). Moreover, although the basic cases of commitment are 
speech acts (Rationality in Action 172–173), a commitment need not be an explicit avowal 
(Rationality in Action 174). For example, when one orders a beer at a bar, one is committed 
to pay for the beer, even though there is no explicit avowal about that—she might just 
say, “can I have a Hoegaarden?” As long as her behavior in a particular social context 
constitutes the action of ordering a beer, she has imposed a certain status function on 
some silent but recognizable content, namely, “I will pay for the beer,” and thus created 
an obligation to pay for herself. 
Now we may return to political obligation. Searle does not discuss political obligation 
in Rationality in Action, but given what is said in the official story of desire-independent 
reason, political obligation is supposed to be the sort of implicit obligation similar to the 
obligation to pay for the beer. It is created when one interacts with the government and 
other members of society. 
However, in The Making of Social World, Searle tells a seemingly different story about 
how individuals come to have political obligation as their reason for action, and the story 
is told primarily in terms of political power. Searle thinks that political power is the power 
a political society can exercise over its members163 and political obligation is created 
through the exercise of such power. What is power? According to Searle, “A has power 
                                                
163 Cf. Making the Social World 156. Searle thinks society in general is not a collective intentionality, just as 
“the white community” is not a collective intentionality. Rather, “[t]here are particular societies in which 
there is a pervasive collective intentionality, and the nation-state is perhaps the most famous form of 
political collective intentionality.”	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over S with respect to action B if and only if A can intentionally get S to do what A wants 
regarding B, whether S wants to do it or not” (Making the Social World 151). One can 
exercise one’s power by using it directly or threating to use it. Here, power can be either 
coercive (e.g., force or threat of force) or non-coercive, and the latter is called “deontic 
power.” Political power is supposed to be of the non-coercive sort. 
How does deontic power work? Suppose A has deontic power of a particular sort 
over S. That means A can intentionally get S to do what A wants regarding certain kinds 
of action, whether S wants to do it or not. When A exercises her deontic power, she gives 
S desire-independent reasons for performing that kind of action. And being able to 
exercise a particular kind of deontic power is a matter of being recognized or accepted to 
have a certain status collectively. Since both A and S are among those who recognize or 
accept A to have that status, S would recognize or accept that she has a desire-
independent reason for action when A exercises deontic power over her. 
The new story is different from the old story in at least two regards. First, in the old 
story, whether one has political obligation is solely up to oneself—as long as one commits 
oneself in a certain politically relevant way, one has political obligation.164 In particular, 
Searle thinks that commitment always create desire-independent reasons, even in the 
most trivial cases (Rationality in Action 180). By contrast, in the new story, whether one has 
political obligation depends on whether someone else exercises her political power. When 
A exercises her deontic power over S, A gets S to do what A wants regardless of what S 
wants by giving S a desire-independent reason to do what A wants. So if A does not 
exercise her power, A does not give S any desire-independent reason. Does S still have 
any desire-independent reason? If yes, A’s power seems irrelevant to whether S has any 
desire-independent reason; if no, the new story is in conflict with the old story. 
                                                
164 Of course, it is also necessary that the relevant institution is in place. For example, without the institution 
of money there cannot be any obligation to pay, and whether there is the institution of money is not up to 
any particular individual. But Searle stresses that “the reason does not derive from the institution, rather the 
institution provides the framework, the structure, within which one creates the reason” (Rationality in Action 
204).	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Second, in the old story, one rationally recognizes that one has political obligation 
because one knows that one has imposed the relevant status function on oneself. It is 
unclear how this works in the new story. A has the status that allows her to exercise her 
deontic power as long as her status is collectively recognized, and S is one of those in the 
collective. But “collective recognition” is actually a “hybrid notion” of “collective 
recognition or acceptance” (Making the Social World 57).165 That is, one need not accept A’s 
status in the sense of approval or endorsement in order to be in the collective; one may 
merely “go along with” the crowd out of “prudence.”166 If S merely goes along with the 
crowd and “recognize” the status of A out of prudence, it seems that S only gets present 
prudential reason (i.e. desire-dependence reason) when A exercises her power over S. 
Searle does not disavow the old story. In fact, he maintains in the new story that 
“desire-independent reason for action contained in institutional facts must be, explicitly 
or implicitly, created as such by that agent” (Making the Social World 132). How can we 
reconcile the two stories? First, we would have to say that S has desire-independent 
reasons even if A does not actually exercise her power. The mere prospect that A would 
exercise her power is enough to give S a desire-independent reason for action. When A 
exercises her power, she just help S to see a reason that S already has; whether A actually 
exercises her power is indeed irrelevant to the existence of the reason S already has. 
Therefore, there is something special about the status-recognizing collective, such 
that one sets oneself up to create desire-independent reasons for oneself by being a 
member of it. S becomes a member of the collective by interacting with other members of 
the collective in a certain way—in a way that constitute “recognizing or accepting” A’s 
                                                
165 It appears that “recognition” is ambiguous in Searle’s work. On the one hand, it means the recognition 
of a reason for action (“recognitional rationality”); on the other hand, it means the acceptance or “going 
along with” of a status function. These two meanings are mutually exclusive. The acceptance or “going 
along with” of a status function may create a reason for action, but it is not itself the recognition of a reason 
for action.	  
166 Searle’s example: “At the time of the Nazi regime… members of the Nazi Party enthusiastically 
endorsed the institutional structure of the Third Reich. But there were lots of people in Germany at the 
time, who, while not endorsing the institutional structure, went along with it as a matter of nationalism, 
indifference, prudence, or even just apathy.” (Making the Social World 57)	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status as having certain deontic power. Once S becomes a member, S has a desire-
independent reason. 
But this does not resolve all the tension. How can S be intentionally creating, or setting 
herself up to create, a reason for herself when she is merely going along with the crowd? 
It seems absurd to think that when Pastor Niemöller went along with the crowd while the 
Nazi was arresting the socialists, trade unionists and Jews, he intentionally set himself up to 
create a desire-independent reason for obeying the Nazi when the Nazi came to arrest 
him. It seems implausible because Niemöller did not foresee that he would have such a 
reason. Even if he did create the reason, he did so unintentionally. Therefore, if Searle 
still wants to stick to his guns and say that Niemöller did have a desire-independent 
reason for obeying the Nazi because of his previous interaction with other members of 
Nazi Germany, something else needs to be said. My best suggestion is that if Niemöller 
did recognize a desire-independent reason for obeying the Nazi, it is not because he 
recognized that he created the reason intentionally, but that he recognized that he was a 
member of the collective. He unwittingly created such a reason for himself by becoming a 
member of this collective. Therefore, it turns out that the collective is playing a 
mysterious but indispensible role in explaining the obligation S has. The problem is, of 
course, that mystery does not explain anything. 
  
 162 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, Robert Merrihew. “I—Conflict.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83.1 
(2009): 115–132. Web. 
Alonso, Facundo M. “Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations.” Ethics 
119.3 (2009): 444–475. Web. 
American Civil Liberties Union. “War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of 
American Policing.” 2014. Web. 14 Aug. 2014. 
Apuzzo, Matt. “War Gear Flows to Police Departments.” The New York Times 8 June 
2014. NYTimes.com. Web. 14 Aug. 2014. 
Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York, NY: Modern 
Library, 2001. Print. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare.” Journal of Political 
Economy 58.4 (1950): 328–346. Print. 
Ball, Andrea, and Eric Dexheimer. “State Undercounts Child Abuse-Related Deaths.” 
Austin Statesman 11 Jan. 2015. Web. 28 Feb. 2015. 
Bell, Daniel. “Communitarianism.” Ed. Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 2013. Web. 9 Mar. 2015. 
Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969. Print. 
Bratman, Michael. “Agency, Time, and Sociality.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Association 84.2 (2010): 7–26. Print. 
---. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language 
and Information, 1999. Print. 
Butler, Joseph. The Analogy or Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of 
Nature, To Which Are Added Two Brief Dissertations: 1. Of Personal Identity. 2. Of the Nature of 
Virtue. 5th ed. London: R. Horsfield, 1765. Google Books. Web. 
Butler, Kiera. “I Went to the Nutritionists’ Annual Confab. It Was Catered by 
McDonald’s.” Mother Jones. N.p., 12 May 2014. Web. 20 May 2014. 
Cacioppo, John T., and Jean Decety. “Social Neuroscience: Challenges and 
Opportunities in the Study of Complex Behavior.” Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences 1224.1 (2011): 162–173. Web. 
Calhoun, Cheshire. “Responsibility and Reproach.” Ethics 99.2 (1989): 389–406. Print. 
Carrick-Hagenbarth, Jessica, and Gerald A. Epstein. “Dangerous Interconnectedness: 
Economists’ Conflicts of Interest, Ideology and Financial Crisis.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 36.1 (2012): 43–63. Web. 
Chang, Ruth. “Are Hard Choices Cases of Incomparability?” Philosophical Issues 22.1 
(2012): 106–126. Web. 
---. “II—Reflections on the Reasonable and the Rational in Conflict Resolution.” 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83.1 (2009): 133–160. Web. 
 163 
---. “The Possibility of Parity.” Ethics 112.4 (2002): 659–688. Print. 
Cohen, Joshua, and Charles Sabel. “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy.” European Law 
Journal 3.4 (1997): 313–342. Web. 
Coleman, Jules, and John Ferejohn. “Democracy and Social Choice.” Ethics 97.1 (1986): 
6–25. Print. 
Colquhoun, David. “Publish-or-Perish: Peer Review and the Corruption of Science.” The 
Guardian 5 Sept. 2011. The Guardian. Web. 5 Aug. 2014. 
Coote, Anna, and Jo Lenaghan. Citizens’ Juries: Theory Into Practice. London: Institute for 
Public Policy Research, 1997. Web. 
Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989. 
Print. 
Dancy, Jonathan. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. 
---. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Print. 
Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy 60.23 (1963): 
685–700. Print. 
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1957. 
Print. 
Doyle, Alison. “Politics and Your Job Search.” About.com Job Searching. N.p., 22 July 2014. 
Web. 22 July 2014. 
Elster, Jon. Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print. 
Emanuel, Ezekiel J., and Linda L. Emanuel. “Four Models of the Physician-Patient 
Relationship.” The Journal of the American Medical Association 267.16 (1992): 2221–2226. 
Print. 
Finley, M. I. Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology. London: Chatto & Windus, 1980. Print. 
Fishkin, James S. Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Print. 
French, Peter A. “The Corporation as a Moral Person.” American Philosophical Quarterly 
16.3 (1979): 207–215. Print. 
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. 
New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. Print. 
Gaus, Gerald F. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print. 
Gibbard, Allan. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41.4 
(1973): 587–601. Web. 
Gilbert, Margaret. A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print. 
 164 
---. Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plural Subject Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000. Print. 
---. On Social Facts. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992. Print. 
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12.03 (2014): 564–581. 
Web. 
Goodin, Robert E. “Democractic Deliberation Within.” Debating Deliberative Democracy. Ed. 
James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. 54–79. Print. 
---. “What Is so Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?” Ethics 98.4 (1988): 663–686. 
Print. 
Guerrero, Alexander A. “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and 
Caution.” Philosophical Studies 136.1 (2007): 59–97. Print. 
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. “Deilberative Democracy Beyond Process.” 
Debating Deliberative Democracy. Ed. James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2003. 31–53. Print. 
---. Why Deliberative Democracy?. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004. Print. 
Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Print. 
Hardin, Russell, James S. Fishkin, and Peter Laslett. “Street-Level Epistemology and 
Democratic Participation.” Debating Deliberative Democracy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2006. 161–181. Print. 
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955. Print. 
Hasan, Mehdi. “Not In My Name: Islam, Pakistan and the Blasphemy Laws.” The 
Huffington Post 21 Aug. 2012. Web. 22 Aug. 2012. 
Hayek, F. A. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” The American Economic Review 35.4 
(1945): 519–530. Print. 
Held, Virginia. “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?” 
Journal of Philosophy 67.14 (1970): 471–481. Print. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. J.C.A Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Print. 
Holpuch, Amanda. “Oakland Pays $4.5m to Scott Olsen, Veteran Onjured in Occupy 
Protest.” The Guardian 21 Mar. 2014. The Guardian. Web. 20 Aug. 2014. 
Huebner, Bryce. “Genuinely Collective Emotions.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 
1.1 (2010): 89–118. Web. 
Hunt, Katie, and Nasir Habib. “Girl Held in Pakistan, Accused of Burning Quran 
Pages.” CNN. N.p., 20 Aug. 2012. Web. 22 Aug. 2012. 
Isaacs, Tracy Lynn. Moral Responsibility in Collective Context. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. Print. 
 165 
Jackson, Frank. “Group Morality.” Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. 
Ed. Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan, and Jean Norman. New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 
1987. 92–110. Print. 
Jeske, Diane. “Special Obligations.” Ed. Edward N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy 2008. Web. 15 Oct. 2013. 
---. “Special Relationships and the Problem of Political Obligations.” Social Theory and 
Practice 27.1 (2001): 19–40. Print. 
Joseph, Brian. “The Government Outsourced This Girl’s Safety to a Private Company. 
Nine Months Later She Was Dead.” Mother Jones 26 Feb. 2014. Web. 28 Feb. 2015. 
Kahn, David. Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II. Cambridge, MA: Da 
Capo Press, 2000. Print. 
Kang, Jay Caspian. “A Militarized Night in Ferguson.” The New Yorker 12 Aug. 2014. 
Web. 14 Aug. 2014. 
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. “Three Kinds of Social Kinds.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 87.1 (2013): 1–17. Web. 
Kim, Sungmoon. Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014. Print. 
Kraska, Peter B. “Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st Century Police.” 
Policing 1.4 (2007): 501–513. Web. 
Kutz, Christopher. “Acting Together.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61.1 (2000): 
1–31. Web. 
List, Christian, and Philip Pettit. Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate 
Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Vol. 1. N.p., 2004. Project Gutenberg. 
Web. 
MacCallum, Gerald C., Jr. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” The Philosophical Review 76.3 
(1967): 312–334. Web. 
MacGillis, Alec. “Those War-Ready Cops in Ferguson Are 9/11’s Awful Legacy—and 
Your Taxes Are Paying for It.” The New Republic 14 Aug. 2014. The New Republic. Web. 
14 Aug. 2014. 
Martinich, A.P. “A Solution to a Paradox of Promising.” Philosophia 15.1-2 (1985): 117–
122. Web. 
May, Larry. “Collective Inaction and Responsibility.” Individual and Collective Responsibility. 
Ed. Peter A French. Rochester, VT: Schenkenman Book, 1998. 211–231. Print. 
Milgram, Stanley. “Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority.” 
Human Relations 18.1 (1965): 57–76. Web. 
 166 
Miller, David. “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice.” Debating Deliberative 
Democracy. Ed. James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. 182–
199. Print. 
Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. N.p., 2004. Project Gutenberg. 
Web. 28 Jan. 2013. 
Moody-Adams, Michele M. “Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance.” Ethics 
104.2 (1994): 291–309. Print. 
Mooney, Chris. “Here Are the Psychological Reasons Why an American Might Join 
ISIS.” Mother Jones 29 Aug. 2014. Web. 31 Aug. 2014. 
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974. Print. 
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Print. 
Parkinson, John. Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. 
Park, Joseph H. “England’s Controversy over the Secret Ballot.” Political Science Quarterly 
46.1 (1931): 51. Web. 
Pettit, Philip. On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Print. 
Phonesavanh, Alecia. “A SWAT Team Blew a Hole in My 2-Year-Old Son (UPDATE).” 
Salon 24 June 2014. Web. 20 Aug. 2014. 
Plato. Complete Works. Ed. John M Cooper and D. S Hutchinson. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1997. Print. 
Pogge, Thomas W. “Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?” Yale 
Human Rights & Development Law Journal 14.2 (2011): 1–33. Print. 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Print. 
---. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001. Print. 
---. Political Liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005. Print. 
Riker, William H. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy 
and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1988. Print. 
Roller, Emma. “How Congress Helped Create Ferguson’s Militarized Police.” National 
Journal 14 Aug. 2014. Web. 23 Apr. 2015. 
Rosen, Gideon. “Culpability and Ignorance.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103.1 
(2002): 61–84. Print. 
Roth, Abraham Sesshu. “Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.” The 
Philosophical Review 113.3 (2004): 359–410. Print. 
Rovane, Carol Anne. The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. Print. 
 167 
Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 2 edition. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. Print. 
Satterthwaite, Mark Allen. “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and 
Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” 
Journal of Economic Theory 10.2 (1975): 187–217. Web. 
Scanlon, Thomas. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2000. Print. 
Schawbel, Dan. “How Recruiters Use Social Networks to Make Hiring Decisions Now.” 
Time 9 July 2012. Web. 22 July 2014. 
Searle, John. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. 
---. Rationality in Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Print. 
---. The Construction of Social Reality. New York, NY: Free Press, 1995. Print. 
Shapiro, Ian. “Optimal Deliberation?” Debating Deliberative Democracy. Ed. James S. Fishkin 
and Peter Laslett. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. 121–137. Print. 
Shoemaker, Sydney. “Personal Identity and Memory.” Journal of Philosophy 56 (1959): 
868–902. Print. 
Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1979. Print. 
Slote, Michael. “Is Virtue Possible?” Analysis 42.2 (1982): 70–76. Web. 
Smith, Michael. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Print. 
Sosa, David. “T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1998)  A Big, Good Thing.” Noûs 38.2 (2004): 359–377. Web. 
Stanley, Jason. Knowledge and Practical Interests. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2005. Web. 
Strawson, P. F. Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. Print. 
Sunstein, Cass. “The Law of Group Polarization.” Debating Deliberative Democracy. Ed. 
James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003. 80–101. Print. 
The Federalist Papers. N.p., 1992. Project Gutenberg. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. 
Therolf, Garrett. “Private Foster Care System, Intended to Save Children, Endangers 
Some.” Los Angeles Times 18 Dec. 2013. Web. 28 Feb. 2015. 
Tuomela, Raimo. The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. Print. 
United States Federal Aviation Administration. “Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners.” 
2006. Web. 28 Oct. 2014. 
Waldron, Jeremy. “Special Ties and Natural Duties.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22.1 
(1993): 3–30. Print. 
 168 
Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981. Print. 
Wolff, Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998. Print. 
Zimmerman, Michael J. “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance.” Ethics 107.3 (1997): 410–
426. Print. 
 
